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Abstract  
Introduction: In recent decades, there has been considerable international attention 
directed towards minimising healthcare-associated harm and improving the safety of 
hospital care. More recently, this attention has broadened to include primary medical 
care. In 2002, the World Health Assembly recognised the issue of inadequate levels of 
patient safety as a major threat to global public health. In the following years, many 
countries have developed national strategies for the measurement, monitoring and 
prevention of patient safety incidents (PSIs) and their outcomes. Experience 
accumulated from secondary care has shown that the initial steps for understanding 
patient safety include the systematic identification of the most frequent and most 
harmful threats. However, the safety profile of primary care dentistry remains poorly 
investigated. As a result, current evidence cannot provide reliable estimates of the 
types of PSIs in primary care dentistry, the causes of these incidents, or the associated 
disease burden caused by such incidents.  
In medicine, improvements in patient safety were achieved at a national level by 
developing a shared conceptual understanding, the standardisation of terminology and 
through preventive initiatives such as the introduction of a national incident reporting 
and learning system. In the United Kingdom (UK), the England and Wales’ National 
Reporting Learning System (NRLS) has been an important source of insight, from the 
perspectives of the reporter, into understanding why PSIs occur. This initiat ive has led 
to the implementation of patient safety oriented policies to monitor and reduce cases 
of healthcare-associated harm. Examples of such policy initiatives include national 
guidelines and national safety recommendations to encourage the reporting of serious 
reportable events called ‘never events’ (NEs). These are defined as serious, 
preventable PSIs that should not occur if the available preventive measures are 
implemented. At a national level, serious incidents and NEs must be reported to the 
NRLS and/or other reporting systems. However, little is known about NEs in dentistry 
as wrong-tooth extractions are the only currently defined NE that has a clear 
application in dentistry. Although surgical NEs, such as wrong-site surgery and wrong 
implants may be related to dental procedures, these overlap with procedures conducted 
in secondary care. As a result, there is no agreed list of NEs for primary care dentistry. 
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The overall aim of my PhD was to explore patient safety, its concepts, including error 
and harm, and how these can help to create an understanding of the types of PSIs that 
occur in primary care dentistry, their contributory factors and their consequences. In 
addition, I also aimed to identify NEs with the greatest need and opportunity for future 
intervention strategies, in order to improve patient safety in primary care dentistry. 
Methodology and methods: My PhD was conducted in three phases. For the first 
phase, I conducted a systematic scoping review of the empirical evidence published 
over a 20-year period (1994-2014). To achieve this, I searched MEDLINE and 
EMBASE for articles reporting incidents that could have or did result in unnecessary 
harm from primary dental care. I also extracted and synthesised data on the types and 
frequencies of PSIs (including NEs) and adverse outcomes. Then, for the second 
phase, I undertook an exploratory sequential mixed-methods evaluation, which 
involved the qualitative exploration and analysis of a weighted-by-year randomised 
sample (n=2,000) of the most severe incident reports from primary care dentistry 
submitted to the England and Wales’ NRLS. This approach generated three coding 
frameworks, aligned to the International Classification for Patient Safety developed by 
the World Health Organization, for i) the classification of incidents, ii) contributory 
factors and iii) incident outcomes. These coding frameworks informed the quantitat ive 
analysis, during which myself together with a trained second coder, applied codes to 
deconstruct the narrative of these patient safety incident reports whilst retaining the 
meaning of the report. To assess inter-rater reliability, Cohen’s Kappa statistic was 
calculated for the primary incident type which was defined as “the incident that 
resulted in the outcome experienced by the patient.” Finally, for the third phase, I 
undertook an electronic Delphi exercise to achieve international agreement on NEs for 
primary care dentistry. The results obtained from Phases 1 and 2 were used to identify 
candidate NEs. I then invited an international panel of 41 experts to complete two 
rounds of questionnaires; 32 (78%) agreed to participate and completed the first round, 
and 29 (91%) completed the second round. I provided anonymised controlled feedback 
between rounds and used a cut-off of 80% agreement to define consensus. The results 
from the first stage built the evidence base for the second and third phases. Likewise, 
the results from the second phase further informed the third and final stage of my PhD.  
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Results: I undertook a systematic scoping review which demonstrated: a) there were 
considerable differences in definitions for terms used to describe patient safety, b) that 
a range of populations had been studied, and c) that major differences in sampling 
strategies exist between studies. The main five PSIs I identified were errors in i) 
diagnosis/examination, ii) treatment planning, iii) communication, iv) procedural 
errors and v) the accidental ingestion or inhalation of foreign objects. However, little 
attention has been paid to wider organisational factors such as problems within the 
physical environment, scheduling (e.g. errors in managing appointments) and patient 
access, management and lines of responsibility. Also there is very little evidence of 
interest in researching into the influence of policies for either quality or patient safety 
assurance. The retrieved evidence was used to build a conceptual literature-der ived 
model of patient safety risks in primary care dentistry. This model helped to bring 
structure to the analysis of the 1,456 patient incident reports that were eligible for 
analysis out of a total of 2,000. These reports described incidents across the pre-
operative (40.3%; n=587), intra-operative (56.1%; n=817) and post-operative (3.6%; 
n=52) clinical stages of care delivery. Further analysis showed the more frequently 
reported incidents were related to a) delays in treatment (333/1,456; 22.9%), b) 
procedural errors (220/11,456; 15.1%), c) medication-related adverse incidents 
(160/1,456; 11.0%), d) equipment failure (90/1,456; 6.2%) and e) errors in obtaining 
or processing x-rays (87/1,1456; 6.0%). Only 5.3% (77/1,456) of the incidents resulted 
in harmful outcomes. Of the 77 incidents that resulted in a harmful outcomes (n=77; 
5.3%), around half were due to wrong tooth extractions (37/77; 48.1%) and resulted in 
unnecessary procedures. Three out of the 1,456 incidents (0.2%) resulted in death. 
Data from the scoping review and the mixed-method analysis informed a list of 42 
candidate NEs. I further sought and achieved international consensus for 23 of these 
NEs. These were related to routine assessment, and pre-operative, intra-operative and 
post-operative stages of dental procedures. 
Conclusions: The findings from my PhD have revealed that patient safety research in 
dentistry is mostly descriptive and poorly organised with various approaches to 
defining and measuring PSIs and their outcomes. This poor organisation of patient 
safety research also includes differing study designs and patient populations studied. 
The evidence-based conceptual framework from the systematic scoping review, and 
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coding frameworks from analysis of PSI reports selected from a national database, can 
bring structure to future work by providing a robust approach to classifying PSIs, their 
contributory factors and outcomes. My research findings also show that PSI reports 
are an important source of information that can generate important insights about 
patient safety in primary care dentistry. The mixed-method analysis of PSI reports 
showed that most incidents in primary dental care do not result in harm. PSIs that 
resulted in harmful outcomes more frequently occurred intra-operatively. My findings 
also reveal that unsafe care in dentistry is not limited to human error, but can also be 
ascribed to the presence of other administrative or organisational flaws that contribute 
to the reported incidents. Future initiatives to improve and research clinical practice 
should focus on improving administrative processes to reduce delays in treatment. 
Also, the reduction of procedural errors through the standardisation of x-rays, 
medication prescription and other clinical procedures is needed. Lastly, I have 
constructed the first comprehensive international list of NEs for primary care dentistry. 
I believe my findings, including the list of NEs, can provide an evidence-base which 
will encourage researchers to further expand the patient safety research and 
development agenda in dentistry, as well as encouraging decision-makers and 
professional bodies to translate my findings into quality improvement strategies.
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Lay summary  
In recent decades, there has been a lot of international attention aimed at improving 
the safety of hospital care, and more recently this attention has broadened to include 
primary medical care. In 2002, the World Health Assembly recognised the issue of 
inadequate patient safety as a major threat to global public health. A patient safety 
incident has been defined by the World Health Organization as “an event or 
circumstance that could have resulted, or did result, in unnecessary harm to a 
patient”. Experiences gathered from many hospitals show that an initial key step for 
understanding patient safety is to gain an understanding of which incidents are the 
most frequent and harmful. However, despite the progress made in patient safety over 
the last 20 years in medicine, concerns have been raised about the limited 
understanding of healthcare-associated harm in the field of dentistry. 
The overall aim of my thesis was to: explore and understand the types of error that 
have been reported from primary care dentistry, the reasons why they occurred, and 
their outcomes; and, identify a list of potentially serious preventable incidents that 
should not occur (so called ‘never events’). 
To achieve this aim, I read the scientific literature and studied 2,000 patient safety 
incident reports submitted to the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS). I 
used the literature review and the incident report analysis to draw up a provisional list 
of never events. The NRLS is a patient safety incident reporting system that was 
established to receive detailed reports describing incidents involving patients receiving 
National Health Service (NHS) funded care in England and Wales. Since 2003, this 
system has collected over 15 million reports with written descriptions of what 
happened, and why, from the perspectives of the individuals who wrote them. Around 
270,000 of those reports are from primary care practices. The resulting provisional list 
of ‘never events’, after reviewing the literature and analysing patient safety incident 
reports, was then used to look for agreements between experts. To achieve this task, I 
contacted experts around the world and asked them whether they agreed on my list of 
‘never events’.  
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Studying the incident reports revealed that the main reported sources of unsafe care 
were related to delays in receiving treatment, procedural errors, medication-related 
adverse incidents, equipment failure, errors in obtaining or processing dental x-rays 
and wrong tooth extractions. Only a small percentage (5.3%) of the reported incidents 
resulted in harmful outcomes. The experts I contacted agreed on 23 never events 
related to events that happen before, during and after dental procedures.  
My thesis has shown that the literature for the past 20 years is poorly organised, as 
reflected in the different research approaches used to study patient safety incidents and 
their outcomes. This thesis also shows that incident reporting systems, like the NRLS, 
are a valuable source of learning; my findings reveal that most patient safety incidents 
in primary dental care do not result in harm. However, those that do result in harm 
commonly occur during dental care delivery (intra-operatively). My findings also 
reveal that unsafe care in dentistry is not limited to human error, but to the presence of 
other administrative or organisational flaws that contribute to the reported incidents. 
Examples of these latter flaws include errors in managing appointments, insuffic ient 
staff members and communication errors between dental practices. Lastly, I have 
constructed the first comprehensive international list of NEs for primary care dentistry. 
I believe my findings, including the list of NEs, can help decision-makers and 
professional bodies to develop improvements in primary care dentistry. 
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Introduction  1 
Chapter 1 . Introduction 
Patient safety incidents (PSIs) occur in all healthcare settings worldwide. 1-4 Since 
2002, as issued in resolution 55.18, the World Health Assembly (WHA) has 
recognised PSIs in healthcare as a significant public health concern.5 The resulting 
harm from unsafe healthcare, as seen in PSIs, is estimated to occur in one in every 10 
encounters in hospitals, 2, 6-9 and in 2.0–3.0% of encounters in primary care.10 Over the 
past 20 years, seminal publications in Australia,11-13 the United States (US)14-16 and the 
United Kingdom (UK),17, 18 have encouraged healthcare organisations, researchers and 
policy makers around the world to focus attention on patient safety.  
Currently, standard definitions of patient safety19, 20 are available for medicine (Table 
1.1), and the accumulated evidence about the extent of harm and underlying causes is 
in some cases beginning to be translated into interventions designed to reduce harm.21  
A global response towards patient safety in primary care began in 2012 when the 
World Health Organization’s (WHO) Patient Safety Programme formed the Safer 
Primary Care Expert Working Group thereby acknowledging the importance of the 
issue of unsafe primary care, as well as encouraging the need for the identification of 
priority areas and key knowledge gaps.3 Global research priorities for iatrogenic harm 
in this area were identified and reported.22 However, this field remains in its infancy 
23, 24 and this is particularly true for dentistry.25-28 
Table 1.1 Patient safety concepts developed in medicine 
Concept Definition 
Adverse event An injury that was caused by medical management or complication 
instead of the underlying disease and that resulted in prolonged 
hospitalisation or disability at the time of discharge from medical care 
or both.29  
Clinical error The failure to carry out a planned action as intended or the application 
of an incorrect plan.30 
Harm Impairment of structure or function of the body and/or any deleterious 
effect arising there from. Harm includes disease, injury, suffering and 
death29  
Patient safety The reduction of risk of unnecessary harm associated with healthcare 
to an acceptable minimum.29  
Patient safety incident An event or circumstance that could have resulted, or did result, in 
unnecessary harm to a patient.29  
Never events Serious, largely preventable patient safety incidents that should not 
occur if the available preventative measures have been implemented.19 
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Based on the Alma Ata Declaration,31 the WHO defines primary healthcare as: 
“…essential healthcare based on practical, scientifically sound and socially 
acceptable methods and technology, made universally available to individuals and 
families in the community through their full participation and at a cost that the 
community and the country can afford to maintain at every stage of their development 
in the spirit of self-reliance and self-determination.” 31 
This introductory chapter provides a description of the relevant empirical evidence to 
contextualise my PhD degree. Initially, I explored existing terms and concepts, then I 
considered current frameworks and approaches to classify PSIs. After that I took a step 
back to consider the beginnings of the science of patient safety research, including the 
creation of institutions that specialised in preventive initiatives at a national and 
international level. Lastly, I focused on the current patient safety research gaps in 
primary care and summarised the progress made in the field of dentistry. This chapter 
also introduces definitions for the main terms I used throughout the thesis, which are 
summarised in Appendix 1.The goal of this chapter is to provide an overview of the 
conceptual framework I followed for understanding patient safety in primary care 
dentistry. 
1.1 Terms and concepts in patient safety 
The measurement of PSIs and their potential harm is a fundamental step for healthcare 
quality and patient safety improvement.16, 32 The use of a standardised termino logy 
provides a structured approach to organise PSI data so as to identify incidents and 
enable their categorisation. This approach can be used for standardised research 
methodologies, policy making and monitoring interventions designed for the reduction 
or prevention of PSIs.29 However, the concepts of patient safety, error and adverse 
event (AE) are interrelated33 and bring challenges for their measurement and 
interpretation. As shown in Figure 1.1, there is a variety of overlapping and interrelated 
concepts and terms used to describe PSIs in medicine. The overlap of PSIs resulting 
in errors, preventable and non-preventable AEs, and concepts related to malpractice 
and litigation has raised methodological issues for research studies attempting to 
compare outcomes of patient safety.9, 32, 34 Current approaches for measuring PSIs, 
include a classification approach to describe contributory factors to incidents and 
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outcomes through risk and safety frameworks30, 35-40 and bespoke patient safety 
taxonomies.41-44 However, there is no agreement on a standardised measurement to 
collect PSI data and monitor/assess interventions to reduce PSIs and their outcomes,3 8  
as most classification systems have been developed within their respective databases 
from different sources of information.45 
 
In the next section, I provide an overview of patient safety as a concept and consider 
its relationship with quality. Then I explore the concept of error and its typology, 
followed by a discussion of the frameworks used in medicine for patient safety 
research. 
1.1.1 Patient safety is a dimension of quality 
The Institute of Medicine (IOM), now renamed as the National Academy of Medicine 
(NAM), has defined quality as “the degree to which health services for individuals and 
populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with 
current professional knowledge.”32 In this context, quality and patient safety are not 
mutually exclusive as patient safety is a feature of quality within a healthcare system 
that aims to deliver services under the six dimensions of quality (Table 1.2).32 Further, 
the IOM defines the aims of high quality healthcare services as being safe, effective, 
patient-centred, timely and efficient.32 Therefore, improvement of patient safety is also 
linked to an improvement of quality that targets the measurable organisationa l 
Figure 1.1 Overlap of terms commonly found in medical literature 
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structure of healthcare delivery systems and their processes.46, 47 In this context, the 
IOM proposed that any measurable improvements need to be compared against 
standards of care in line with the six dimensions of healthcare delivery, shown in Table 
1.2, including patient safety. 
Table 1.2 The six proposed dimensions by the IOM for healthcare improvement32 
Domain Definition 
Safe Avoiding injuries to patients from the care that is intended to help them 
Effective 
Providing services based on scientific knowledge to all who could 
benefit and refraining from providing services to those not likely to 
benefit (avoiding underuse and overuse, respectively). 
Patient-centred 
Providing care that is respectful of and responsive to individual patient 
preferences, needs, and values and ensuring that patient values guide all 
clinical decisions. 
Timely 
Reducing waits and sometimes harmful delays for both those who 
receive and those who give care 
Efficient 
Avoiding waste, including waste of equipment, supplies, ideas, and 
energy. 
Equitable 
Providing care that does not vary in quality because of personal 
characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, geographic location, and 
socioeconomic status. 
Reprinted with permission from Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 
21st Century, 2001 by the National Academy of Sciences, Courtesy of the National Academies 
Press, Washington, D.C (approval for reproduction shown in Appendix 2) 
 
Batalden and Davidoff (2007) defined quality improvement as “the combined and 
unceasing effots of everyone – healthcare professionals, patients and their families, 
researches, payers, planners and educators - to make the changes that will lead to 
better patient outcomes (health), better system performance (care) and better 
professional development (learning)”.48 However, the increased attention towards the 
prevention of PSIs and their outcomes has required support from other fields, such as 
anthropology, sociology, psychology, engineering, human factors science, and 
medical science. As the field of patient safety has been increasing, patient safety itself 
is becoming an academic discipline to support the training and education of healthcare 
professionals.49 
As issued in Resolution 55.18, the WHA urged the WHO to develop standards and 
guidelines for the concepts and terms of quality care and patient safety for their 
measurement and reporting.5 Then, seven years after this Resolution, the Conceptual 
Framework for the International Classification for Patient Safety (ICPS) was published 
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by the World Alliance for Patient Safety (WAPS).29 In this document, patient safety is 
defined as “the reduction of risk of unnecessary harm associated with healthcare to 
an acceptable minimum…”.29 Based on this Framework, a PSI was defined as an event 
or circumstance that could have resulted, or did result, in unnecessary harm to a 
patient(s).38 Unnecessary harm, often referred as an adverse event (AE), is defined by 
the WHO as “an injury that was caused by medical management or complication 
instead of the underlying disease and that resulted in prolonged hospitalisation or 
disability at the time of discharge from medical care, or both”. 29 AEs can be classified 
as preventable and non-preventable. The former are of research interest for the 
development of evidence-based strategies for diminishing their impact. An AE is 
regarded as preventable whenever the event is perceived as potentially avoidable if the 
patient had received ordinary standards of care appropriate for the time.29 
1.1.2 Measurement of error and harm 
In 1998 in the US, reports from the IOM,50 the Advisory Commission on Consumer 
Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry51 and the Research and 
Development Corporation52 (RAND) documented quality issues relating to the over-
utilisation of healthcare services, their under-utilisation and their misuse. These 
analyses suggested that healthcare errors can occur through human action 
(commission) or inaction (omission) as a consequence of cognitive failure.41 However, 
PSIs and AEs are not limited to individual performance.42, 53 According to reports from 
the IOM, the majority of medical errors is due to multiple failures that contribute to a 
single AE.16, 32, 54 These failures related to faulty systems and processes during 
healthcare delivery, such as referral errors, flaws in appointments management, lack 
of patient follow-up, inadequate expertise or training of staff members and inadequate 
systems for information transfer between healthcare settings.32 
Apart from the ICPS,29 other frameworks for study design and interpretation in patient 
safety research have been developed.36-40 The Organisational Accident Model 
developed by Vincent et al. (1998) for analysing risk and safety in clinical medicine, 3 5  
and the Swiss Cheese Model of System Accidents developed by Reason,30 differentiate 
errors made by people (active errors) from errors within the organisational structure of 
healthcare delivery (latent errors). Also, known as the ‘human and systems approach’, 
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the first seeks to identify and explain errors (unintentional errors) and procedural 
violations (intentional deviation of standard care) committed by the healthcare 
personnel, due to their mental/cognitive processes. The Swiss Cheese Model of System 
Accidents, however, acknowledges that human errors are common30 and aims to 
identify latent flaws within the organisational structure of healthcare settings and the 
processes for delivery of care. These approaches have been further integrated into 
other frameworks such as the Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework of PSIs in 
hospital settings.55 These models are described more fully below.  
1.1.3 Human error in healthcare 
Before I explore the person approach to error, it is important to establish the distinct ion 
between clinical error and mistake. Clinical error, or error of planning,54 is defined as 
“the failure of applying a correct and standardised action during the process of 
care”.33, 38, 41 Mistakes, or errors of execution,54 occur when the actions proceed as 
planned, but the plan itself is inadequate to achieve its intended aim.29, 41 Failure in 
human performance has been classified as skill-based error and rule-based and 
knowledge-based mistakes.41, 56 In general, skill-based errors refer to flaws in 
attention, perception or memory for solving routine and / or complex tasks.30, 41 Within 
skill-based errors, two types errors arise: slips and lapses (Table 1,3).  
Slips are any observable, external failure in the physical execution of a plan, they 
generally occur as a result from deficits in attention or perception.42 Lapses, however, 
occur simply by forgetting a step of a procedure, and can include errors of omission 
whenever there is a tendency to omit the final step(s) when the main aim of the 
treatment has been achieved.56 Also needing to be taken into consideration is that both 
slips and lapses can also take place when there is over-attention during a procedure.56  
Ruled-based mistakes occur when incorrect or incomplete knowledge is applied.41, 56 
Also, such mistakes can take place when an appropriate rule is applied without 
recognising a relative or absolute contra-indication, or when a correctly executed 
procedure is incorrectly chosen based, and then applied, based on past experiences, 
training, or a fundamental misunderstanding of the problem is applied. 41, 56 
Knowledge-based mistakes occur when a problem is addressed, but the stored 
knowledge is inadequate to solve it.41 In such a situation preconceptions, past 
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experiences and others opinions are likely to be used to solve the problem.56 However, 
error and harm are not always linked,57 patients can be injured in the absence of error, 
and errors may not lead to harm.56 Errors are much more common than AEs, because 
many errors, even if carried through to the patient, will not turn out to be harmful. 3 3  
This may be because: (a) luck is involved, (b) the error is not clinically significant 
enough to cause harm, (c) the error is caught before causing harm or (d) other 
mitigating factors may have prevented any potential harm.57  
Table 1.3 Human failure types 
Nature of failure  Failure type Feature 
Not intentional 







Action-based error; frequent correct actions did 




Memory-based error; frequent correct actions 
did not proceed as planned due to short-term 
memory lapse. This resulting in the omission to 
perform a required action 
Mistakes 
Rule-based 
Decision-making flaws; actions are based on 
remembered rules and procedures. The mistake 
occurs due to misapplication of a good rule or 
application of a bad rule 
Knowledge-
based 
Wrong action which is believed to be right;  
healthcare professionals rely on their available 
knowledge and experience, however, they may 
not have the appropriate knowledge nor 





Routine Non-compliance becomes the “norm” 
Situational  
Non-compliance dictated by situation specific 
factors (e.g. time pressure, work load, lack of 
equipment); non-compliance may be the only 
solution to an impossible task 
Exceptional 
Person attempts to solve a problem in highly 
unusual circumstances  
 
Incidents which did not reach the patient are referred as ‘near misses’, whereas a ‘no 
harm incident’ is one in which an event reached a patient but no discernible harm 
resulted.20 Both no harm incidents and near misses are considered during the init ia l 
steps for patient safety management since high detection rates are needed for the 
identification of unintended risk and hazards.58 Retrospective analysis of medical 
records is a common method for studying past AEs, whereas prospective approaches 
aim to identify potential hazards by analysing the process of care.59 For instance, 
reporting systems can support identifying harm incidents, no-harm incidents and near 
misses occurring within a healthcare delivery system.60 Addressing the causes of near 
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misses can reduce the risk of actual episodes of patient harm. Therefore, strategies can 
be developed in order to prevent future potentially harmful events. 
1.1.3.1 Violation, malpractice and negligence 
The terms “violation”, “malpractice” and “negligence” are commonly used in the 
literature. A violation is defined as a deliberate deviation from an operating procedure, 
standard or rule.44 Violations often occur in poorly designed health systems to shorten 
processes and to save time; overtime these violations can become part of tolerated 
routines (see Table 1.4).61 Also, an unnecessary procedure on a patient is a form of 
iatrogenic harm, and therefore the decision to undertake it must either be an error or a 
violation.62 Although violations may predispose to the making of errors, only extreme 
deviation from the expected standard, or those that involved serious events, are 
reported.63 However, some violations do not necessarily imply a disregard for safety. 
Situational violations can occur when circumstances arise in which a procedueal 
violation is unavoidable or when it is appropriate to break a rule, because doing so is 
thought to create less risk than the following rule (see Table 1.4).44 When investiga t ing 
errors, associated violations are relevant to evaluating the degree of moral blame.62  
Malpractice and negligence are also  terms that overlap and it is common to find they 
are used interchangeably. According to Studert et al. (2004) the social goals of 
malpractice litigations are to prevent unsafe medical practices, compensation of harm 
through medical negligence and to obtain corrective justice.64 Such litigation usually 
involves the healthcare professional or healthcare system covering associated costs 
and medical bills arising from failure to meet the required standard of care. In this 
context, negligence referes to the failure to provide a standard level of care.65 In the 
UK, the NHS Litigation Authority defines clinical negligence as “a breach of duty of 
care by members of the health care professions employed by NHS bodies or by others 
consequent on decisions or judgements made by members of those professions acting 
in their professional capacity in the course of their employment, and which are 
admitted as negligent by the employer or are determined as such through the legal 
process”.66 Within this definition, a breach of duty of care refers to an incident causing 
harm, damage or loss as the result of failing to provide the standard of care, whether 
by commission or omission, advice given or failure to advise.36, 64, 66 If, however, the 
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patient has not suffered any damage in terms of pain, loss of function or need for 
additional treatment, no harm has been caused by the negligent act.67 However, most 
medical injuries are not caused by negligence.30 
Errors should not be considered as equivalent to negligence. Errors are circumstantia l, 
whereas negligence occurs due to true incompetence in medical practice and is 
generally perceived as ‘failure to meet the expected standard of care’.41 Traditiona lly, 
the standard of care usually refers to the expected behaviour of other healthcare 
professionals to deliver healthcare under similar circumstances and, if availab le, 
clinical practice guidelines.64 Harm due to negligent, reckless, or criminal activity is 
not considered a healthcare associated harm.56  
1.1.4 System approach to error and harm in healthcare 
The system approach to error seeks to understand the conditions in which people 
work30 and Reason´s Swiss Cheese Model of System Accidents has been the most 
referenced system-based model for patient safety research.60 Illustrative examples of 
this model adapted for primary dental care are shown in Figure 1.2. 
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Adverse 
outcomes 
Individual factors Dental team factors Equipment and supplies Administration of dental 
practices 
Latent/system factors Human factors 
A. Poor management of 
appointments resulting 
in a busy dental clinic 





B. Poor management of 
appointments resulting 
in a busy dental clinic 
practice with long 
waiting times. The 
referral letter for tooth 
extraction is poorly hand 
written.  
A. Poor equipment 
maintenance. The 
high-speed hand piece 
is faulty as the engine 
is loose and might fall 
during the procedure 
 
 
B. The dental chair 
unit is faulty and 
provides intermittent   
and suboptimal 
illumination.  
A. Trained staff realise 
that the hand piece is 
faulty. Therefore, 
he/she informs the 
dentist and replaces 
the hand piece with a 
non-faulty one. 
 
B. Insufficient staff 
members. The dentist 
needs to prepare all 
the material and 
equipment for all the 
patients. 







B. The dentist is 
stressed due to the 
accumulating patients 
waiting to be treated. 
He/she forgets to 
double check the 
patient referral letter. 











Figure 1.2 Two examples illustrating the use of Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model of System Accidents to study the impact of errors in 
primary dental care 
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From this analysis, errors are shown to be a consequence of failures in the workplace 
and organisational processes at distinct levels within the healthcare system, which may 
include engineering, procedural, administrative as well as the absence of ineffic ient 
defensive barriers that rely on healthcare staff to intervene.30 For example, failure of 
appropriate referrals, diagnostic errors, drug prescribing errors, communica t ion 
problems (informal and within hierarchical structures), errors within organisationa l 
systems and technological failures have been reported as areas of concern.21 Therefore, 
current patient safety research focuses mainly on health system features as well as 
latent risks and other factors, which that may influence the occurrence of AEs.20 
1.1.5 The Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework 
PSIs and their AEs can be prevented through the identification of their contributory 
factors and the development of strategies for their prevention. According to the ICPS, 
a contributory factor is defined as “a circumstance, action or influence (such as poor 
rostering or task allocation) which is thought to have played a part in the origin or 
development of an incident, or to increase the risk of an incident .”29 Therefore, both 
PSIs and their outcomes are due to a series of organisational and/or human factors.16,  
32, 54 In the absence of an evidence-based list of contributory factors for their 
measurement and reporting in patient safety, the Humber Academic Health Science 
Network (AHSN) Improvement Academy developed the Yorkshire Contributory 
Factors Framework (see Figure 1.3).55 This framework integrates evidence generated 
from secondary care into the person and system approaches to dealing with the issue 
of error in healthcare.55 This framework proposes a list of contributory factors within 
a chronological order of organisational contributory factors (latent errors) and places 
active errors at the end of the chain of events. The authors also further developed the 
framework and, based on their systematic review55 of the literature, identified 
contributory factors, in the form of latent errors from the system approach to error,30, 
60 which were broadly classified as situational factors, local working conditions, 
organisational factors and external factors. 
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Figure 1.3 Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework 
 
(Permission for reproduction of this image is shown in Appendix 3) 
1.2 Two decades of progress in secondary care 
The accumulated evidence generated from secondary care over the past two decades 
is in some cases being translated into patient safety interventions for the prevention of 
unsafe healthcare delivery.21 A full description of the historical development of patient 
safety worldwide is therefore beyond the scope of this thesis. The following section 
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will describe important milestones achieved firstly in the US, secondly, the UK and 
thirdly, relating to the overall international response to patient safety. Then, in the 
following section I will discuss the historical development of patient safety in primary 
care medicine and primary care dentistry. 
1.2.1 United States 
Initial publications can be tracked to the work from Ivan Illich published in 1975.68, 69 
In his work, Illich argued about the negative impact of modern medicine on society 
due to ineffective and unsafe medical care (clinical iatrogenesis), medicalisation of life 
(social iatrogenesis) and the destruction of traditional approaches to deal with sickness 
and death (cultural iatrogenesis).69 Later, the Medical Insurance Feasibility Study70  
(1977) reported 4.6% of cases of disability were due to healthcare mismanagement in 
hospitals in California. Fourteen years later, Brennan et al. (1991) published the 
Harvard Malpractice Study14 which reported incidence rates of 3.7 for AEs and 1.0 for 
negligent AEs per every 100 hospitalisations in New York. They also reported that 
58.0% of the reported AEs were preventable.14 Later studies by Thomas et al. (1999, 
2000) in hospitals from Colorado and Utah71, 72 employed a similar methodology to 
that used by the Harvard Malpractice Study and estimated an incidence rate of 2.9 of 
AEs for every 100 hospitalisations.72 The Utah study reported surgical complications, 
adverse drug events and delayed/incorrect diagnosis and / or treatment as the most 
expensive types of AEs.71  
In 1998, the IOM50 highlighted evidence from the Advisory Commission on Consumer 
Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry51 and RAND Corporation52 and 
raised awareness about the over-utilisation and under-utilisation of healthcare services 
as well as practice-related errors. From here, the IOM released the report To err is 
human to bring national attention to patient safety in the US.16 In this report, the 
findings from the studies conducted in Colorado and Utah71, 72 and the findings from 
the Harvard Malpractice Study14 were used to estimate the burden of medical errors in 
hospitals across the US. The report estimated between 40,000 to 98,000 annual deaths 
were due to medical error, and that over 1 million patients were injured as a result of 
the same cause; they estimated an annual cost of preventable AEs between $17 billion 
and $29 billion.16 After this, the IOM followed by issuing recommendations for the 
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strategic redesign of the healthcare system.32 The recommendations included the 
development and implementation of a national reporting system. Formal nation-wide 
responses from the US started with the establishment of the Agency for Health Care 
Policy and Research in the US (1989) which was later renamed as the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).73 Other national bodies that were funded 
in response to patient safety concerns are the Joint Commission on the Accreditation 
of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) and the non-profit organisation known as the 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI). 
1.2.2 United Kingdom 
The focus on patient safety in the UK started in 1999 with the release of a consultat ion 
paper issued by the Department of Health.74 This document provided insights into the 
poor processes for the timely identification, prevention and management of poor 
clinical performance. The paper also highlighted the need for exploring potential 
contributory factors at an individual level, as well as within the healthcare system that 
might affect clinical performance. Then, in the same year, the NHS required group of 
experts to understand the extent of PSIs and their outcomes, and to propose approaches 
for their identification, collection and analysis. This challenge resulted in the report An 
Organisation with a Memory17 published in 2000 by the Department of Health. This 
document firstly provided an overview of the problem and, secondly, set out a plan for 
the development and implementation of a national and local system for the 
identification of PSIs and their outcomes. Due to the scarcity of reliable information, 
the group of experts commissioned by the England Department of Health extrapolated 
the findings from the Harvard Malpractice study14 and the Quality in Australian Health 
Care study11 and obtained broad estimates between 3,000 and 1.4 million of AEs that 
occurred in NHS hospitals were offered.17 Also, extrapolated from a small-scale pilot 
study conducted by Vincent et al.,18 the estimated annual cost of AEs to the NHS was 
around £2 billion.17 The report recommended the development of a unified national 
mechanism to report, analyse, monitor and learn from PSIs in the NHS.  
Another important report in 2001 was the public inquiry into children's heart surgery 
at the Bristol Royal Infirmary.75 The aim of this inquiry was to investigate the deaths 
of 29 babies who underwent heart surgery at Bristol Royal Infirmary between 1984 
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and 1995. In this report, poor performance and errors of the healthcare professiona ls 
were due to latent organisational errors within the healthcare system. Overall, these 
errors were related to the low priority given to vulnerable children, poor standards for 
quality care, a culture of secrecy for disclosing the performance of doctors and poor 
approaches to ensure patient safety. In the same year,  following the report An 
Organisation with a Memory,17 the Department of Health published the report 
Building a Safer NHS for Patients.76 This report proposed an integrated approach 
through the creation of the National Reporting Learning System (NRLS) and the 
establishment of the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) in England and Wales.  
Other formal national responses towards patient safety were the creation of the 
National Clinical Assessment Authority, whose functions were later transferred to the 
National Clinical Assessment Service (NCAS), and the Commission for Health 
Improvement which is now operated NHS Litigation Authority.77  
1.2.2.1 Policies and strategic developments for improving patient safety 
The field of patient safety has now moved on from developing standard definitions, 
and describing the extent of harm to the underlying causes and, more recently, 
interventions designed to reduce harm.23 However, as a dimension of quality, patient 
safety in healthcare must be assured at a national or regional level through policies and 
strategic developments.47 In the UK, after the publication of An organisation with a 
memory,17 initiatives following this report included the establishment of the NPSA in 
England and Wales, the NCAS77 and the Commission for Health Improvement, now 
replaced by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) since 2009.78 However, through the 
years, their functions have been transferred to different regulatory bodies. In 2002, the 
roles of the NPSA were transferred to the NHS Commissioning Board Special Health 
Authority, which later was transferred to NHS England in 2013. From 2016, patient 
safety is being managed by NHS Improvement. A timeline of events, policies and 
strategic developments is shown in Table 1.4. 
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Table 1.4 Timeline of relevant events, policies and strategic developments towards the 
improvement of patient safety within the United Kingdom 
Year Action 
1999  Establishment of the Commission for Health 
1999  Establishment of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
2000  Publication of An Organisation with a Memory 
 Publication of Building a Safer NHS for Patients 
2001  Foundation of the National Patient Safety Agency for England and Wales 
2002  Roles of the NPSA transferred to the NHS Commissioning Board Special 
Authority 
2003  Establishment of the National Reporting Learning System 
2004  Launch of the Health Foundation’s Safer Patients Initiative 
2004  Publication of 7 Steps for Patient Safety 
2004  The Commission for Health is replaced by the Healthcare Commission 
2005  The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence merged with the 
Health Development Agency and changed its name to the National Institute 
for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
2005  Introduction of a dedicated patient safety improvement programme that 
precedes the Scottish National Patient Safety Programme 
2008  Patient Safety First campaign launched in England 
2008  Due to the international interest, UK’s NICE founded NICE International. 
They offer advice to governments and governmental agencies overseas on 
building capacity for assessing and interpreting evidence to inform health 
policy and on designing and using methods and processes to apply this 
capacity to their local country setting 
2009  Introduction of the National Framework for Reporting and Learning from 
Serious Incidents Requiring Investigation 
 Introduction of the Never Events Policy and Framework 
2009  The Healthcare Commission is replaced by the Care Quality Commission 
(independent regulator of health and adult social care in England) 
2009  The first healthcare system worldwide to introduce the mandatory use of the 
World Health Organisation’s Surgical Safety Checklist 
2012  Commissioning Board set up a taskforce to assess surgical never events and 
issue recommendation towards their eradication from NHS surgery 
2012  The General Medical Council released the guide Raising and acting on 
concerns about patient safety 
2013  Evidence Based Networks was founded to provide help improve healthcare 
through better use of evidence, best practice, information and 
communication 
2013  Roles of the Commissioning Board Special Authority are transferred to 
NHS England 
2013  The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence took on 
responsibility for developing evidence-based guidelines and 
recommendations for quality standard in England, also known as NICE 
guidelines. NICE guidance is also provided to Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. 
2013  The National Framework for Reporting and Learning from Serious 
Incidents Requiring Investigation is replaced by the Serious Incident 
Framework 
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Year Action 
2014  The national patient safety campaign “Sign up to Safety” is launched 
2014  Publication of the Surgical Never Events Taskforce report 
2014  Establishment of 15 Patient Safety Collaboratives led by England’s 
Academic Health Sciences Networks 
2015  Introduction of the Revised Serious Incident Framework 
 Introduction of the Revised Never Events Policy and Framework 
2015  Introduction of National Safety Standards for Invasive Procedures 
2016  Roles of NHS England are transferred to NHS Improvement 
 
Professional bodies in the UK have defined the standards for healthcare delivery 
through the development of healthcare guidelines, the establishment of patient safety 
competencies, standards for Information Technologies (IT) systems and 
implementation of quality-focused infrastructures.79 An example of these standards is 
the practice guidelines from the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(known as the NICE guidelines).80 Initially established in 1999 for England, NICE 
currently provides guidance to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland as well. Since 
2008, due to global interest, NICE International was founded.81 National Safety 
Standards for Invasive Procedures,82 are also available, as are the standards for medical 
competence across UK’s Royal Colleges. Patient safety standards for IT employed 
with clinical risk management systems developed by the Health and Social Care 
Information Centre,83 is now known as NHS Digital. 
The development and introduction of policies is another approach taken to address 
patient safety at a national level. Examples of these initiatives include the introduction, 
in 2009, of the National Framework for Reporting and Learning from Serious Incidents 
Requiring Investigation,84 and the Never Events Policy and Framework.85 Since then, 
these have been updated and renamed as the Revised Serious Incident Framework86  
and the Revised Never Events Policy Framework.87 Serious incidents are defined as 
“events in health care where the potential for learning is so great, or the consequences 
to patients, families and carers, staff or organisations are so significant, that they 
warrant using additional resources to mount a comprehensive response.”86 A subset 
of these incidents is comprised of NEs, being defined “as serious, largely preventable 
PSIs that should not occur if the available preventive measures are implemented”.19 
The supporting criteria for this definition in shown in Table 1.5. 
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Table 1.5 Never event criteria developed by the National Patient Safety Agency19 
 It is wholly preventable, where guidance or safety recommendations that provide strong 
systemic protective barriers are available at a national level, and should have been 
implemented by all healthcare providers (preventability) 
 It has the potential to cause serious patient harm or death. However, serious harm or 
death is not required to have happened as a result of a specific incident occurrence for 
that incident to be categorised as a never event (seriousness) 
 There is evidence of its occurrence in the past, and a risk of recurrence remains (past 
and future risk) 
 It is easily recognised and can be clearly defined (recognisable) 
 
This definition and corresponding criteria are also supported by a list of NEs for 
hospital settings developed in England by the NPSA in 2009 and further revised by 
the UK Department of Health in 2015.19 Due to their clear potential for severe harm,87,  
88 national guidance and national safety recommendations encourage the reporting of 
NEs.87, 88 In England, such policies enable Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCG) to 
recover healthcare costs when a procedure or treatment results in a NE.89  NEs are 
collected and monitored in patient safety incident reporting systems overseen by the 
NHS Improvement’s Patient Safety Domain.90 
1.2.2.2 Incident reporting systems 
According to the WHO, the fundamental role of incident reporting systems is “to 
enhance patient safety by learning from failures of the health care system”.91 To 
achieve this, policymakers need to retrieve evidence about performance and 
outcomes.47 Useful lessons can be obtained from PSIs, including near misses and NEs. 
Over the past 20 years, PSI reporting systems been developed and implemented in the 
USA,92 Canada,93 Australia94 and Europe.95 
Incident reporting systems may be compulsory or voluntary.38, 95 National-level data 
from these systems can allow the identification of patient safety priorities for 
intervention, unsuspected hazards or reports of the malfunction of devices or 
equipment used for healthcare delivery.38 In the UK, the NRLS for NHS practices in 
England and Wales was established.76 The NRLS is a voluntary, national reporting 
system created in 2003. However, all serious incidents (including NEs) are mandatory 
to report, and since 2010 it is also mandatory to report any incidents that resulted in 
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severe patient harm or death. The NRLS is one of the most comprehensive reporting 
systems in the world, having collected over 10 million incident reports since its 
creation.96, 97 It provides a clear focus on patient safety within the overall NHS quality 
programme through a systematic structure that enables the identification, recording, 
reporting and analysis of PSIs (including near misses) and their outcomes.  
1.2.2.3 Professional compliance with regulations 
To make the patient-safety-oriented regulations/policies work, healthcare 
professionals, organisations and professional teams are all expected to provide the 
highest possible standard of care while considering the needs of the patients and their 
communities.47 To achieve this aim, their performance can be regulated by either 
strengthening current healthcare regulatory bodies or developing new ones to deal with 
poor levels of clinical performance. Examples of these regulatory bodies within the 
UK are the Professionals’ Standards Authority98 which oversees independent 
regulatory agencies such as the General Medical Council (GMC)99 and the General 
Dental Council (GDC).100 These regulatory agencies, in their areas of interest, set the 
standards of competence and conduct that healthcare professionals must meet to obtain 
and maintain their registration and fitness to practise. Additional functions include 
reviewing the content and quality of education and training courses and conducting 
enquiries about complaints. For example, the GDC has the responsibility to assure the 
quality of education and training for all UK programmes100 in accordance with the 
GDC’s Standards for Education.101 These standards cover the areas of i) patient 
protection, ii) quality evaluation and review and iii) student assessment,  101 which any 
education or training programmes are required to meet in order to be accepted for 
registration. For established approved programmes, the GDC conducts periodical 
inspections, every five years, to ensure the Standards for Education101 are maintained. 
Other measures to tackle patient safety are the CQC78 and the NCAS to address the 
poor performance from doctors, dentists and pharmacists.102  
However, guidance is also needed and the guide The Seven Steps for Patient Safety 
developed by the former NPSA is an example of a checklist to guide healthcare 
professionals to plan their activities and measure their patient safety performance.1 0 3  
Also, clinical governance is the way in which local services can assure, and seek ways 
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to improve the quality of their services by putting in place the systems, networks and 
staff competencies necessary to do so (Table 1.6).104 Clinical governance is a 
systematic approach to maintaining and improving the quality of patient care within a 
health system; for example the NHS Trust. Another strategy learned from the human 
factors research undertaken in hospital-based studies is to reduce among the healthcare 
staff, their reliance on memory when they provide care.105 Apart from standardisat ion 
of procedures, development and compliance of protocols, the implementation of 
patient safety checklists has been developed106 to reduce flaws that may depend on 
memory, attention or perception from healthcare staff.105  
Table 1.6 Areas of improvement within the framework of clinical governance 
Areas of clinical governance 
Risk management 
Clinical audit 
Education, training and continuing professional development  
Evidence-based care and effectiveness  
Patient and carer experience and involvement 
Staffing and staff management 
 
1.2.2.4 Education and training 
The major sources of patient safety education in the UK and most developed countries 
have been developed by patient safety initiatives. In the UK, the Safer Patients 
Initiative was the first major improvement programme that addressed patient safety 
from 2004 to 2008. The report, Safer Patients Initiative: Lessons from the first major 
improvement programme addressing patient safety in the UK, provided an important 
source of organisational learning as it identified poor data management, poor 
reorganisation and executive change, and poor staff engagement as the main barriers 
to progress.107 Also, from 2008 to 2010, the Patient Safety First campaign focused on 
improving patient safety culture within the NHS108 providing educational tools for 
leadership building and intervention in patient safety,109 and the application of human 
factors in healthcare.110  The NHS Institute’s Leading Improvement in Patient Safety 
programme111  was also developed to support NHS Trusts to develop patient safety 
improvement strategies. Other national approaches in the UK were also developed and 
implemented. In Wales, between 2008 and 2009 the 1000 Lives Campaign was 
introduced, to be followed by the 1000 Lives Plus campaign. The latter campaign was 
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further expanded in order to introduce a national programme to improve the quality of 
healthcare in Wales. It is now known as 1000 Lives Improvement.112  
An example in Scotland to foster patient safety is the Scottish Patient Safety 
Programme, which was introduced in 2008, supported by NHS Scotland Quality 
Improvement, and it is considered the first Patient Safety Programme to be introduced 
anywhere in the world.113 More recently (March 2016), Health Education England, the 
regulatory body responsible for all the healthcare workforce, established the 
independent Commission on Education and Training for Patient Safety.114 The 
Commission issued recommendations for the education and training for patient safety 
within the NHS115 and is broadly concern with: 1) the creation of a culture of shared 
learning, 2) the patient at the centre of education and training,3) lifelong learning and 
4) delivering education and training for patient safety.115 In the report First, do no 
harm, the Medical Schools Council and the GMC show examples of the integration of 
patient safety within teaching initiatives across undergraduate medical programmes in 
the UK.116 These examples range from the introduction of patient-safety-oriented 
programmes, the practical use of the WHO surgical safety checklist,106 the sciences of 
human and system errors in healthcare and learning about infection control practices. 
1.3 International response towards the prevention of patient 
safety incidents in secondary care 
Patient safety assurance is a shared goal between healthcare systems around the world 
that should not be limited to high- income economies, but should also include low- and 
middle-income economies.117 The publications such as To err is human, An 
Organisation with a Memory and the Quality in Australian Health Care Sudy11 
attracted international attention as the two works showed similar findings. 
In early 2002, the Executive Board of the WHO recommended Resolution WHA55.18 
to bring international attention to patient safety. In the same year, the Resolution was 
passed by the Fifty-fifth WHA which recognised AEs as a public health concern.5 This 
document urged WHO member states to promote patient safety as a fundamenta l 
principle of all health systems and requested the development of global norms, 
standards and guidelines for quality of care and patient safety.5 As a result, in 2004, 
the World Alliance for Patient Safety (WAPS) was formed.118 Later, in 2009, the 
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WAPS was renamed the WHO’s Patient Safety Programme and issued 
recommendations towards the understanding of the epidemiology of AEs with 
particular interest in the processes leading to them.1 In the same year, in 2009, the 
WHO’s the Patient Safety Education Programme was also established.119  
Following the adoption of Resolution WHA55.18,5 the WHO developed a set of 20 
global priorities for research.9, 120 Further progress made by the WHO includes: 1) the 
publication of their Conceptual Framework for the International Classification for 
Patient Safety29 in order to foster standardised reporting of incidents; 2) the WHO 
Guidelines for Adverse Event Reporting and Learning Systems to promote continuous 
learning from patient safety incident reports;91 and 3) the Patient Safety Curriculum 
Guides for Medical schools121 in 2009 and, in 2012, the multi-professional edition of 
the Guide122 was produced in order to help healthcare leaders, schools and students to 
integrate and promote patient safety knowledge and skills within their curricula. These 
Guides were based on the National Patient Safety Education Framework developed by 
the Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care.123 The WHO has also 
made materials from workshops available to foster learning from errors124 and, in 2014, 
drafted a framework for the core leadership competencies required to oversee and 
manage patient safety and quality of healthcare.125 
Despite the progress made in hospital care settings, it is clear that work still needs to 
be done; particularly in developing countries and countries with their economies in 
transition.2, 126 The WAPS reported that the global evidence of patient safety is 
produced mainly in developed economies and is distributed into three areas of work: 
1) the organisational structure of healthcare delivery; 2) the processes for delivery of 
care and 3) the consequences (e.g. AEs).2 Also, Rodriguez et al.126 used  bibliometr ic 
data, mapping global patient safety research activity from 2000 to 2010 into research 
focused mainly on the measurement and reporting of incidents (42.0%) and much less 
focused on the identification and understanding of PSI contributory factors (31.0%) or 
the implementation of solutions at an organisational or national level (19.0%).  More 
recently, Schreiber et al.127 reviewed the global patient safety literature over a period 
of 50 years (1960-2014) and found that of 4079 articles,  most published studies came 
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from the US (n=2068), UK (n=556), Canada (n=221), Germany (n=148), Australia 
(n=145) and the Netherlands (n=121).  
1.4 International call to action to patient safety in primary 
care 
Whilst progress has been made in secondary care, by contrast there has been very little 
progress in this field in primary care.23, 24, 128 It was not until 2001 when research, action 
and leadership for patient safety in primary care were fostered.129 In the same year,  the 
AHRQ presented an Agenda for Research in primary patient safety in the US.130 Also 
in the early 2000s, Australia, Canada, England, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the 
US formed the LINNAEUS collaboration and proposed a classification system for 
patient safety in primary care.131 Then, half a decade later in 2008, the LINNEAUS 
Euro-PC collaboration was funded by the European Union Framework 7 Programme. 
This European Union initiative proposed their own classification system132 and issued 
recommendations for research in primary care within the Union.133 More recently, in 
2015 the Primary Care Patient Safety (PISA) Classification System134 was proposed 
to identify the most frequent and most harmful PSIs, and relevant contributory issues, 
occurring within general practice. Evidence has accumulated since the 1980s from a 
variety of study designs, with an estimated median frequency of 2-3 incidents per 100 
consultations/patient records.10 
A global response towards patient safety in primary care began in 2012, when  the 
WHO’s Patient Safety Programme formed the Safer Primary Care Expert Working 
Group and acknowledged: 1) the importance of dealing with unsafe primary care, 2) 
the integration of baseline measurements with quality improvement in low- and 
middle-income settings, 3) a need for the identification of priority areas and key 
knowledge gaps, 4) recognition of the need for increased knowledge together with 
practical proposals to bridge major knowledge gaps, and 5) suggestions for a roadmap 
for action.3 
Global research priorities for iatrogenic harm in primary care were reported.22 These 
priorities include the improvement of data collection methods and improved 
taxonomies for learning about PSIs in primary care.22 Moreover, further PSI-research 
priorities were identified and include improvements in communication among 
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healthcare professionals, staff teamwork, laboratory and diagnostic imaging 
investigations, data management, transitions between different care settings, and 
medical records.22 
1.5 Patient safety in primary care dentistry 
Having discussed the developments of patient safety in secondary care and primary 
care in medicine, I will now proceed to explore the field of patient safety in dentistry. 
The WHO’s emerging agenda for “Safer Primary Care” 3 has advocated the need for a 
better understanding of patient safety in primary care,23, 24 which includes dentistry.2 5 -
28 The reason behind the infufficient attention to patient safety in primary care dentistry 
may be explained by a generalised assumption that this sector is safer than the hospital 
sector.135 Dentistry is often approached by the public from a business-mode l 
perspective instead of a healthcare profession, as the demand for aesthetic dentistry 
increases.136, 137 Moreover, dentistry keeps a balance between patient demand (often 
aesthetic) and professional standards of practice.136 Nonetheless, injuries with varying 
degrees of harm can occur among dental patients.138-140  
Research into the conceptual understanding of patient safety and the epidemiologica l 
data of PSIs is needed.26 The National Dental Associations, surveyed by the 
International Dental Federation (FDI for Fédération Dentaire Internationale), has 
called for information and knowledge about patient safety in primary care dentistry, in 
terms of what lessons can be learnt from PSIs, drug-related PSIs, as well as the ethical 
and legal aspects of patient safety.27 Also, the Council of European Dentists has 
recommended the introduction of incident reporting systems.141 Unfortunately, only 
two studies have assessed reports from this resource.142, 143 Firstly, Thusu et al. 
analysed 2,012 patient incident reports from which they reported injuries, medical 
emergencies, inhalation and ingestion of foreign objects, adverse reactions and wrong-
tooth extractions as the main areas of concern within a period of one year.142 Later, 
Renton and Sabbah reviewed the same data from 2005 and 2014 to report the 
frequency of serious incidents and never events related to dentistry.143 
NEs are also a promising area for research in dentistry.144 However, wrong-tooth 
extractions are currently the only specifically defined NE related to dentistry that has 
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been included in the NE list used in the English NHS19 an incident which accounts for 
around 120 reported cases per year.90, 143 Little is known about other potential NEs that 
can occur in dentistry. As a result, no formal list has been developed for primary care 
dentistry, and no systematic attempts have been made to identify and propose NEs for 
international use. Black and Bowie took an initial step in proposing a list of NEs for 
primary care dentistry.145 However, although promising, the authors acknowledged the 
study required a more systematic approach to review the literature and identify other 
potentially missed NEs; also needed was a greater diversity of participants 
representative of the dental practitioner population.145 
Guidelines and standards of care to ensure high quality and safe dental procedures are 
available from the GDC.146 Such standards are supported by the development of a 
revalidation scheme to ensure practising dentists within the UK remain fit to 
practice.147 However, the historical development of dentistry as a profession from an 
experience-based to evidence-based practice has been a challenge for measuring the 
quality of care delivery due to the broad variability of dental treatments and scarcity 
of clear evidence-based guidelines.148 Evidence-based dentistry provides professiona ls 
the opportunity to apply relevant empirical research findings to primary dental care.149 
However, when compared with medicine, the evidence-based dentistry is its early 
development.148 Limitations include the poor quality of available evidence used to 
develop evidence-based guidelines and the insufficient compliance with them amongst 
practitioners.149, 150 
Bailey et al. (2015) systematically reviewed the literature for current patient safety 
strategies in dentistry.26 They found that the efficacy of electronic tools, reporting 
systems and trigger tools in dentistry is unclear as they have not been tested. Only 
surgical safety checklists showed their efficacy to reduce or minimise AEs.26 
Nevertheless, primary dental care professionals need to be cognisant of the most 
reliable expected standards of care even when clinical guidelines or tools for the 
prevention of PSIs are not available. The GDC’s Standards for the Dental Team146 
mandate all dental team members to: 1) provide good quality care based on current 
evidence and authoritative guidance, 2) work within their existing knowledge, skills 
and professional competencies and 3) continuously update and develop their 
Introduction  26 
professional knowledge and skills throughout your working life.  146 These standards 
should therefore, where possible be followed by practitioners. 
1.6 Chapter summary 
In summary, the literature review presented within this chapter indicates that there is 
a need to understand the field of patient safety in primary care dentistry. To 
contextualise my PhD, I reviewed the relevant literature in patient safety research in 
primary and secondary care. Then, I presented a discussion of the terms and concepts 
used in secondary care. For this PhD, to bring an overall structure of the studies, I 
decided to use the WHO ICPS classification as my preferred terminology for PSIs, 
AEs and contributory factors. I used the definition of NE as offered in the Revised 
Never Events Policy and Framework.87 The complete list of preferred terminologies 
and definitions is shown in the Appendix 1 of this thesis. I also discussed the human-  
and system-based frameworks to measure error and harm and their subsequent 
integration into Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework.55 These frameworks 
aided me throughout my PhD degree to bring conceptual structure to my methods and 
interpretation of the results. 
I believe the work derived from this thesis to be important in light of the patient safety 
agenda within the Safer Primary Care report3 developed by the WHO, particularly in 
providing a better understanding of reported PSIs and AEs, and identifying priority 
areas and key knowledge gaps. This report also demands the recognition of the 
importance of unsafe primary care, including dentistry. I also believe this work can 
inform further short- and medium-term research strategies. 
I will now describe in detail, in the following chapters, the aims, objectives and 
methods employed for each phase of my PhD on Population Health Sciences. 
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Chapter 2 . Aims, objectives and overview of methods 
2.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1, it appears that primary care dentistry has not received 
appropriate attention to understand the role of patient safety within this discipline. 
Concerns have been raised about the limited understanding of the concepts and 
terminology relating to patient safety,26 along with the main risks to unsafe dental care 
delivery,151 including NEs.144 Therefore, this PhD was designed to understand the 
safety risks and priorities for patient safety in primary care dentistry. To achieve this 
understanding, I structured my PhD according to the aims and objectives listed in 
sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
2.2 Aims 
The overall aim of my PhD was to examine patient safety, its concepts, as well as the 
processes of error and healthcare associated harm and how understanding these events 
can be used to assess and analyse PSIs and their outcomes in primary care dentistry. 
In more detail, I aimed to: 
 Obtain a comprehensive overview of relevant conceptual work and empirica l 
evidence of PSIs and AEs in primary care dentistry; 
 Understand the nature of PSI reports from dentistry in the NRLS and provide 
insights into the nature and type of PSIs and their outcomes;  
 Identify contributory factors to PSIs; 
 Identify the most frequent and severe threats to patient safety in primary care 
dentistry, and with the greatest opportunity for improvement; and, 
 Establish an expert consensus on NEs for primary care dentistry in order to reduce 
or minimise serious harm 
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2.3 Objectives 
My specific objectives of the PhD were to: 
 Conduct a systematic scoping review of the empirical literature in order to 
understand the global extent, range and nature of relevant theoretical literature and 
empirical research activity relating to the types and frequencies of PSIs and AEs 
arising from primary care dentistry; 
 Characterise the reports submitted to the NRLS into categories and subcategories 
of PSIs, contributory factors, outcomes and severity of harm; 
 Identify patterns in chronological order of multiple incidents with their related 
contributory factors; 
 Identify which PSIs can be considered as potential NEs; and, 
 Establish an international expert-informed consensus-based list of NEs for primary 
care dentistry. 
2.4 Overview of the methodological approach 
This thesis was undertaken in three complementary, sequential phases. As Figure 2.1, 
shows, I began the first phase with a systematic scoping review of the literature. I 
produced a comprehensive account of current relevant empirical research activity and 
theoretical literature in primary care dentistry, particularly on PSIs, AEs and NEs. The 
results of this phase were also used to inform the second and third phases. 
For the second phase of my thesis, I employed a mixed-methods exploratory sequentia l 
design152, 153 to interrogate free-text descriptions of PSIs submitted to the NRLS, so as 
to understand PSIs, their contributory factors and outcomes reported by healthcare 
professionals from the field of primary care dentistry.  
After the review of the literature and analysis of the NRLS database, the third phase 
consisted of a modified Delphi exercise to develop a list of ‘never events’. The data 
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obtained from both the literature review and the NRLS database served as the basis for 
defining and developing the questionnaire used in the Delphi method. 
 
2.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has provided a description of the aims, objectives and the overall structure 
of my PhD. As shown in Figure 2.1, the results of the first and second phases informed 
the subsequent remaining phase(s) of my PhD. I will now proceed through describing 
International Delphi study to generate consensus 
Never events Outcomes Contributory factors Patient safety incidents 
Exploratory sequential design 
Never events Adverse events Patient safety incidents Research activity 




















The findings from Phase 1 informed the second and third phases 
The findings from Phase 2 informed the third phase 







Preliminary list of evidence-based candidate never events 
International expert consensus-based list of never events for primary care dentistry 
Figure 2.1 Structure of the PhD 
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the systematic review, to explore the global extent of the current evidence base and 
knowledge gaps in patient safety research in primary care dentistry. 
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Chapter 3 . Patient safety incidents in primary dental 
care: a systematic scoping review 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 has outlined the need for exploring the field of patient safety in primary care 
dentistry. National dental associations have called for more information about unsafe 
dental care and have highlighted the need to learn lessons from dental errors.27 As 
Pemberton outlined,151 the identification of the main risks to patient safety is a 
necessary step to understanding the magnitude of unsafe care in dentistry. However, 
no concerted efforts have been made to systematically review the current empirica l 
evidence for understanding patient safety in dentistry. This chapter describes the 
systematic approach I followed to understand the globally generated theoretical 
literature and empirical research activity surrounding types and frequencies of PSIs 
and AEs in primary care dentistry. 
3.2 Aim 
To obtain a comprehensive overview of relevant conceptual work and empirica l 
evidence of PSIs and AEs in primary care dentistry. 
3.3 Objective 
I sought to undertake a systematic scoping review of the empirical literature to 
understand the globally generated range and nature of relevant empirical research 
activity and theoretical literature in regard to the types and frequencies of PSIs and 
AEs arising from primary care dentistry. 
3.4 Methods 
Due to the anticipated broad nature and heterogeneity of studies to screen, I decided 
to conduct a systematic scoping review.154, 155 In contrast to systematic reviews, this 
technique is recommended to map broad topics with a diverse variety of study designs 
and methodologies, particularly when the body of evidence is still emerging. For this 
thesis, my methodological approach was adapted from the framework developed by 
Levac et. al.155 (see Figure 3.1) to facilitate the identification of relevant studies, study 
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selection and charting the data. However, I also drew on Cochrane’s systematic review 
principles for the literature search and selection criteria.156 
 
The reporting of the results followed, where appropriate for a scoping review, by 
employing the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-analyses 
(PRISMA) checklist.157 
3.4.1 Data sources and search strategy 
I decided to narrow my search strategy to MEDLINE and EMBASE as these as these 
databases are the main sources for dentistry-related research publications (see 
Appendix 4). My decision to focus on these two databases and to not include other 
databases such as Web of Science and Scopus was supported by: 1) an init ia l 
exploration of these databases, which revealed insufficient number of dentistry-related 
articles, and 2) the feedback received from these initial findings by a librarian 
(Marshall Dozier) at the Main Library from The University of Edinburgh. The same 
Identifying the research question 
Identifying relevant studies  
(Data sources and search strategy) 
Study selection 
(Study selection) 
Charting the data 
(Data extraction and analysis) 
Collating, summarising and reporting the results  
(Data summary and synthesis) 
Consultation 
Figure 3.1 Framework proposed by Leval et al. for conducting systematic 
scoping reviews 
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librarian, aided me to develop a search strategy with a set of established medical 
subheadings (MeSH) and free-text terms (see Appendix 5). The screening period 
accessed material that ranged from January 1994 to January 2015. Due to its relevance 
within the medical field, the year of publication of Error in Medicine158 in 1994 was 
considered to be an appropriate start date. Due to time required to screen publicat ions 
over a period of 20 years, I decided to use a snowball approach instead of hand 
searching journals to identify potentially relevant publications missed in the search 
strategy. The snowball approach consisted in screening the reference lists of all the 
eligible full-text articles for the review.159 Within these, two reviewers (EEC & MF) 
screened and assessed whether titles and abstracts were for further inclusion in the 
review. 
3.4.1.1 Eligibility criteria 
I included studies that reported any type of incident that could have resulted or actually 
did result in unnecessary harm from to primary dental care. Primary dental care 
settings included all individual practices, community practices, private practices and 
hospital outpatient clinics.160 Opinion studies, forensic studies, disease risk 
management, as well as recommendations for antibiotic prophylaxis, treating patients 
with pre-existing medical conditions or occupational hazards were also discarded. 
Articles that reported PSIs or AEs but lacked information about their frequency were 
eliminated. The detailed criteria for inclusion and exclusion of the included studies is 
shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Inclusion and exclusion criteria for the included articles 
Inclusion Exclusion 
Any study that reported: 
 Any incident that could have resulted in 
unnecessary harm 




 Disease risk management 
 Antibiotic prophylaxis 
 Treatment of patients with pre-existing 
medical conditions 
 
Primary dental care settings: 
 Individual practices 
 Community practices 
 Private practices 
 Hospital outpatient clinics  
 
Other: 
 Opinion studies 
 Forensic studies 
 Disease risk management articles 
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3.4.1.2 Types of included studies 
The following study designs were considered for inclusion:  
 Theoretical studies (e.g. investigations into human and system errors in 
dentistry); 
 Systematic reviews; 
 Experimental studies (e.g. randomised controlled trials, controlled clinica l 
trials, controlled before and after studies, interrupted time series); 
 Epidemiological studies (e.g. descriptive and analytical studies); and, 
 Qualitative studies (e.g. ethnographic, interviews, focus groups). 
3.4.1.3 Outcome measures 
The primary outcomes were PSIs and AEs as defined in Table 1.1. in Chapter 1. 
Furthermore, potential candidate issues that could meet the criteria for NEs (Table 1.5) 
were considered according to the definition provided by England and Wales’ former 
NPSA.19 
3.4.2 Study selection 
Two reviewers (EEC and MF) independently reviewed the articles for inclusion. To 
achieve this, I recruited and trained a PhD student from the Centre for Population 
Health Sciences as the second reviewer (MF). As MF did not have a background in 
dentistry, his training included an overall introduction to the discipline, its treatments 
and related terminology. Additional training included an introduction to patient safety, 
its terminology (Table 1.2) and examples applicable to dentistry (Figure 1.2). The 
citations were imported into EndNote 6 software161 where all duplicates were deleted. 
Initially, only the title and abstracts were screened. Then, full-text copies were 
obtained and assessed for eligibility. If not available, authors were contacted and a 
copy was requested. In case of a disagreement, a third reviewer (Aziz Sheikh) was 
consulted. 
3.5 Data extraction and analysis 
Data were extracted into a customised form using Microsoft Excel 2011 software.162  
The main categories for data extraction (Table 3.1) were agreed by the reviewers. The 
full data extraction form is shown in Appendix 5. The reviewers met after extracting 
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the first five articles to determine if the extraction approach was consistent with the 
objectives of the study.  Working definitions for PSIs and AEs were recorded. 
Table 3.2 Main categories for data extraction 
Authors Measurement method 
Publication year Types of patient safety incidents   
Discipline Frequencies of patient safety incidents  
Research design Types of adverse events 
Method for data collection Frequencies of adverse events  
 
3.5.1 Data summary and synthesis 
The scoping review method was likely to generate a heterogeneous body of work.163 
As I anticipated this, along with different definitions as discussed in Chapter 1, I did 
not seek to generate summary estimates of the frequency and burden of PSIs. Instead, 
following the framework suggested by Levac et al.,155 one reviewer (myself) 
conducted conceptual and narrative syntheses164 from the reported findings. The 
included articles were read and I developed notes/annotations about recurring themes 
or concepts. Then, I conducted a preliminary synthesis by developing a conceptual 
map of the reported PSIs and AEs. Emerging themes or concepts with similar meaning 
were grouped. Then, based on these conceptual groups, I described frequency ranges 
of PSIs and AEs. Moreover, identified PSIs and AEs were judged again by EEC and 
FSO, and proposed as potential NEs if they met the criteria shown in Table 1.5.87 
3.6 Results 
A total of 8386 potentially relevant articles were retrieved from which 40 were 
included (Figure 3.2). The general characteristics of these articles are displayed in 
Table 3.2. The relative percentage of the included publications substantially increased 
from 15.0% (n=6) in the first four years (1994-1998) to 37.5% (n=15) in the last four 
years (2011-2015). Healthcare systems within high-income economies were the source 
of the majority of the publications (92.5%, n=37) in which general dentistry ranked as 
the top discipline (27.5%, n=11), followed by endodontics, legal medicine and studies 
reporting various disciplines (15.0%, n=6 each). Fewer articles were found for oral 
surgery (12.5%, n=5), paediatric dentistry (7.5%, n=7.5), implantology (5.0%, n=2) 
and orthodontics (2.5%, n=1). Most studies concerned private practices (72.5%, n=29) 
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and dental schools (22.5%, n=9); few were related to outpatient hospital clinics (5.0%, 
n=2). Documentary review (75.0%, n=30) and structured questionnaires (25.0%, 
n=10) were used for data collection. The sample sizes varied substantially from 11 to 
2,830,000 participants. None of the included articles used a randomised sample. 
 
 
6,166 records retrieved from 
MEDLINE and 2185 from 
EMBASE 
35 records identified from 
reference lists 
8,386 potentially relevant papers were identified 
After de-duplication, 7,808 potentially relevant papers 
were included for tit le and abstract screening 
7,721 records excluded: 
irrelevant (n=7,708), 
duplicates (n=13) 
88 full-text articles assessed for eligibility 
578 records excluded as 
duplicates 
48 full text articles 
excluded (non 
empirical work) 































Figure 3.2 PRISMA diagram 
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M ilgrom, P.  165 1994 USA HIE Various No SQ Survey 289 No 
Haas, D.A. 166 1995 Canada HIE Various No Doc. Rev Malpractice claim analysis 143 No 
Lupi, J. E. 167 1996 USA HIE Orthodontics No Doc. Rev Radiographic review 88 No 
Nkansah P.J. 168 1997 Canada HIE Various No Doc. Rev Survey 2830000 No 
Keur I. 169 1998 Netherlands HIE General dentistry No SQ Survey 471 No 
Venta I. 170 1998 Finland HIE Legal medicine No Doc. Rev Malpractice claim analysis 237 No 
Atherton G.J. 171 1999 UK HIE General dentistry No SQ Survey 1110 No 
Ammar, WA.. 172 2000 Saudi Arabia HIE Legal medicine No Doc. Rev Malpractice claim analysis 32 No 
Leelataweedwud, P. 173 2001 USA HIE 
Paediatric 
dentistry 
No Doc. Rev Record review 195 No 
Givol, N 174 2002 Israel HIE Implantology No Doc. Rev Malpractice claim analysis 61 No 
D´Eramo E.M. 175 2003 USA HIE Oral surgery No SQ Survey 157 No 
Frangiskos, F. 176 2003 Greece HIE Oral surgery No SQ Direct observation 250 No 
Tiwana k.K 177 2004 USA HIE Various No Doc. Rev Record review 36 No 
Ozdemir M.H. 178 2005 Turkey 
UMI
E 
Legal medicine No Doc. Rev Malpractice claim analysis 11 No 
Susini, G. 179 2007 France HIE Endodontics No Doc. Rev Malpractice claim analysis 24651* No 
Bjorndal, L. 180 2008 Denmark HIE Legal medicine No Doc. Rev Malpractice claim analysis 482 No 
Tzanetakis G.N. 181 2008 Greece HIE Endodontics No Doc. Rev Record review 2180 No 
Abbreviations: HIE= high income economies; UMIE= upper middle income economies; LMIE= lower middle income economies; NA=Not applicable; CS=Cross-
sectional study; UCT=Uncontrolled clinical trial;; CaCo=Case control study; SQ=Structured questionnaire; Doc. Rev= document review. 






































































































Kleier, DJ  182 2008 USA HIE Endodontics No SQ Survey 314 No 
Gaffen, A. S. 183 2009 Canada HIE General No Doc. Rev Malpractice claim analysis 182 No 
Kiani, M. 184 2009 Iran 
UMI
E 
Legal medicine No Doc. Rev Malpractice claim analysis 157 No 
Lee, JJ 185 2009 Taiwan HIE Oral surgery No Doc. Rev Malpractice claim analysis 2,223,971 No 
Peleg O. 186 2010 Israel HIE General No Doc. Rev Malpractice claim analysis 48 No 
Tsesis, I. 187 2010 Israel HIE Endodontics No Doc. Rev Radiographic review 56175 No 
Hisanaga, R 188 2010 Japan HIE Various No Doc. Rev Record review 37 No 
Givol, N 187 2010 Israel HIE Endodontics No Doc. Rev Malpractice claim analysis 720 No 
Ashkenazi, M. 189 2011 Israel HIE 
Paediatric 
dentistry 
No SQ Survey 85 No 
Obinata K. 140 2011 Japan HIE General No Doc. Rev Record review 23 No 
Perea-Perez B. 190 2011 Spain HIE Legal medicine No Doc. Rev Malpractice claim analysis 63 No 
Soehardi A. 191 2011 Netherlands HIE Oral surgery No SQ Survey 157 No 
Hillerup, S. 192 2011 Denmark HIE Oral surgery No Doc. Rev Record review 241 & 115 No 
Chicka M.C. 193 2012 Canada HIE 
Paediatric 
dentistry 
No Doc. Rev Malpractice claim analysis 17 No 
Schwamburger N.T. 194 2012 USA HIE General No Doc. Rev Record review 1,468 No 
Thusu, S. 142 2012 UK HIE General No Doc. Rev Incident reports 2,012 No 
Abi Najm S. 195 2013 Switzerland HIE Implantology No Doc. Rev Record review 83 No 
Hashemipour M.A. 196 2013 Iran 
UMI
E 
General No Doc. Rev Malpractice claim analysis 64 No 
Hiivala N. 197 2013 Finland HIE General No SQ Survey 856 No 
Abbreviations: HIE= high income economies; UMIE= upper middle income economies; LMIE= lower middle income economies; NA=Not applicable; CS=Cross-
sectional study; UCT=Uncontrolled clinical trial; CaCo=Case control study; SQ=Structured questionnaire; Doc. Rev= document review. 






































































































Kalenderian, E. 198 2013 USA HIE General Yes Doc. Rev Trigger tool 315 No 
Pinchi, V. 199 2013 Italy HIE Endodontics No Doc. Rev Malpractice claim analysis 120 No 
Renton, T. 200 2013 UK HIE 
General & 
Specialist 
No SQ Survey 415 No 
Perea-Perez B. 201 2014 Spain HIE General No Doc. Rev Malpractice claim analysis 415 No 
Abbreviations: HIE= high income economies; UMIE= upper middle income economies; LMIE= lower middle income economies; NA=Not applicable; CS=Cross-
sectional study; UCT=Uncontrolled clinical trial; CaCo=Case control study; SQ=Structured questionnaire; Doc. Rev= document review. 
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The results were ordered into the conceptual domains displayed in Figure 3.3. Each of 
these will be described in turn. 
3.6.1 Types and frequencies of patient safety incidents  
Initially, PSIs were organised across three stages that were conceptualised as the 
period before clinical treatments were carried out (pre-operative stage), the period of 
clinical treatment (intra-operative stage) and the period after the clinical treatment 
(post-operative stage). Then, PSIs and their frequencies were grouped and presented 
across the main three identified measurement methods (Table 3.3). As discussed in 
Chapter 1 (section 1.1), the overlapping terminology in patient safety may result in 
events like wrong-tooth extractions and tooth perforations to be classified as a PSI or 
an AE, I decided to allocate them as PSIs. This in accordance with the Revised Never 
Events Policy and Framework87 which was also discussed in Chapter 1 (section 
1.2.2.1). Based on this decision, my results showed that malpractice case reviews and 
surveys were the methods most frequently used to identify diverse types of PSIs.  
Errors concerning administrative processes,165 examination and diagnosis,165, 184, 187, 
189, 197, 201 treatment planning,178, 184, 186, 187, 189, 196, 201 communication,184, 196, 197 informed 
consent172, 178, 180, 187, 189 and referral184, 186, 196 were identified pre-operatively. 
Examples of errors in referrals and treatment planning resulted in wrong-tooth 
extractions186, 202 and jaw fractures,191 respectively. Intra-operatively, confusion of the 
operator led to wrong-tooth extractions.186 Procedural errors included technical errors, 
broken instruments and tooth perforations.165, 172, 174, 175, 180, 181, 189, 197, 199, 201  Inhalation 
and ingestion of foreign objects were related to broken instruments and flaws in 
handling small objects. 188 Drug prescription errors emerged post-operatively,165, 180, 
189, 201 along with flaws in following-up in patients seeking legal assistance.165 
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Errors in documentation, diagnosis, initial 
clinical assessment, referral, treatment 
planning & informed consent  
Errors in the implementation of the 
procedure & cognitive errors 






















effects of LA, 
GA & 
sedation 
Figure 3.3 Conceptual model for the activity in patient safety research in primary care dentistry 
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Table 3.4 Variability of frequencies of PSIs across three main measurement methods  
 
Patient safety incidents Malpractice case review (n=17) Surveys (n=10) Record review (n=8) 















Administrative errors ------ ------ 8.3 165 ------ ------ 
Error in examination or 
diagnosis 
11.4-24.0 165, 184, 187, 201 
6.7-55.0 PSIs 
6.5-8.0 NMs 
165, 189, 197 ------ ------ 
Errors in treatment planning 9.1-26.6 178, 184, 186, 187, 196, 201 2.4 189 ------ ------ 
Documentation errors 3.2-55 184, 196, 199 
42.0 PSIs 
12.0 NMs 
189 ------ ------ 
Communication errors 3.2-12.4 165, 184, 187, 196, 201 
6.3 PSIs 
15.5 NMs 
165, 189, 197 ------ ------ 
Informed consent errors 3.1-59.4 172, 178, 180, 187 
6.2-11.0 PSIs 
4.0 NMs 
165, 189 ------ ------ 
















Cognitive failure / action 
lapse/ confusion 
13.0-26.2 186, 187 ------ ------ ------ ------ 
Procedural errors 5.9-49.0 172, 174, 180, 199, 201 
<1.0-49.0 PSIs 
5.0 NMs 






197 ------ ------ 
Inhaled & ingested objects <1.0-18.2 178, 179, 184, 196 
<1-12.0 PSIs 
9.0-13.9 NMs 
171, 175, 189, 197 <1.0 140, 177, 188 
Failure to appropriately treat 
medically compromised 
patients 
3.8 184 ------ ------ ------ ------ 
Equipment failure 4.5-7.9 184, 196, 201 
30.0 PSIs 
18.7 NMs 
189, 197 ------ ------ 
Multiple exposure to x-rays 3.7 184, 196, 201 
5.6-89.0 PSIs 
1.0-5.0 NMs 
189, 197 ------ ------ 
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 Patient safety incidents Malpractice case review (n=17) Surveys (n=10) Record review (n=8) 
 Ranges (%) References Ranges (%) References Ranges (%) References 
Sedation errors ------ ------ 
<1-33 PSIs 
1.2-6 NMs 
165, 175, 189, 197 ------ ------ 
Infection control ------ ------ 
<1 PSIs 
5.82 NMs  
















 Drug prescription errors 1.68-2.9 
180, 201 3.5-32 PSIs 
5-19 NMs 
165, 189 ------ ------ 
Lack of follow-up 1.63 174 4.8 165 ------ ----- 
Abbreviations: PSIs= patient safety incidents; NMs= near misses 
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3.6.2 Types and frequencies of adverse outcomes 
A distinction is apparent between local adverse outcomes which concerned the oral 
cavity and surrounding areas, and systemic adverse outcomes which involved the 
systemic effects of local anaesthesia (LA), general anaesthesia (GA) and sedation.41,  
43, 45, 63 This finding was considered to group the identified AE outcomes shown in 
Table 3.4. Then, the variety of adverse outcomes and their frequencies were grouped 
and presented across the main three identified measurement methods (Table 3.4). 
When these main methods were compared, my results show that malpractice studies 
again contributed the most to the identification of adverse outcomes. However, further 
analysis showed that most adverse outcomes were related to local adverse outcomes 
or consequences that involved the oral cavity and surrounding areas. Systemic adverse 
outcomes were less frequently reported and generally identified in surveys and record 
reviews. Within the category of local adverse outcomes, nerve damage emerged after 
LA administration or after surgical procedures.166, 183, 203 For systemic adverse 
outcomes, cardiovascular events included angina pectoris, myocardial infarction, and 
stroke171, 175, 194 Death was reported as a consequence of flaws in LA administrat ion, 
sedation and GA.166, 168, 178, 190, 193, 201 
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Table 3.5 Variability of frequencies of adverse outcomes across three main measurement methods  
 Adverse outcomes Malpractice analysis (n= 17) Surveys (n= 10) Record review (n= 8) 




















170, 174, 178, 184, 
190, 196, 201 
<1–14.1 AEs 
2.02 NMs 
175, 189, 197 14.46 195 
Accidental injection of sodium 
hypochlorite 
----- ----- 2.03 182 ----- ----- 
Tooth damage ----- ----- 
10.62 AEs 
2.5 NMs 
197 ----- ----- 
Alveolar bone loss 1.63 174, 201 ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Nerve damage <1-59 
166, 170, 174, 183, 
184, 190, 196, 201 <1 
200 75.1 192 
Wrong tooth 3.1-5.7 184, 196 
7-31 AEs 
1-8 NMs 
189 ---- ---- 
Wrong treatment 5.7-15.6 180, 184, 196 
1.08 AEs 
1.5 NMs 
197 ----- ----- 
Wrong patient ----- ----- 
<1 AEs 
6.07 NMs 
197 ----- ----- 
Wrong body part 3.1-5.7  
4.5 AEs 
3.5 NMs 
197 ----- ----- 
Tooth loss 8.8-29.4 180, 184, 190, 196, 201 ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Tooth fracture  1.58-8.8 170, 180, 190 52 191, 197 ----- ----- 
Infection after treatment <1-16.8 
170, 174, 178, 180, 
184, 185, 190, 201 
58 AEs 
1 NMs 
175, 189, 197 ----- ----- 
Peri implantitis ----- ----- ----- ----- 2.40 195 
Treatment failure 29.7-37 187, 196 ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Temporomandibular joint 
complication 
3.1-14.4 184, 190, 196, 201 ----- ----- ----- ----- 
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 Adverse outcomes Malpractice analysis (n= 17) Surveys (n= 10) Record review (n= 8) 
  Ranges (%) References Ranges (%) References Ranges (%) References 
Prolonged pain  2-13.3 172, 180, 184, 196 ----- ----- ----- ----- 




















Adverse reactions to local anaesthesia <1-4.5 184, 196, 201 <1 171 <1 194 
Allergic reactions <1 201 <1 169, 171, 197 ----- ----- 
Cardiovascular events ----- ----- <1 171, 175 <1 194 
Diabetic events ----- ----- <1 169, 171 ----- ----- 
Vasovagal collapse /syncope ----- ----- <1-3.3 169, 175, 197 <1-3.3 194, 203 
Dizziness, headache, nausea or 
vomiting 
----- ----- ----- ----- <1 173, 194 
Fits/seizures ----- ----- <1 171, 175 ----- ----- 
Asthma or apnoea events ----- ----- <1-5.5 169, 171 <1 173 
Desaturation ----- ----- ----- ----- <1 173 
Prolonged sedation ----- ----- ----- ----- 1.53 173 
Brain damage 53 193 ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Death <1-53 166, 178, 190, 193, 201 <1 168 ----- ----- 
Abbreviations: AEs= adverse events; NMs= near misses 
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3.6.3 Potential never events 
All the emerging PSIs and adverse outcomes were further assessed for their inclus ion 
in a list of potential NEs. These potential NEs were compared against the NE-criteria 
shown in Table 3.5. By the conceptualised stages of clinical treatment, I developed a 
list informed by the three stages of dental surgery shown in Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.6 List of potential never events for primary care dentistry 
Pre-operative stage  
Nerve damage due to errors in treatment plan 204 
 
Intra-operative stage 
Injection of wrong anaesthetic solution197 
Ingestion & aspiration of foreign objects140, 142, 171, 175, 177-179, 184, 188, 189, 196, 197 
Wrong tooth treated or extracted142, 180, 184, 186, 196, 197, 201, 205 
Intravascular injection of local anaesthetic176 
Acrylic set inside the mouth189 
Jaw fracture due to implant placement191 
Accidental injection of sodium hypochlorite182 
Overdose of sedatives189 
 
Post-operative stage 
Severe apical tooth resorption due to orthodontic treatment167 
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3.7 Chapter summary 
The results from this systematic scoping review show that patient safety research in 
dentistry is limited as most of the current work is descriptive. It is also difficult to 
generalise from such studies due to differences in underlying definitions, varying 
methodological approaches, and differing patient populations. The majority of existing 
work also comes from a limited number of high-income countries. Compared to the 
progress achieved in secondary care medicine, as discussed in Chapter 1, the field of 
patient safety in dentistry is in its early development. The main five PSIs identified in 
the systematic scoping review were a) errors in diagnosis and examination, b) 
treatment planning, c) communication, d) procedural errors and e) the accidental 
ingestion or inhalation of foreign objects. However, little attention was paid to wider 
organisational issues such as flaws within the physical environment, scheduling and 
patient access, management and associated lines of responsibility, and the influence of 
policies. 
I conducted a comprehensive overview of an under-explored field through systematic 
methods following published guidelines.154, 155 The great diversity of study designs, 
measurement methods, populations studied and sampling strategies did not permit 
formal statistical comparisons between the included studies in this systematic scoping 
review. Also, due to the lack of standardised terminology, the search strategy 
comprised broad terms, in order to retrieve as many potential articles as possible. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, patient safety concepts in dentistry are, as yet, poorly 
understood.25-28 This insufficient understanding was reflected in my systematic 
scoping review, which revealed differences in definitions or no explicit definitions at 
all for PSIs or adverse outcomes.  
Quality assessment is not a component of scoping reviews and so this step was 
therefore not undertaken.163 Therefore, I anticipated retrieval of a wide variety of 
studies as the scoping review method allowed us to cover broad area of the literature.1 6 3  
However, the heterogeneity of evidence also posed challenges for the interpretation of 
data. In order to address this issue, the emerging AEs and PSIs were grouped into the 
major concepts shown in Figure 3.3. Individually, I gathered data from each article for 
specific and narrow objectives, which represented a challenge for data extraction and 
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to conceptually map and organise the PSIs and AEs. These were also synthesised1 6 4  
and integrated in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Moreover, there was insufficient evidence to 
either justify a systematic review, meta-analysis or to provide pooled estimates. The 
results of this systematic scoping review (excluding NEs data), have been published 
in the Journal of Patient Safety206. From the articles included in this systematic scoping 
review, Thusu et al.142 made an important contribution as they were first to study 
secondary data from a PSI-reporting system, the NRLS. Compared with other sources 
of information,207 data from incident reporting systems can provide continuous, near 
real-time insights about diverse PSIs, including near misses. However, their study did 
not fully characterise the PSI-reports into incidents, their contributory factors and 
outcomes. Therefore, I believe that more rigorous mixed-methods approaches are 
needed in order to fully understand and characterise PSI-reports are needed. The 
rigorous mixed-method approach I used in this PhD will be described in Chapter 4 of 
this thesis. The results and the conceptual model for the activity in patient safety 
research (Figure 3.2) were used to provide the evidence-base for the methods and 
analysis described in Chapter 4.  
A set of NEs for primary care dentistry is needed,144 NEs are entirely preventable high-
impact events19 and the list of potential NEs that I identified in my systematic scoping 
review (Table 3.4) was used to provide the evidence-base for the third and final stage 
of my PhD, which is described in Chapter 5. In the following chapter I will describe 
the process I followed to understand the value of PSI-reports from dentistry in the 
NRLS. This process includes the characterisation of these reports into their types, 
contributory factors, outcomes and their severity. 
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Chapter 4 . Mixed-methods characterisation and 
analysis of patient safety incident reports from 
primary care dentistry 
4.1 Introduction 
The results described in Chapter 3 show that the majority of patient safety research in 
primary dental care is descriptive, with a variety of approaches to the terminology, the 
study designs and differing patient populations. Based on the findings of the systematic 
scoping review, the most reported PSIs were related to diagnosis and examination, 
treatment planning, communication, procedural errors and the accidental ingestion or 
inhalation of foreign objects.206 Although this systematic scoping review brings an 
important contribution to the evidence base for patient safety research in dentistry, the 
identification of the main risks to patient safety in dentistry remains to achieved.15 1  
Data already available from incident reporting systems brings an opportunity to 
expand the evidence base further. This contribution to the evidence base can be 
achieved by exploring a range of incident reports submitted to one of the most 
comprehensive databases for PSI-reports, the NRLS. Data analysis of incident reports 
has brought an initial understanding to patient safety in primary care.208-212 
Unfortunately, only two studies have assessed this resource in dentistry.142, 143 The 
study conducted by Thusu et al.142 as identified in Chapter 3, brought an init ia l 
categorisation of PSIs and their outcomes. However, the study conducted by Renton 
and Sabbah,143 published after the screening period of my systematic scoping review, 
only analysed serious incidents and NEs. Although these studies represented 
welcomed steps, they did not use rigorous mixed-methods approaches to fully 
understand and characterise the existing PSs, their contributory factors the resulting 
outcomes in primary care dentistry. Previous mixed-methods studies analysing general 
practice PSI-reports within the NRLS have shown their utility to categorise PSIs and 
identify patterns of contributory incidents and contributory factors.208-212 This current 
chapter provides a description of the approach I followed in order to a) understand the 
value of secondary data from a comprehensive incident reporting system, b) to 
characterise dentistry-related PSIs and c) to identify key areas for research and 
intervention. 
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4.2 Aims 
This chapter addresses the following aims: 
 To understand the nature of PSI reports from dentistry in the NRLS and provide 
insights into the nature and type of PSIs and their outcomes;  
 To identify contributory factors to PSIs; 
 To identify the more frequent and severe threats to patient safety in primary care 
dentistry, and with the greatest, opportunity for improvement 
 
4.3 Objectives 
This chapter addresses the following objectives: 
 Characterise the reports submitted to the NRLS into categories and subcategories 
of PSIs, contributory factors, outcomes and degree of harm 
 Identify patterns in chronological order of multiple incidents with their related 
contributory factors 
4.3 Methods 
I conducted a two-stage exploratory sequential mixed-methods study of a patient 
safety incident database with a selected sample of reports from primary care practices 
selected for analysis. This design combined a detailed data coding process and iterative 
generation of data summaries using both descriptive statistical and thematic analysis 
methods.128 
4.3.1 Ethics  
Ethical approval for this research was obtained from the University of Edinburgh’s 
Centre for Population Health Sciences Research Ethnics Committee (Appendix 7). 
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4.3.2 Data source (National Reporting Learning System) 
The data source for this study was the PSI reports submitted to the NRLS. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, the NRLS is a national reporting system created in 2003 for the NHS in 
England and Wales and it is one of the most comprehensive reporting systems 
worldwide.96, 97 The NRLS consists of a database of incident reports which are 
submitted from NHS healthcare organisations. Patients and other members of the 
public can also submit online reports directly to the NHS. The NHS definition for the 
reported PSIs refers to “any injury or unexpected incident that could have or did lead 
to harm for one or more patients receiving NHS-funded healthcare”,142 a definit ion 
closely allied to my preferred terminology as show in Chapter 1 (see Table 1.1 and 
Appendix 1). Although the incident reporting was initially voluntary, since 2010 the 
reporting of any incidents that resulted in severe patient harm or death has been 
mandatory.213 The reports contain categorical data (e.g. age, incident location and 
severity of harm) and three unstructured free-text fields to encourage the individua l(s) 
reporting to provide a narrative description of the event, its perceived causes and any 
potential preventive measures.128 Incident reports containing details relating to severe 
harm and/or death are analysed by NHS staff and safety experts to identify 
opportunities for the continuous improvement of NHS-healthcare. A more detailed 
description of the database has been reported previously.214 
4.3.2.1 Sample selection 
I initially received 42,729 reports that covered a period of 8 years (between April 2005 
and September 2013) from general practice in England and Wales. I considered these 
to be a complete data set. To include any PSI-reports related to primary dental care 
services, I applied filters for pre-coded NHS categories “Primary care setting” for the 
column titled INO5 Location (Lvl2) and “Dental surgery” for the column titled INO3 
Location (Lvl3). As a result, I obtained a sample of 11,836 records. A more detailed 
review of these 11,836 reports still showed the presence of reports not related to 
dentistry; e.g. incidents related to pressure sores, podiatry procedures and patient’s 
residences. Therefore, I decided to further revise the filtered reports (n= 11,836) and 
exclude those not related to dentistry. I achieved this reduction by reading the narrative 
descriptions and, based on my clinical experience, decided whether the reports were 
suitable for inclusion or elimination. As a result, a revised sample of 4,247 reports was 
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obtained, which was used for the initial pilot thematic analysis in the first stage of my 
study. 
Apart from the pilot thematic analysis, I also assessed the 4,247 reports to describe 
their distribution by year and degree of harm using the pre-coded categories allocated 
in the NRLS (see Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1 Frequency distribution per year and degree of harm as pre-coded by the NHS 
 Degree of harm  
Period No Harm Low Moderate Severe Death Grand Total 
2005 81 20 8 3 1 113 
2006 154 77 24 1 1 257 
2007 148 66 21 2 1 238 
2008 275 108 20 2  405 
2009 428 154 32 4 1 619 
2010 556 162 27 3 2 750 
2011 505 157 23 7  692 
2012 437 184 40 6  667 
2013 339 139 26 2  506 
Grand Total 2923 1067 221 30 6 4247 
 
Given the time required to read and code each narrative description, I decided to obtain 
a randomised sample of 2,000 reports, weighted by year and severity of harm. I used 
this approach to ensure the more recent report (2012-2013) and those referring to more 
harmful incidents. Similar approaches have been used previously.128 To achieve this 
selection, all the “moderate”, “severe” and “deaths” cases (n=257) were chosen for 
inclusion from the 4,247 reports in the final sample. Then, proportions per year and 
degree of harm were obtained for the remaining 3,990 reports (Table 4.2).  
Table 4.2 Frequencies and proportions of the total 3,990 of “low” and “no harm” incident 
reports as pre-coded by the NHS 
Period Frequencies Percentage 
 Low No Harm Low No Harm 
2005 20 81 1.9 2.8 
2006 77 154 7.2 5.3 
2007 66 148 6.2 5.1 
2008 108 275 10.1 9.4 
2009 154 428 14.4 14.6 
2010 162 556 15.2 19.0 
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Period Frequencies Percentage 
 Low No Harm Low No Harm 
2011 157 505 14.7 17.3 
2012 184 437 17.2 15.0 
2013 139 339 13.0 11.6 
Total 1067 2923 100 100 
  
From these reports, 1,743 ‘low’ and ‘no harm’ reports were selected to complete the 
final sample of 2,000 reports. To achieve this selection, the required reports were 
weighted by year and randomly selected by obtaining similar proportions when 
compared to the 3,990 reports (Table 4.3). The process for obtaining this randomised 
sample weighted by year and the severity of harm was aided by an actuary. 
Table 4.3 Distribution of frequencies and percentages of the required 1,743 patient safety 
incident-reports weighted by year and degree of harm 
 Frequencies Percentage 
Period Low No Harm Low No Harm 
2005 7 38 1.5 3.0 
2006 23 63 4.9 5.0 
2007 34 58 7.2 4.6 
2008 48 117 10.1 9.2 
2009 73 187 15.4 14.7 
2010 75 250 15.8 19.7 
2011 65 219 13.7 17.3 
2012 88 187 18.6 14.7 
2013 61 150 12.9 11.8 
Total 474 1269 100.0 100 
 
4.3.3 Data processing 
For the first stage of this study, I undertook a pilot analysis involving 300 of the init ia l 
4,247 reports. This analysis involved the development and application of initial codes 
to bring structure to the narrative descriptions and to describe the types of PSIs, 
contributory incidents (if applicable), contributory factors and their reported outcomes. 
During the application of the initial codes, these and other emerging codes were 
constantly compared against current topics or themes from other patient safety 
classification systems. These systems included the WHO ICPS,20 the LINNEAUS 
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Patient Safety Classification for Primary Care,132 and the Primary Care Patient Safety 
(PISA) Classification System.134 Also included were the results obtained from the 
systematic scoping review,206 described in Chapter 3. This iterative comparison of 
classification systems against the emerging codes resulted in three coding frameworks 
to describe a) what happened i.e. type of incident (Appendix 8), b) perceived reasons 
the incident occurred i.e. contributory factors (Appendix 9) and c) incident outcomes 
(Appendix 10). These frameworks present a hierarchical arrangement of first- and 
second-level codes that were continuously refined in the second stage of the study, 
being applied to the weighted randomised sample of 2,000 reports. 
The second stage of this study consisted of a quantitative exploratory descriptive 
analysis215 of the 2,000 free-narrative descriptions. To achieve this analysis, the reports 
were coded by the author (EEC) and a trained second coder (AS). The second coder 
was provided with a training sample of 300 reports and discussed the challenges and 
additional improvements to the coding frameworks. Also, following the method 
described by Rees et al.,209 we applied the nine rules of the Recursive Model of 
Incident Analysis216 as developed by the Australian Patient Safety Foundation, were 
applied in order to structure the coding process (see Appendix 11). Based on this 
analysis, between one to four codes in chronological order were applied to describe 
both incidents and potential contributory factors (see Figure 4.1).  
The main incident was labelled as a “primary incident”, then “contributory incidents” 
were defined as those incidents preceding the primary incidents. “Contributory 
factors” were defined as any condition that influenced the occurrence of the primary 
incidents.29 Coding of the free-text narrative descriptions allowed the categorisation of 
reports by incident type, potential contributory factors, outcome and severity of harm. 
This categorisation provided the basis for the subsequent data analysis. Severity of 
harm was assessed using the WHO’s ICPS definitions (see Table 4.4).20  
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Definition Examples in dentistry 
No harm Patient outcome is not symptomatic, and 
no treatment is required 
Patient’s lip got accidentally caught 
by hand piece bur without any 
visible injury 
Low harm Patient outcome is symptomatic, 
symptoms are mild, loss of function or 
harm is minimal and intermediate but 
short term, and no or minimal 
intervention is required 
Contact of etching gel to the oral 
mucosa during procedure 
Moderate 
harm 
Patient outcome is symptomatic requiring 
intervention, an increased length of stay, 
or causing permanent or long-term harm 
or loss of function 
Fracture of the maxillary or 
mandible during surgical procedure 
Severe 
harm 
Patient outcome is symptomatic, 
requiring life-saving intervention or 
major surgical/medical intervention, 
shortening life expectancy or causing 
major permanent or long-term harm or 
loss of function 
Non-fatal anaphylactic reaction to 
local anaesthesia that resulted in 
hospitalisation 
Death On the balance of probabilities, death was 
caused or brought forward in the short 
term by the incident 
Fatal anaphylactic response to local 
anaesthesia 
Incidents Contributory factors Outcomes 
Coding frameworks 









Why Why? Why 
Resulted in Resulted in Resulted in 
Figure 4.1 Coding process based on the Recursive Model of Incident 
Analysis 
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To assess the inter-coder reliability, twenty percent (n=400) of the reports  were double 
coded (EEC and AS) and Cohen’s Kappa statistic217 was calculated for the primary 
incident type and which were the closest reported incidents to the outcome experienced 
by the patient and contributory factors. The Kappa statistic is a measurement 
introduced by Jacob Cohen in 1960218 which determines the extent to which the 
agreement between two coders, who are working with categorical data, can be 
reproduced. For this study, a Kappa of >0.7 was sought between the two coders. The 
interpretation of Cohen’s Kappa statistic is shown in Table 4.5. Disagreements in 
coding were arbitrated by a third person. 
Table 4.5 Interpretation of Cohen's Kappa statistic 
Value of Kappa Level of agreement Percentage reliable data 
0.0-0.20 None 0.0 - 4.0 
0.21-0.39 Minimal 4.0 - 15.0 
0.40-0.59 Weak 15.0 - 35.0 
0.60-0.79 Moderate 35.0 - 63.0 
0.80-0.90 Strong 64.0 - 81.0 
Above 0.90 Almost perfect 82.0 - 100 
Extracted from McHugh et al,217 
 
4.3.3 Analysis and interpretation of data 
The qualitative codes were extracted into Excel 2013.162 Then, as previously described 
in the second stage for data processing, I undertook an exploratory, descriptive 
analysis215 to generate descriptive summaries for the most frequent incident types, 
contributory factors, types of outcomes and degrees of harm was carried out. This 
procedure allowed me to identify priority areas based on: (i) the more frequent 
incidents; and (ii) the most harmful outcomes that resulted in moderate harm, severe 
harm or death. Then, I cross-tabulated primary incident types with the degree of harm, 
in order to identify potential relationships in the data. These cross-tabulations allowed 
me to identify the most harmful incidents and further investigate the role of 
contributory incidents and contributory factors. Additional patterns in the data were 
identified by assessing all the frequencies of combinations of incidents and 
contributory factors (e.g. primary incident + secondary incident + contributory factor).  
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During the data coding and following the method used by Rees et al.,209 I identified a 
purposive sample of the more frequent incidents per clinical stage that cross-tabulated 
with available contributory incidents, contributory factors and their outcomes. The 
corresponding reports were further thematically analysed and re-read to strengthen my 
familiarisation with the data. If needed, new codes were created to capture additiona l 
semantic (descriptive and superficial) insights and latent (underlying or inferred) 
insights present in the narrative descriptions and the circumstances (context) in which 
the incidents occurred.152, 219 All the codes were grouped into themes and sub-themes 
to support my understanding of both the data and the underlying reasons for incidents 
that might not have been captured by the quantitative data.152, 219 
4.4. Results 
Of the 2,000 randomised reports, 1,456 were included in the quantitative analysis. 
Reports were excluded if they did not describe a PSI (n=311), were not related to 
dentistry (n=125), concerned patient falls (n=31), contained insufficient details (n=23), 
dentist harmed rather than patient (n=18), or were about general non-specific 
complaints (n=6). Cohen’s Kappa (k) statistic for inter-rater coding reliability for 
primary incidents was high (k=0.860; p<0.01). Data about the patients’ demographics, 
outcomes and actions for recurrence was largely unstructured and missing for more 
than 50% of the reports. Table 4.6 shows the distribution of reports per discipline using 
pre-coded NHS categories. 
Table 4.6 Distribution of patient safety incidents per discipline by pre-coded NHS data 
Discipline Frequency Percentage 
Other 1425 71.3% 
Oral surgery 176 8.8% 
Restorative dentistry 78 3.9% 
Missing 75 3.8% 
Endodontics 67 3.4% 
Orthodontics 45 2.3% 
Dental surgery 41 2.1% 
Paediatric dentistry 34 1.7% 
Dental medicine 23 1.2% 
Periodontics 15 0.8% 
Maxillofacial / oral surgery 11 0.6% 
Radiology 10 0.5% 
Grand Total 2000 
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4.4.1 Overview of primary incident types and related harm 
Table 4.7 shows a description of identified incidents, which occurred in the pre-
operative (40.3%; n=587), intra-operative (56.1%; n=817) and post-operative (3.6%; 
n=52) stages of dental care delivery. All the possible combinations of contributory 
incidents and contributory factors per clinical stage are available in Appendices 12-14. 
Regardless of the clinical stage, the main five incident types were: i) delays in 
treatment (22.9%; 333/1,456), ii) procedural errors (15.1%; 220/1,456), iii) 
medication-related adverse incidents (11.0%; 160/1,456), iv) equipment failure (6.2%; 
90/1,456) and v) errors in obtaining or processing x-rays (6.0%; 87/1,456). Of the 
1,456 incidents, 5.3% led to harmful outcomes (77/1,456). Of these harmful outcomes, 
the main incidents were wrong-tooth extractions (48.1%; 37/77), medication-related 
adverse incidents (29.9%; 23/77) and procedural errors (13.0%; 10/77). 
Table 4.8 shows the characterisation of outcomes. Patient outcomes following an 
incident were not described for 40.0% of the reports (583/1,456). The most commonly 
described outcomes were increased documentation/follow-up (12.4%; 181/1,456), 
laceration/bleeding (99/1,420; 6.8%), delays in using the dental clinic (5.8%; 
85/1,456), unnecessary x-ray exposure (5.1%; 74/1,456) and repeated 
procedures/additional treatment (4.9%; 71/1,456). The majority of outcomes resulted 
in either no harm or low harm (94.7%; 1,379/1,1456). The majority of harmful 
incidents were due to wrong-tooth extractions (48.1%; 37/77) and this meant the 
patient required further unnecessary procedures (91.9%; 34/37). Medication-related 
adverse incidents (29.9%; 23/77) resulted in paresthesia (21.7%; 5/23), vasovagal 
responses (17.4%; 4/23) and anaphylaxis (13.0%; 3/23). The more frequent incident 
types with their respective contributory incidents, contributory factors and outcomes 
are described below. 
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Preoperative stage 578 7 1 
 
1 587 2 0.3 
Delays in treatment  332 1 
   
333 0 0.0 
Incorrect or unavailable documentation 49 
    
49 0 0.0 
Breaches of confidentiality 28 
    
28 0 0.0 
Errors in managing appointments  19 
    
19 0 0.0 
Errors in the logistics for transporting patients  16 
    
16 0 0.0 
Inefficient transfer of information between healthcare settings  15 
    
15 0 0.0 
Record not up to date or information missing 12 2 1 
  
15 1 6.7 
Insufficient supplies 13 
    
13 0 0.0 
Ability to access the dentist 10 
    
10 0 0.0 
Inaccurate information on record 10 
    
10 0 0.0 
Dental laboratory errors 9 
    
9 0 0.0 
Professionalism issue 7 1 
   
8 0 0.0 
Errors in choosing the correct process or procedure 7 1 
   
8 0 0.0 
Incomplete referral 8 
    
8 0 0.0 
Insufficient assessment in history /examination 6 
    
6 0 0.0 
Communication errors between dentist and patient 6 
    
6 0 0.0 
Communication errors between professionals  5 
    
5 0 0.0 
Delayed referral 4 1 
   
5 0 0.0 
Wrong medical record 5 
    
5 0 0.0 
Errors in obtaining the informed consent 3 
    
3 0 0.0 
Communication errors between staff and patients  3 
    
3 0 0.0 
Interpreter services not available or non-attendance 2 
    
2 0 0.0 
Information filled incorrectly 2 
    
2 0 0.0 











































































Inaccurate laboratory test results  2 
    
2 0 0.0 
Errors in the process of payment systems 2 
    
2 0 0.0 
Unnecessary referral 1 
    
1 0 0.0 
Delayed assessment 1 
    
1 0 0.0 
Failure to follow-up 
 
1 
   
1 0 0.0 
Missed diagnosis 
    
1 1 1 100.0 
Delayed diagnosis 1 
    
1 0 0.0 
         
Intraoperative stage 434 311 69 1 2 817 72 8.8 
Procedural errors 72 138 10 
  
220 10 4.5 
Medication-related adverse incidents 5 132 21 
 
2 160 23 14.4 
Equipment failure 85 5 
   
90 0 0.0 
Errors in obtaining or processing x-rays 87 
    
87 0 0.0 
Broken instrument 79 4 
   
83 0 0.0 
Ingestion / inhalation of foreign body 36 6 
   
42 0 0.0 




39 37 94.9 
Failure to comply with infection control standard procedures  30 
    
30 0 0.0 
Other procedural complications  6 18 1 1 
 
26 2 7.7 
Insufficient supplies 11 
    
11 0 0.0 
Procedure performed on wrong anatomical side or site 6 5 
   
11 0 0.0 
Errors in the process of administering a medication 8 
    
8 0 0.0 
Errors in obtaining a biopsy 1 1 
   
2 0 0.0 
Supplies out of date 1 
    
1 0 0.0 
Lost equipment 1 
    
1 0 0.0 
Unexpected movement from staff 
 
1 
   
1 0 0.0 
Wrong instrument used 1 
    
1 0 0.0 











































































Contraindicated dental material used 1 
    
1 0 0.0 
Equipment not available 1 
    
1 0 0.0 
Errors in choosing the correct process or procedure 1 
    
1 0 0.0 
Complication as a result of the dental material used 
 
1 
   
1 0 0.0 
         
         
Postoperative 46 3 3 
  
52 3 5.8 
Contraindicated medication prescribed / dispensed 12 1 2 
  
15 2 13.3 
Errors in the process of delivering a medication 10 
    
10 0 0.0 
Wrong dose prescribed 7 
    
7 0 0.0 
Medication incorrectly stored 5 
    
5 0 0.0 
Wrong medication / treatment given 4 
    
4 0 0.0 
Unintentional drug overdose (self-administered) 3 1 
   
4 0 0.0 
Medication not available 3 
    
3 0 0.0 
Lost prescription 2 
    
2 0 0.0 
Wrong medication prescribed 
 
1 
   
1 0 0.0 




1 1 100.0 
Total 1058 321 73 1 3 1456 77 5.3 
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Table 4.8 Characterisation and distribution of outcomes within the analysed patient safety incident reports per degree of harm 










































































Incident occurred but no outcome 583 
    
583   0.0 
         
Organisational inconvenience 290 14 2     306 2 0.7 
Increased documentation / follow-up 169 11 1 
  
181 1 0.6 
Delays in using the dental clinic 84 




Long wait for service 22 




Treating patients without sufficient information 14 2 




Legal implication 1 1 1 
  
3 1 33.3 
         
Inconvenience to patients (non-clinical) 144 15 37     196 37 18.9 
Unnecessary x-ray exposure 74 




Repeated procedures / additional treatment 59 9 3 
  
71 3 4.2 
Unnecessary procedures 11 6 34 
  
51 34 66.7 
         
Local outcomes 28 144 17     189 17 9.0 
Laceration/bleeding 9 88 2 
  
99 2 2.0 
Chemical injury 8 14 








16 1 6.3 
Localised pain / discomfort 5 7 1 
  





11 5 45.5 
Bruises 3 3 




Skin tear 1 4 
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5 4 80.0 
Needle stick injuries 
 
3 




Localised pain/discomfort 1 1 








2 2 100.0 




2 2 100.0 
Affection of the temporomandibular joint 
 
1 


















         
Systemic outcomes 12 144 17 1   174 18 10.3 
Vasovagal response 1 51 4 
  
56 4 7.1 
Faint / loss of consciousness 6 36 2 
  
44 2 4.5 
Seizure 2 19 




Dizziness 3 14 






10 6 1 
 
17 7 41.2 




8 1 12.5 
Prolonged sleep / unarousable after sedation 
 
3 








2 2 100.0 
Nausea / vomiting 
 
2 





















Laryngospasm and bronchospasm 
 
1 




         
Psychological / emotional distress 1 4 
   
5   0.0 
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Death 
    
3 3 3 100.0 
Total 1058 321 73 1 3 1456 77 5.3 
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4.4.2 Pre-operative incidents  
Delays in a treatment (333/587; 56.7%) were the main incident within the pre-
operative stage (see Table 4.4). When available, frequent contributory incidents, or 
those incidents preceding the primary incidents, were a) the patient’s inability to access 
the dentist (102/333; 30.6%) (Example 1 in Box 4.1), b) errors in managing 
appointments (53/333; 16.8%) (Example 2 in Box 4.1), and c) errors in the logistics of 
transporting patients (25/333; 7.5%) (Example 3 in Box 4.1). Contributory factors 
included i) insufficient staff members (111/333; 33.3%) (Example 4 in Box 4.1), ii) 
lack of equipment maintenance (15/333; 4.5%) and iii) lack of supplies (10/333; 
3.0%). Delays in treatment mostly resulted in increased documentation/follow-up 
(76/333; 22.8%) (Example 5 in Box 4.1) and repeated procedures/additional treatment 
(15/333; 4.5%) (Example 6 in Box 4.1). 
The second most common pre-operative incident was incorrect or unavailable  
documentation (49/587; 8.3%). The main contributory incidents resulted from IT-
software errors (11/49; 22.4%) (Example 7 in Box 4.1). Incorrect or unavailab le 
documentation mostly led to increased documentation/follow-up (7/49; 14.3%) 
(Example 8 in Box 4.1) and delays in using the dental clinic (5/49; 10.2%) (Example 
9 in Box 4.1). The third most common pre-operative incident was breaches of 
confidentiality (28/587; 4.7%). The main contributory incidents were ineffic ient 
transfer of information between healthcare settings and wrong medical records (2/28; 
7.1% each) (Example 10 in Box 4.1). Main contributory factors were failure to adhere 
to procedures or regulations (14/28; 50.0%) (Example 11 in Box 4.1) and distraction 
(4/28; 14.3%). One breach of confidentiality resulted in legal implications (1/28; 3.6%) 
(Example 12 in Box 4.1). 
4.4.3 Intra-operative incidents  
The main intra-operative incidents were procedural errors (220/817; 26.9%). 
Contributory incidents included equipment failure (20/220; 9.1%) (Example 13 in Box 
4.1) and insufficient assessment in history/examination (5/220; 2.3%). The main 
contributory factors were i) distraction (68/220; 30.9%) (Example 14 in Box 4.1), ii) 
unexpected movement from the patient (23/220; 10.5%) (Example 15 in Box 4.1) and 
iii) inadequate skills/knowledge (20/220; 9.1%). Procedural errors mostly led to a) 
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laceration/bleeding (93/220; 42.3%) (Example 16 in Box 4.1), b) chemical injur ies 
(21/220; 9.5%) (Example 17 in Box 4.1), c) repeated procedures/additional treatment 
(17/220; 7.7%) (Example 18 in Box 4.1) and d) thermal injuries (14/220; 6.4%) 
(Example 19 in Box 4.1). 
The second most common intra-operative incident were medication-related adverse 
incidents (160/817; 19.6%). Contributory factors included the patient’s previous 
health-related conditions (22/160; 13.8%) (Example 20 in Box 4.1) and non-
compliance from the patient (9/160; 5.6%) (Example 21 in Box 4.1). Medication-
related adverse incidents mostly led to vasovagal response (51/160; 31.9%) (Example 
22 in Box 4.1) or fainting/loss of consciousness (35/160; 21.9%) (Example 23 in Box 
4.1). The third most common intra-operative incident was related to equipment 
failure (90/817; 11.0%). The main contributory factors were lack of equipment 
maintenance (40/90; 44.4%) (Example 24 in Box 4.1) and poor equipment design 
(6/90; 6.7%). Equipment failure mostly led to delays in using the dental clinic (31/90; 
34.4%) (Example 25 in Box 4.1). 
 
4.4.4 Post-operative incidents  
Main post-operative incidents were due to contraindicated medications being 
prescribed/dispensed (15/52; 28.8%). The main contributory incident was 
insufficient assessment in history/examination (3/15; 20.0%) (Example 26 in Box 4.1). 
Contributory factors included the patient’s previous history on allergies (7/15; 46.7%) 
(Example 27 in Box 4.1) and distraction (3/15; 20.0%) (Example 28 in Box 4.1). 
Contraindicated medications being prescribed or dispensed mostly led, in most cases, 
to increased documentation or follow-up and anaphylaxis (3/15; 20.0% each) 
(Example 29 in Box 4.1). The second most common post-operative incident resulted 
from errors in the process of delivering a medication (10/52; 19.2) (Example 30 in 
Box 4.1). Most of these reports did not describe harmful outcomes (8/10; 80.0%). 
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Box 4.1 Free-text examples of key incidents. 
These are extracts from the free-text narrative descriptions of patient safety incidents 
reported to the National Reporting Learning System. The extracts have been edited by the 
author to correct typographical errors and remove indecipherable text. 
Pre-operative stage  
Example 1. The dentist rang the clinic, said he was on his way in but had a call to go back home to 
help with the family (sickness of relative). The dentist said he was sorry for the late call and could 
we let (person’s name) know that said he (the dentist) would definitely be in tomorrow. 
 
Example 2. Due to a communication breakdown, the dental nurse and dentist left for an appointment 
offsite without realising that the patient, who was due to be seen, had arrived early onsite with her 
mother and had been overlooked. This meant that the patient was not able to be seen that day. 
 
Example 3. Patient was taken to wrong clinic by transport and was left with her carer to walk to the 
actual clinic. The patient was left waiting for 1 hour 50 mins before the transport collected her after 
2 phone calls to ask pick up time which was 1120hr - one hour after appointment time. The patient 
was eventually collected by transport. 
 
Example 4. The dental nurse called in sick. Patients had to be cancelled as an agency nurse was not 
available. The senior nurse was unable to step in as it was her paperwork day. 
 
Example 5. Patient double booked by dental nurses. The appointment was cancelled at short notice 
1 hour prior to the scheduled visit. Request to cancel delegated to reception staff. The patient was 
contacted by consultant and reassurance was given to address this. 
 
Example 6. The Senior Dental Officer expected to find the lab work for his patient as it was due to 
be fitted at the next appointment, but it was discovered that it had not  been delivered. The Senior 
Dental Officer telephoned the laboratory and they informed him that the work in question had gone 
missing at the lab. The lab suggested that an ex - worker at the premises may have been responsible 
for the missing work, or may have sabotaged the work. The lab apologised, offered to re - start the 
work and to prioritise the job. 
 
Example 7. I was unable to view a letter regarding a patient on the computer. We tried to read the 
letter on the computer in the office in (name of clinic) and then on the two computers on the dental 
reception, but were unable to operate the file, despite clicking on the letter etc. Eventually, a dental 
nurse was able to access the letter from the clinic. This is unacceptable when trying to view 
information directly relating to a patient’s management. 
Example 8. Unable to access patient’s radiographs from September 09. Attempted at 10:20m, still 
unavailable 12:25 at end of appointment. The patient had to be reappointed to complete the treatment 
plan as a consequence. 
 
Example 9. R4 system running very slowly and erratically throughout the day. Difficulty in accessing 
patient records and very difficult writing up notes. Delay in seeing patients and extra work for 
clinician. Stressful. 
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These are extracts from the free-text narrative descriptions of patient safety incidents 
reported to the National Reporting Learning System. The extracts have been edited by the 
author to correct typographical errors and remove indecipherable text. 
 
Example 10. Email containing patient identifiable information (first name and referral dates) was 
forwarded to an incorrect staff member due to similar names. The staff member was notified by the 
sender and deleted the information with immediate action. Provider governance and information  
governance informed, voice mail left for director of clinical services/line manager. Under pressure 
from several deadlines and doing more than one task on the PC at once. No surname, address to NHS 
number were included in this email. 
 
Example 11. During clinical waster audit, 2 black bags opened to look at contents, patients’ letter 
with full details of name, address and all clinical details. Also patient address labels for another 
patient. Black waste is destroyed in land fill sites. Breach of confidential information. 
 
Example 12. Confidentiality breach to GP and family members of HIV status by Dental clinic. 
Incident being investigated as Serious Incident. 
 
Intra-operative stage 
Example 13. (Name of dental clinic) - Whilst patient under sedation undergoing procedure part, the 
bur detached from hand piece and disappeared suction checked and mouth checked. Bur not located, 
procedure stopped and patient’s was father informed. 
 
Example 14. The dentist asked for a saline solution in a syringe to irrigate a socket after extraction. 
I accidentally gave him sodium hypochlorite in a syringe labelled sodium hypochlorite. I handed the 
syringe to the dentist which he used to irrigate the socket, then by the smell he realised that it wasn't 
the saline solution and he informed me. I went and got the saline and put it in a syringe and handed 
it to the dentist and he used it to irrigate the socket. 
 
Example 15. The floor of the patient’s mouth has been cut by a high speed diamond bur 
approximately 5mm in length sublingually in LR5 / 6 area. Pt jerked during treatment causing hand 
piece to slip, thus, causing wound. 
 
Example 16. Dentist slipped with luxator during dental extraction and cut the lingual artery, the 
bleeding stopped after 2 sutures. 
 
Example 17. During root canal treatment, needle containing hypochlorite, came away from the 
syringe, causing spillage. The patient was wearing rubber dam & safety goggles, however he felt that 
some solution had passed into his left eye. Advice was sought from ophthalmology – the eye was 
washed with running water & saline – the patient is to attend A&E & eye clinic if necessary. 
 
Example 18. Patient stated she had been attending for regular check-ups, and declared dentally fit, 
until the single handed general dental practitioner retired. On a recent routine visit to locum dentist, 
patient told she needs emergency treatment or risks loss of some teeth, crowns poorly fitted and 
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These are extracts from the free-text narrative descriptions of patient safety incidents 
reported to the National Reporting Learning System. The extracts have been edited by the 
author to correct typographical errors and remove indecipherable text. 
inappropriate anyway, may need dentures, the patient is only in her 40’s. Apparent poor performance 
of previous general dental practitioner. 
 
Example 19. The patient sustained a burn to the lip with heated excavator whilst removing excess of 
gutta percha. The excavator burnt through the rubber dam but was not noticed as the patient was 
under local anaesthesia. The patient was informed and Vaseline was applied to the area. 
 
Example 20. The patient attended to dental clinic for routine care. Following the administration of 
local anaesthetic, the patient began wheezing. Asthmatic patient. 
 
Example 21. The patient suffered hypoglycaemic attack at 4:45pm after we had finished dental 
treatment. The patient had extreme shaking, her speech was extremely slurred. The patient had not 
eaten since 11:30, the patient felt unwell whilst we were doing dental treatment, but she didn't want 
to stop us. We observed the patient whilst she recovered and escorted her home. The patient suffered 
a hypoglycaemic attack and was given to glucose drinks, hypostop and some chocolate. 
 
Example 22. The patient was given topical anaesthetic followed by infiltration of local anaesthetic. 
After approximately 3-4 minutes, the patient looked unwell and head started to roll grey and sweaty. 
No recovery with oxygen and worsened on sitting upright again. 
 
Example 23. I gave a right inferior dental block. A few minutes later, the patient lost consciousness, 
rolled eyes, went stiff and slumped. The effect lasted less than a minute. The patient was very pale, 
on regaining consciousness, the patient did not remember. The treatment proceeded uneventfully. 
 
Example 24. A leak from the 3in1 equipment. It leaked during a patient having treatment and the 
patient was unhappy about getting soaked. I had not noticed sooner that there was a problem with 
the equipment. The problem with the equipment should have been reported when it was first noticed 
and not left until a patient made a complaint. Staff meeting held. All staff to report any equipment 
problems straight away to the practice manager. 
 
Example 25. I gave the patient local anaesthetic but the portable suction started to fail whilst the 
nurse was trying to aspirate. Treatment could not be completed in surgery 3. Surgery 1 had a free 
bay, therefore, the patient had to be transferred to surgery 1 in order for me to complete treatment. 
Patient care not affected. 
Post-operative stage 
Example 26. Patient came to the surgery with pericoronitis on lower right third molar and facial 
swelling. The patient was given a 1 x 3g amoxicillin sachet, which he took on the spot. We noticed 
he was allergic to penicillin, he rang his mother and she informed he once had swelling and rash 
when he was a child, no incidents since. The patient was informed of this and advised to go to 
emergencies. The staff rang NHS direct and could not advice on the situation. The p atient stayed in 
the practice for about an hour and he showed no symptoms of allergy. 
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These are extracts from the free-text narrative descriptions of patient safety incidents 
reported to the National Reporting Learning System. The extracts have been edited by the 
author to correct typographical errors and remove indecipherable text. 
 
Example 27. Patient attended the emergency clinic with a toothache. He was assessed and prescribed 
amoxicillin. The patient returned the following day as there wasn't any improvement with the pain. 
The dentist working that session noticed he had been prescribed amoxicillin but the patient was 
allergic. The dentist told the patient to stop taking the amoxicillin immediately and prescribed an 
alternative. The patient was happy with this. He had only taken one of the amoxicillin prescribed. 
 
Example 28. A prescription was made out for Amoxicillin 500mg*21 and Metronidazole 200mg*21. 
The notes said patient was allergic to penicillin. The patient has a complex medical history . The 
dentist’s concentration was on other aspects of the consultation. The dentist realised his prescribing 
error within a few minutes while writing up patient notes. Staff went out of building to see if patient 
still nearby. Patient does not have contact telephone numbers. Dentist immediately advised senior 
colleague and clinical director. 
 
Example 29. Amoxicillin 250mg three times daily was prescribed to patient for an infected socket 
after asking whether she was allergic to penicillin. Patient called in  approximately half an hour later 
saying that she has gone red in her face and is itchy on her legs advised to come back immediately . 
No stridor angioedema or wheezing, itching on her legs. Called GPs downstairs who agreed to see 
her immediately. Sent patient downstairs with a nurse and she was temporarily registered with the 
GP practice and was seen by one of the GPs. Called her in the afternoon to see how she was. Patient 
felt all right. Updated medical history regarding penicillin allergy. 
 
Example 30. Dentist gave prescription form for 3g sachet. I dispensed 250mgs capsules. Dentist 
informed, asked me to contact the patient to return for correct antibiotics. 
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4.5. Chapter summary 
In this chapter, I have employed a mixed-methods approach to analyse free-narrative 
descriptions of PSI-reports submitted to the NRLS related to primary care dentistry. In 
doing so I have characterised and identified the main PSIs, as well as their contributory 
factors and outcomes. To my knowledge, this is the first mixed-methods analysis of 
reports from primary care dentistry. The WHO’s Safer Primary Care Expert Working 
Group encourages a better understanding of PSIs and their adverse outcomes, as well 
as the identification of priority areas.3 In this chapter, as the vast majority of the 
reported incidents did not lead to harmful outcomes, priority areas based on their 
frequency in accordance with the clinical stages previously conceptualised in Chapter 
3, have been identified. The most common reported incidents from primary care 
dentistry included: a) delays in a treatment or procedure, b) procedural errors, c) 
medication-related adverse incidents, d) equipment failure and e) errors in obtaining 
or processing x-rays. Wrong-tooth extractions were the incidents with the most 
harmful outcomes, although it should be noted that most reported incidents did not 
result in patient harm. As stated in Chapter 3, the field of patient safety research in 
dentistry has progressed without adopting standardised definitions,206 therefore, in 
dentistry there is still no international agreement to distinguish  between PSIs, 
contributory factors and outcomes. To take account for this lack of agreement, in this 
Chapter I firstly employed a mixed-methods exploratory sequential design that 
allowed me to systematically deconstruct the free-narrative descriptions in PSI-reports 
into quantitative data.152, 153 I employed qualitative methods to develop the three 
coding frameworks that are shown in Appendices 8 to 10. 
The qualitative methods employed in this study comprised a thematic analysis and the 
constant comparison of the emerging themes with existing patient safety classifica t ion 
systems. The development of these frameworks was also supported by the literature 
review in Chapter 1 and evidence base obtained from the systemic scoping review 
described in Chapter 3. There frameworks were then used by myself and a second 
coder (AS) to guide the systematic quantitative coding of the reports. The recruited 
second coder was previously trained and achieved very good agreement with a 
Cohen’s Kappa statistic of 0.860 (p<0.01). This methodological approach has been 
used in other mixed-methods studies for analysing incident reports.4, 128, 220, 221 
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The reports I analysed are likely to constitute the tip of the iceberg63 as they only 
included events that were actually reported. Since its introduction in 2003, the NRLS 
has collected over 15 million incident reports; however, less than 1% of NRLS reports 
originate from primary care.222 Whilst NHS healthcare professionals might be aware 
of the NRLS, their fear of punishment from reporting incidents, the time required to 
report, and the lack of belief that reporting will lead to change, are all recognised 
barriers to submitting incident reports.222  Moreover, a challenge I encountered was to 
bring sense to the data, as Renton and Sabbah143 (2016) also reported. The data was 
largely made up of unstructured information with insufficient information about the 
demographics and disciplines involved. Such omissions limit a more in-depth 
understanding of the contexts in which the incidents occurred.  
Although the majority of the incidents did not lead to harmful outcomes, a notable 
finding was that the majority of harmful outcomes were due to wrong-tooth extractions 
(48.1%; 37/77). As a result of this incident, 34 of the 37 patients (91.9%) required 
further unnecessary procedures. As these events can be prevented, the area of 
unnecessary procedures needs to further explored; paying particular attention to those 
events with the highest potential to cause severe harm. These events resonate with the 
area of NEs, which are entirely preventable high-impact events.19 Therefore, in the 
following chapter, I will describe the process I employed to seek an expert-based 
consensus of a list of NEs for primary care dentistry through a formal international e-
Delphi study. The findings from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 were further used to support 
the third and final stage of my PhD programme (Chapter 5). 
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Chapter 5 . Developing agreement on never events in 
primary care dentistry: an international eDelphi study 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The findings from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 have provided insights into the diversity 
of PSIs and adverse outcomes occurring in primary care dentistry. Based on their 
frequency, I identified key preoperative, intraoperative and postoperative areas for 
improvement. This included include: a) delays in a treatment or procedure, b) 
procedural errors, c) medication-related adverse incidents, d) equipment failure, and 
e) errors in obtaining or processing x-rays; however, it is important to point out that 
the majority of these PSIs did not lead to harmful outcomes. I also identified wrong-
tooth extractions as another key area for improvement, an incident that was also 
identified as the main source of harmful outcomes. Wrong-tooth extractions are of 
interest within dentistry and patient safety due to their severity and high potential for 
prevention186, 202, 205, 223, 224 and, in the UK, this incident meets the criteria for a NE.19 
NEs are entirely preventable high-impact events, which are defined as serious, largely 
preventable PSIs that should not occur if the available preventive measures are 
implemented.19 The criteria from the former NPSA for defining NEs is shown in 
Chapter 1 (see Table 1.5). However, as described in Chapter 3, patient safety research 
activity in primary care dentistry is mostly descriptive without standardised definit ions 
and different methodological approaches. As a result, no systematic attempts have 
been made to identify and propose NEs for international use. Parallel to the 
development and implementation of the study described in this Chapter, Black and 
Bowie (2017) proposed an initial list of NEs for dentistry145 (see Table 5.1). However, 
the authors also recommended a more systematic approach to review the literature and 
identify other potential NEs existing within primary care dentistry. The authors also 
suggested the need to address a more diverse composition of participants to be more 
representative of primary dental care settings.  
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Table 5.1 NEs for primary care dentistry proposed by Black and Bowie141 
Black and Bowie (arranged by themes) 
A. Checking medical history and prescribing 
1. Failure to check past medical history  
2. Incorrect prescribing  
3. Extraction when INR not checked  
4. Extraction when on intravenous bisphosphonates 
 
B. Infection control and decontamination 
5. Using dirty/unsterilised equipment 
6. Reuse of single-use items. 
7. Poor infection control 
8. Not following correct hand hygiene procedures  
9. Patient contracts a blood borne virus  
 
C. Emergency drugs and equipment 
10. Emergency drugs out of date 
11. Equipment out of date 
12. No up-to-date cardio pulmonary resuscitation training 
13. Defibrillator defective or not being checked 
 
D. Extracting or restoring the wrong tooth 
14. Extracting wrong tooth 
15. Restoring wrong tooth 
16. Incorrect dental charting 
 
E. Treating the wrong patient 
17. Wrong record for the patient 
18. Wrong patient invited into the surgery 
19. Fitting the wrong lab work 
 
F. Inhalation or ingestion of foreign objects or substance 
20. Inhalation of, or swallowing, crown or instrument 
21. Not using rubber dam 
22. Hypochlorite incident 
 
G. Record keeping and referrals  
23. Forgetting to write up notes  
24. Not including enough information in a patient note 
25. No record of soft tissue examination 
26. Failure to send a referral 
27. Delay in sending a referral 
 
This current chapter provides a description of the approach I followed in this thesis to 
integrate the findings described in Chapters 3 and 4, in order to generate a list of 
candidate NEs and to achieve international expert-consensus regarding a list of NEs 
for primary care dentistry. 
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5.2 Aim 
 To develop and achieve consensus on a list of NEs through the responses from a 
panel of primary care dental experts located around the world. 
5.3 Objectives 
 To identify an international panel of experts on patient safety in primary care 
dentistry 
 To build a list of candidate NEs applicable to primary dental care settings  
 To establish an international expert consensus-based list of NEs for primary care 
dentistry. 
5.3 Methods 
I undertook a modified electronic Delphi (eDelphi) exercise based on the method 
developed by the US Research and Development Corporation (RAND) in 1948.225, 226  
The first RAND experiment was conducted in 1951, but it was not made available to 
the public until 1962, as it was originally developed to forecast the impact of 
technology on warfare.227 This method involves a formal, structured process for 
generating consensus among a group of experts based on feedback obtained from their 
anonymous responses.228-230 Such an approach is favoured in cases where little to no 
empirical or historical data exist and therefore, an aggregated group response from 
experts is needed.229, 231, 232 There were three stages to the study (see Figure 5.1): i) the 
identification of candidate NEs and questionnaire development; ii) selection of the 
experts; and, (iii) the iterative completion of a sequence of questionnaires by this panel 
of experts. The use of electronic questionnaires instead of paper-based questionna ires 
represented a modification to the originally described traditional Delphi process. I 
decided to use electronic questionnaires due to the convenience in contacting and 
recruiting panel members, as well as conducting the study with participants from 
different countries. This electronic approach has been previously used in other 
studies.233, 234  
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As shown in Table 5.2, my modified Delphi version consisted of using electronic 
questionnaires instead of paper-based questionnaires that in the past have been sent by 
traditional mail services. 
 
Table 5.2 Comparison between the RAND method and the proposed modified version 
Method Questionnaire 
format 

















Paper-based Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Modified 
version 
Electronic Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
a. Expressed in medians 
b. Variation of opinions around the median 
 
Development of questionnaire 
Findings from 
Chapter 3 - 
Scoping review 
Findings from Chapter 4 – 
Mixed-methods analysis of 
the NRLS 
Never events in other 
disciplines 
Expert consensus-based list of never events for primary care dentistry 
(i) Identification of candidate NEs and questionnaire development 
(ii) Selection of international experts  












Figure 5.1 International expert consensus-based Delphi method 
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5.3.1 Ethics 
Ethical approval for the first (Appendix 15) and second (Appendix 16) round was 
obtained from the University of Edinburgh’s Centre for Population Health Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee. (Ethics Application number 1624) 
5.3.2 Stage 1: Identification of candidate never events and 
questionnaire development 
As the Delphi method aims to make effective use of informed expert judgement,232 the 
experts needed a synthesis of available empirical evidence.225 Therefore, I used three 
approaches to identify the candidate NEs that were included in the init ia l 
questionnaire. The criteria shown in Chapter 1 (see Table 1.5) was used to define 
NEs.19 First, I used the list of potential NEs that was developed during the systematic 
review described in Chapter 3 (Table 3.5). Then, additional candidate NEs were 
identified during the mixed-method analysis of PSI-reports, as described in Chapter 4. 
I reviewed these reports to assess whether they met the NE criteria according to the 
original NPSA definition (see Table 1.5 in Chapter 1). Finally, the third approach 
constituted the revision of existing lists of NEs in hospital care, lists which were 
developed by the NPSA19 and NEs for general practice.235 Table 5.3 shows the NEs 
that I considered, based on my clinical experience, to be transferable to dentistry.  
Table 5.3 Revised list of never events from the Department of Health 19 
 Potential for transferrable 
to dentistry? 
Wrong site surgery Yes 
Wrong implant/prosthesis Yes 
Retained object post-procedure  Yes 
Mis-selection of a strong potassium-containing solution No 
Wrong route administration of medication No 
Overdose of insulin due to abbreviation or incorrect device No 
Overdose of methotrexate for non-cancer treatment No 
Mis-selection of high strength midazolam during conscious sedation No 
Failure to install functional collapsible shower or curtain rails No 
Falls from poorly restricted windows No 
Chest or neck entrapment in bedrails No 
Transfusion or transplantation of ABO-incompatible* blood components or organs No 
Mis-placed naso- or oro-gastric tubes No 
Scalding of patients No 
Note: ABO= Antibodies Blood Group 
 
Based on these approaches, I developed an initial list of candidate NEs. As shown in 
Table 5.4, these were grouped into four clinical contexts. These were conceptualised 
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as i) the period that comprises any routine assessment or check-up, ii) the period before 
clinical treatments were carried out (pre-operative stage), iii) the period of clinica l 
treatment (intra-operative stage), and iv) the period after the clinical treatment (post-
operative stage). 
Table 5.4 List of candidate never events for primary care dentistry 
Routine assessment 
Missed diagnosis of oral cancer236 
Delayed referral of patients with clinical suspicion of cancer235  
Pre-operative stage 
Mistaken patient identity 
Failure to prescribe antibiotic prophylaxis before treating root canal infections  
Procedure carried out without voluntary and signed informed consent  
Intra-operative stage 
Use of non-sterile instruments or equipment 
Use of dental material known to be allergic to the patient 
Use of outdated material 
Administration of unlabelled local anaesthetics  
Injection of wrong anaesthetic solution197 
Ingestion & aspiration of foreign objects (31, 34, 35, 47, 59, 62, 65, 85, 92, 97, 98, 105) 
Wrong tooth treated or extracted142, 180, 184, 186, 196, 197, 201, 205 
Severe apical tooth resorption due to orthodontic treatment167 
Nerve damage due to errors in treatment plan 204 
Intravascular injection of local anaesthetic176 
Acrylic set inside the mouth189 
Jaw fracture due to implant placement191 
Accidental injection of sodium hypochlorite182 
Overdose of sedatives189 
Needle stick injuries235 
 
Post-operative stage 
Retained foreign objects after surgical procedures19 
Prescription of a drug to a patient with a known allergy 
Prescription of teratogenic drug to patients known to be pregnant 235 
 
5.3.3 Stage 2: Selection of experts 
In accordance with the original Delphi method, 225, 226 a sample of 15 experts is 
recommended.225 Therefore, I identified a convenience sample of 41 potential 
participants to ensure a participation rate of at least 70% and to increase the stability 
of the responses. This sample included participants from different countries, levels of 
experience, academic backgrounds and specialties (e.g. general dentistry, paediatric 
dentistry, endodontics, oral surgery and public health) within primary dental care. 
Table 5.5 shows the criteria used for the identification and selection of experts. All 
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eligible experts received an invitation to participate (Appendix 17) by e-mail that 
included an information sheet and a consent form (Appendices 18 and 19). Participants 
were asked to read these documents and provide their voluntary signed consent before 
their participation.  
Table 5.5 Criteria for the identification of experts  
Criteria Justification 
More than three years of active 
clinical experience 
Minimum time I assumed was required for experts 
to experience their own PSIs and ascertain which 
ones should be considered never events 
More than three years of active 
academic experience 
Minimum time I assumed was required for experts 
to observe patient safety incidents committed by 
students and ascertain which ones should be 
considered never events 
Any experience in leadership roles 
within institutions or national dental 
associations 
Potential advocates for patient safety in primary care 
dentistry 
Any experience in patient safety at a 
clinical or organisational level 
To assure that participants were familiar with patient 
safety as a discipline and their concepts  
 
5.3.4 Stage 3: Iterative completion of a sequence of questionnaires 
In the first round, I distributed e-mails containing the questionnaire including the 
definition of NEs and the instructions for answering each item (Appendix 20). Each 
item corresponded to a candidate NE and included three criteria which participants 
were asked to score. These were based on the criteria of ‘preventability’, ‘severity’ 
and and the criterion ‘should be classified as never event’ outlined by the Never Events 
Policy and Framework of the NHS (Table 1.5).19 I removed the criterion surrounding 
‘the past and future risk’ as my systematic scoping review identified evidence of 14 of 
the initial list of candidate NEs being reported over a period of 20 years.206  
In accordance with the Delphi method,237 participants were asked to assign a number 
between 1 to 5  in which the number five represented the closest proximity of each 
candidate NE to meet the NE criteria displayed in Table 1.5.  Also, the experts were 
asked to provide reasons for their assigned scores and recommendations for any 
modification, addition or elimination of NEs on the list. The responses were collected, 
anonymised and summarised. Moreover, participants were asked to suggest any 
potential NE not included. A period of three weeks was given to complete and return 
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the questionnaire. The study was started on 11th September 2016. To achieve high 
response rates, three reminders were sent on the 7th, 12th and 19th day following init ia l 
contact. Non-responders were given an additional reminder on the 21st day. 
For the second round, NEs were rephrased or discarded in line with the scores, 
comments and suggestions received in the first round (Appendix 21). Participants were 
provided with the group’s median score for each item along with their responses 
(expressed in medians) and an anonymous summary of the comments received 
(Appendix 22). The respondents were asked to read this feedback and decide if their 
original scores should be changed. If they decided to modify them, they were asked to 
score the items on the same scale and provide a reason for changing their origina l 
score. Again, they were asked to provide reasons for their assigned scores and 
recommendations for modification of items, additions or elimination of NEs on the 
list. Participants then received a second and final anonymous summary of their 
comments (Appendix 23). 
5.3.5 Analysis 
After each round, all responses were collected and anonymised. Then, all the scores 
and comments were transcribed into a data collection tool using Microsoft Excel 
software.162 According to the Delphi method, after each round, median scores are 
estimated per item.226, 237 However, as participants were requested to assign scores in 
each of the three criteria for every candidate NE, I decided to summarise the overall 
score for each NE, together with the overall median scores of the three criteria for 
every candidate NE were calculated. The median of these final responses represented 
the group response.237 Any unanswered field was considered as ‘no opinion.’ The 
retrieved comments were also summarised and were analysed for the refinement of the 
list of NEs, which was included in the second round. Contrasting comments were 
grouped and compared to assess the possible inclusion of additional items. 
Percentages of agreement were assessed by grouping the overall median proportions 
of ‘agree’ and ’totally agree’. Proportions greater or equal to 80% were interpreted as 
satisfactory agreement. This procedure was repeated after each round until a consensus 
greater than, or equal to, 80% was achieved. Participants also received feedback from 
the final stage. 
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5.4 Results 
A total of 41 experts were invited to participate in the study. Out of these, 32 agreed 
to participate and provided their informed consent and completed the first round 
questionnaire. No potential participant explicitly refused to take part in the study. Of 
the 32 participants who completed the first round, 29 went on to finish the second 
round. Reasons for not completing the second questionnaire included no replies after 
the third reminder was sent (n=2) and no response after further clarification was asked 
about the answers provided. The detailed demographics and professional features of 
the expert panel are shown in Table 5.6. 


























































1 Male Argentina Prosthodontics     
2 Male Australia Public health and community  
 
 
3 Female Brazil Public health and community  
 
 
4 Male Cambodia Paediatric dentistry  
  
5 Female Cambodia Public health and community  
 
 
6 Female Chile General dentistry   
 
7 Male China Public health and community    
8 Female Colombia Geriatric Dentistry   
 
9 Male Colombia Public health and community  
 
 
10 Female Indonesia Public health and community  
 
 
11 Male Kenya Orthodontics    
 
12 Male Mexico Periodontics    
 
13 Female Mexico Paediatric dentistry   
 
14 Female Mexico General dentistry   
 
15 Female Mexico Periodontics    
 
16 Female Mexico Paediatric dentistry   
 
17 Male South Africa Public health and community    
18 Female Spain General dentistry  
 
 
19 Male Spain General dentistry  
 
 
20 Female Sudan Public health and community  
 
 




22 Female Sudan Oral and Maxillofacial surgery   
 
23 Female Sudan General dentistry   
 
24 Female Sudan Periodontics    
 
25 Female UK Sedation and Special Care Dentistry   
  
26 Male UK Orthodontics    
 
27 Female UK Government Policy and Strategy Advisor 
  
 
28 Male UK General dentistry   
 
29 Female UK Sedation and Special Care Dentistry    
 
30 Male UK Sedation and Special Care Dentistry    
 
31 Female UK Prosthodontics    
 






























































In brief, out of the 32 the participants, the majority were from UK (n=7), followed by 
Mexico and Sudan (n=5 each). There were two participants each from Cambodia, 
Colombia and Spain, and one participant each from the following countries: Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, Indonesia, Kenya, South Africa and the US. Public 
Health and Community Dentistry were the main disciplines (n=9) represented, 
followed by General Dentistry (n=6), Paediatric Dentistry (n=4), Periodontics (n=3), 
Sedation and Special Care Dentistry (n=3), and Orthodontics (n=2). See Table 5.7 
offers a full breakdown of disciplines represented. Concerning the professional roles, 
16 participants had both academic and clinical roles whereas eight had professiona l 
roles in academia and public health. Only three participants had academic, clinical and 
public health roles. 
5.4.1 First and second rounds 
We formulated 24 candidate NEs, which were incorporated into the first questionna ire. 
No agreement was reached for any of the first 24 candidate NEs in the first round. The 
scores, comments and feedback received provided the basis for refining and expanding 
the initial list into 43 candidate NEs. After the second round, the consensus was 
achieved in 23 out of the 43 candidate NEs (See Table 5.7). These NEs related to 
routine assessment (n=3), pre-operative (n=3), intra-operative (n=13) and post-
operative (n=4) stages of dental procedures. Examples of these included ‘failure to 
register patient’s history of allergies to medication’ (routine assessment), ‘failure to 
sterilise re-usable instruments’ (pre-operative), ‘wrong-tooth extractions’ 
(intraoperative) and ‘prescription of teratogenic drug to patients known to be pregnant.' 
Candidate NEs that did not reach consensus are shown in Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.7 Consensus on candidate never events after the second and final round 





























… routine assessment 
  
Failure to register patient's history of allergies to medication 5 96.6 
Failure to refer for oral cancer assessment after patient’s lesion do not heal 
after two weeks of receiving treatment 
5 93.1 
Failure to implement oral cancer screening as part of the routine assessments  5 89.7 
… pre-operative stage 
  
Treatment provided to the wrong patient 5 96.6 
Failure to check patient´s identity before implementing a procedure 5 93.1 
Failure to sterilise re-usable instruments  5 89.7 
… intra-operative stage 
  
Wrong tooth extracted 5 96.6 
Use of non-sterilised re-useable instruments 5 89.7 
Patient’s eye injured due to the omission of using appropriate eye protection  5 89.7 
Administration of unlabelled cartridge of local anaesthetics  5 89.7 
Jaw fracture during implant placement due to poor treatment plan 5 89.7 
Jaw fracture during implant placement due to its incorrect placement  5 89.7 
Injection of sodium hypochlorite into surrounding structures during root canal 
treatment/irrigation 
5 89.7 
Use of dental material in a patient with known history of allergy to the dental 
material used 
5 89.7 
Re-use of disposable items 5 86.2 
Aspiration (inhalation) of foreign objects  5 86.2 
Use of non-disinfected equipment 5 82.8 
Re-use of damaged endodontic files  5 86.2 
Injection of wrong anaesthetic solution 5 86.2 
… post-operative stage 
  
Prescription of a drug to a patient with a known allergy to the drug  5 93.1 
Prescription of teratogenic drug to patients known to be pregnant  5 93.1 
Retained foreign objects after surgical procedures  (excluding root canal 
procedures) 
5 89.7 
Incorrect medication prescribed to paediatric patients  5 89.7 
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Table 5.8 Candidate never events that did not achieve consensus 
































… pre-operative stage 
  
Failure to prescribe antibiotic prophylaxis before treating patients at risk of 
developing endocarditis  
4 79.3 
Surgical or complex procedure carried out without  voluntary and signed 
informed consent 
4 79.3 
Failure to take pre-operative radiographs prior to invasive or surgical 
procedures 
4 69.0 
… intra-operative stage 
  
Extraction in a patient with a non-medically controlled bleeding disorder 5 79.3 
Severe apical tooth resorption due to applying heavy forces during orthodontic 
treatment 
4 79.3 
Nerve damage due to errors in treatment plan 4 79.3 
Treatment performed to a patient with a previously known untreated medical 
condition that can potentially be exacerbated by the dental treatment 
5 75.9 
Wrong tooth treated (excluding extraction) 4 75.9 
Thermal injury to the pulp for not using irrigation during cavity/crown 
preparation 
4 75.9 
Overdose of sedatives  5 75.9 
Needle stick injuries 4 75.9 
Thermal injury to the soft tissues during root canal obturation with guttapercha a 4 69.0 
Ingestion (swallowing) of foreign objects  4 65.5 
Tooth extraction in a patient that received radiotherapy in the jaw or maxilla  4 65.5 
Chemical injury by dental materials  4 65.5 
Tooth extraction in a patient treated with bisphosphonates 4 62.1 
Perforation of the maxillary sinus  4 62.1 
Intravascular injection of local anaesthetic 4 62.1 
Perforation of the tooth during root canal treatment 4 58.6 
Acrylic set inside the mouth 3 48.3 
*(agree + strongly agree) 
**expressed as the median calculated from your three responses in every candidate never event  
Agreement reached 
agutta-percha obturation is a technique used in endodontic treatments to fill the root canal system 
prevent microorganisms to re-enter it  
 
5.5. Chapter summary 
In this chapter, supported by the systematic scoping review in Chapter 3 and the 
mixed-methods analysis of PSI-reports in Chapter 4, an evidence base for developing 
an initial list of 43 candidate NEs is presented. From this list it was possible to achieve 
consensus on 23 NEs. They related to four distinct categorised: i) routine assessment 
(e.g., ‘failure to register patient’s history of allergies to medication’), as well as ii) pre-
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operative (e.g., ‘failure to sterilise re-usable instruments’), iii) intra-operative (e.g., 
‘wrong-tooth extractions’) and iv) post-operative (e.g., ‘prescription of teratogenic 
drug to patients known to be pregnant’) stages of dental procedures. 
The international expert consensus-based list of 23 NEs described in this Chapter, 
matches with 10 of the 27 NEs proposed by Black and Bowie (published after the 
completion of my study).145 Although, I identified similar domains for NEs (e.g. drug 
prescription, wrong-tooth extractions, infection control practices, aspiration of foreign 
objects and treating the wrong patient), 13 of my proposed NEs did not match those 
proposed by Black and Bowie.145 However, I believe I have addressed the 
methodological concerns also highlighted in the study by Black and Bowie.145 I 
achieved this outcome by firstly developing an initial list of candidate NEs supported 
by the systematic scoping review206 as described in Chapter 3. This list was further 
complemented by the mixed-methods analysis of PSI-reports described in Chapter 4, 
and the review of established NEs in general practice235 and secondary care.19 
Secondly, I followed a structured and rigorous approach appropriately modified from 
processes developed by the RAND Corporation.225, 226 Finally, I recruited an 
international panel of professionals with clinical and academic backgrounds, as well 
as experience in public health who provided different insights about NEs. However, in 
my sample of international experts, only three public health practitioners had an active 
role in researching and disseminating findings in patient safety research relevant to 
dentistry. Therefore, as more evidence accumulates and training and education in 
patient safety training increases, the number of patient-safety focused experts are likely 
to increase. I believe my proposed list shown in Table 5.8 should be further updated, 
based on the consensus of future patient safety experts who are working in the field of 
dentistry. 
Having described my findings across the three stages of my PhD, I will now build an 
integrated discussion of my findings in each of the stages (Chapters 3 to 5) with the 
current literature (building on Chapter 1). Then, I will examine the contribution of my 
PhD to the evidence base of patient safety research in primary care dentistry. 
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Chapter 6 . Discussion and conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
During the course of this PhD, I have broadened my understanding of patient safety 
and its role within primary care dentistry. I achieved this, as described in Chapter 1, 
beginning with an overview of the relevant global empirical literature on patient safety 
research and its related terminology with a particular focus on primary care and 
dentistry. This overview of the literature allowed me to develop my aims, objectives 
and overall structure of the PhD, which is described in Chapter 2. Then, as described 
in Chapter 3, I produced a systematic summary of empirical data on the state of current 
knowledge on patient safety research in dentistry. The findings from this systematic 
scoping review revealed that progress has been hampered through a lack of 
standardised definitions.206 For example, there is still no international agreement to 
differentiate, in dentistry, between PSIs, contributory factors and outcomes. This lack 
of clarity cause me to reflect on the generalisation of the evidence generated for the 
past 20 years. However, the poor methodological consistency of the evidence also 
suggests important issues around the internal validity of the methods used. As 
Ioannidis pointed out: “The greater the flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes and 
analytical modes in a scientific field, the less likely the research findings are to be 
true.”238 To ensure the internal validity of my findings, I used standardised 
terminology and developed three evidence-based coding frameworks to bring structure 
to studies described in Chapters 3 to 5 and to draw insights from the analysed data.  
I also broadened my understanding of patient safety in primary care dentistry by 
identifying the main sources of unsafe care, their contributory factors and outcomes 
(described in Chapter 4). The most common PSIs reported from primary care dentistry 
included: i) delays in treatment, ii) procedural errors, iii) medication-related adverse 
incidents, iv) equipment failure and v) errors in obtaining or processing x-rays. 
Wrong-tooth extractions were the incidents with the most harmful outcomes.  
Although most reported incidents did not result in patient harm, the findings described 
in Chapter 4 allowed me to reflect that these incidents should be prioritised for research 
and quality improvement, instead of only focusing on those incidents that lead to harm. 
I now understand that PSIs that do not result in harm are also important sources of 
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learning, as these are more frequent than harmful PSIs and offer insights into 
underlying systemic flaws. Finally, the findings described in Chapters 3 and 4 allowed 
me to build the evidence base to develop a list of candidate NEs. This list was further 
validated in Chapter 5 through an international consensus by a group of patient safety 
experts in primary dental care. 
In this chapter, I seek to integrate the findings from the three stages of my PhD, in line 
with my introductory chapter and more recent developments in the patient safety 
literature. In doing so, I will explore the implications of my findings for policy and 
practice. Then, I reflect on the strengths and the limitations of the three phases of my 
PhD. I also offer some recommendations for future research.  
6.2 Interpretation of findings in light of the existing literature 
In the following sections of this chapter I discuss how my findings add to the gradually 
accruing evidence base of patient safety research in dentistry, as well as highlighting 
further opportunities for research and quality improvement. To achieve this outcome, 
I sought for similarities and contrasts of my findings with those reported in the existing 
literature, described in Chapter 1. My findings were also compared with emerging 
literature identified during the course of my PhD. In doing so, I further elaborated a 
discussion around the integration of my findings and propose recommendations for  
practice, policy and research. 
6.2.1 Patient safety incidents 
Primary care dentistry is a discipline which is mainly focused on intra-operative 
processes. This focus was consistent in my findings as the most frequently reported 
PSIs in the literature (Chapter 3) and the NRLS (see Table.4.4, Chapter 4) were intra-
operative incidents. Having analysed the free-narrative descriptions of PSIs submitted 
to the NRLS, intra-operative incidents such as procedural errors, medication-related 
adverse incidents, equipment failure, and errors in obtaining or processing x-rays 
remained among the most frequent incidents regardless of clinical stage. After having 
explored the common underlying factors to these incidents, I found that equipment 
failure was both a PSI and a contributory incident. On the one hand, as a PSI, 
equipment failure was mainly related to lack of equipment maintenance and poor 
equipment design; on the other hand, I found equipment failure to be a shared 
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contributory incident between procedural errors and errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays. The latter PSIs also shared distraction as a main contributory factor. However, 
I also found that among the main PSIs, their contributory incidents were not shared 
between each other. Contributory incidents for procedural errors also included 
insufficient assessment. Moreover, medication-related adverse incidents were mainly 
due to the patient’s previous health-related conditions and/or non-compliance from the 
patient.  
When I compared the distribution of the intra-operative incidents with the existing 
literature, I found similar proportions of incidents related to inhalation and ingestion 
of foreign objects (4%), adverse reactions (4%) and wrong-tooth extractions (2%), as 
reported by Thusu et al. (2012) who also analysed reports from the NRLS.142 However, 
their study142 was limited to describing single- incidents submitted over a period of one 
year (2009), whereas I analysed multiple-incident reports over a period of eight years, 
and further identified combinations of incidents and their reported contributory factors. 
My findings also showed that incidents related to equipment failure accounted for 
6.2% of all incident types, and were also the third most common incident within the 
intra-operative stage (11.0%). This incident type has also been reported by Perea-Perez 
et al. and201 Hiivala et al.197, 239 Other previously reported incidents were inhalation 
and ingestion of foreign objects through the revision of relatively small samples of AE 
case reports,240 malpractice cases,201 and dental patient records.140 Wrong-tooth 
extractions were identified as the main source of harmful incidents. Although not 
frequent (2.7%), these incidents have been studied previously142, 143  as they meet the 
criteria of NEs, which should be entirely preventable high-impact incidents.19  
Although my findings show that intra-operative incidents were predominant among 
the main PSIs (56.1%; 817/1,456), the distribution of PSIs per clinical stage differed  
by 8.4% when compared with the distribution reported by Thusu et al.142(47.7%; 
960/2,012). Probable reasons for these discrepancies are likely related to (1) the 
different NHS-coded filters used within to select the reports, (2) the different 
approaches to structuring and coding incidents, contributory factors and their 
outcomes and (3) the increase of incident reporting through the years due to increasing 
awareness of patient safety, also known as the ‘rising tide phenomena’.241 These 
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discrepancies also highlight misclassification issues for the measurement and 
identification of priorities for PS, in the absence of a standardised classification system 
for patient safety in primary care dentistry. Although most of my identified incidents 
occurred intraoperatively (56.1%; 817/1456), I also identified that preceding incidents 
or contributory factors such as equipment failure, unexpected movement of the patient 
and lack of equipment maintenance have a role among intra-operative incidents.  
The most frequent pre-operative incidents I identified were delays in treatment, 
incorrect or unavailable documentation and breaches of confidentiality. Common 
specific contributory incidents and/or contributory factors between them were not 
found. My findings show that contributory incidents for delays in treatment were 
mostly flaws within administrative procedures (e.g. errors in managing appointments) 
whereas the contributory incidents for incorrect or unavailable documentation were 
IT-errors and inefficient transfer of information between healthcare settings. 
Contributory incidents for PSIs involving breaches of confidentiality as these were 
related to wrong medical records and errors from the staff (e.g. failure to adhere to 
procedures or regulations and distraction). However, when I compared the common 
underlying factors between the intra-and pre-operative incidents, I found that 
equipment-related events were also present as contributory factors (e.g. lack of 
equipment maintenance and lack of supplies) for patients experiencing delays in 
treatment. When compared with the literature, only Obadan et al.240 (2015) had 
previously identified delays in treatment. Although I identified more detailed types of 
incidents, conceptual similarities are appreciated with the clerical errors (36%), 
management errors (4%) and communication errors (5%) identified by Thusu et al.142 
Diagnostic and communication errors between the dentist and the patient have also 
been reported by Hiivala et al.197, 239  
Post-operative incidents were the least reported events.206 Although I identified post-
operative medication-related PSIs (e.g. prescription or dispensing), these accounted 
for 3.6% (52/1456) of all the reported incidents. Perea-Perez et al.201 and Hiivala et 
al.197, 239 have previously identified medication-related PSIs. However, PSIs related to 
prescription of medications, or their dispensing, remain largely unreported. A potential 
reason behind the insufficient reporting of medication related PSI may be explained 
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by a generalised assumption, as discussed in Chapter 1, that healthcare delivery in 
dentistry is safer than that which is delivered in secondary care. Therefore, any dental 
staff and patients are less likely to report incidents that resulted or could result in 
avoidable harm. Patient safety culture should therefore be fostered through the 
profession to encourage incident reporting.  
6.2.2 Contributory incidents and contributory factors 
According to the report from the Institute of Medicine (now the National Academy of 
Medicine),16 the majority of medical errors are due to faulty systems and processes. 
Reason´s Swiss Cheese Model of System Accidents,30 and the evidence-based 
Yorkshire Contributory Factors framework55 for hospital settings, have been 
developed to demonstrate that human errors are often a consequence of latent 
organisational flaws, such as administrative or management issues. However, the 
findings described in my systematic scoping review (Chapter 3) suggest that the roles 
played by administrative and organisational factors in the occurrence of PSIs have 
scarcely been explored in primary care dentistry.206 The limited body of evidence 
identified found that administrative errors,142 equipment failure,142, 197, 239 and errors 
for obtaining or processing x-rays142 are the main causes of PSIs in primary care 
dentistry. Other contributory factors include patient factors (e.g. elderly patients, 
patients with disabilities), staff factors (e.g. distraction, fatigue and economising in the 
dental practice) and organisational factors (e.g. switching dentists, inadequate ly 
trained staff and insufficient post-treatment follow-up). 197, 239 However, these studies 
have mostly provided a general description of contributory factors.  
In this PhD, I systematically reviewed the literature in Chapter 3 and built the 
evidence-base to further develop, in Chapter 4, empirical coding frameworks for PSIs 
and their contributory factors. I then assessed multiple incidents per report and 
structured these in chronological order from which I also obtained combinations of 
incidents. These combinations comprised of respective contributory incidents (which 
preceded primary incidents) and contributory factors (which influenced the occurrence 
of primary incidents).  
When data were available, and regardless of the distribution per clinical stage, the 
contributory incidents for the main primary incidents were: a) the patients’ inability to 
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access the dentist, b) equipment failure and c) errors in managing appointments. The 
main contributory factors for the main primary incidents were: a) distraction, b) 
insufficient staff members and c) lack of equipment maintenance. For the main 
harmful incident, which was wrong-tooth extraction, distraction from the dentist was 
identified as the main contributory factor. Although distraction has been reported in 
the literature,143 i) inadequate checks, ii) incorrect radiographs, and iii) wrong 
diagnoses have also been reported as causes for wrong-tooth extraction.143  
6.2.3 Outcomes 
The overall characterisation of outcomes in Chapters 3 and 4 showed a clear distinct ion 
between local and systemic adverse outcomes. In Chapter 3, I conceptualised the term 
“systemic adverse outcomes” to include a variety of specific events that have been 
used in the literature to describe medical emergencies142 and systemic 
complications.240 These systemic adverse outcomes included allergic reactions 
(including anaphylaxis), vasovagal responses, faint/loss of consciousness and seizures 
and dizziness.142, 197, 240 I also compared these outcomes with those I identified and 
characterised in Chapter 4 (see Appendix 10) and found similar systemic adverse 
outcomes. Although a variety of systemic outcomes was identified in Chapter 4, my 
findings also show that these outcomes were mainly a consequence of medication-
related adverse incidents.  
In Chapter 3, I conceptualised the term “local adverse outcomes” to include a variety 
of events that were described as injuries142 including include lacerations, sharps, burns, 
nerve damage and damage to the temporomandibular joint197, 201, 240 These local 
adverse outcomes were similar to those I identified and characterised in Chapter 4 in 
order to develop the framework of incident outcomes (see Appendix 10). Then, after 
coding the free narrative descriptions within the NRLS-reports, I identified 
lacerations/bleeding, chemical injuries and thermal injuries as the main local outcomes 
reported. In Chapter 3, my findings also showed that the majority of reported PSIs, 
noted in the literature over the past two decades are, mostly related to local and 
immediate adverse outcomes (see Table 3.4). From the retrieved articles, it appears 
that the main concern for reporting these in the literature is the severity of harm. 166, 170, 
172, 174, 178, 180, 183, 184, 190, 193, 196 , 201 Malpractice studies were the main source for the 
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identification of adverse outcomes in my systematic scoping review.206 Cases included 
in such studies might involve incidents where the harm was severe enough to raise 
sufficient concern for patients to seek legal and financial compensation.28, 242 
Therefore, as the field of patient safety grows within dentistry, the quality and thus 
contents within all available patient safety data sources for research, also need to be 
improved. To achieve this improvement, further studies should not be limited to only 
reporting severe harm incidents, but should also report near misses and/or no harm 
incidents.  
The adverse outcomes I identified in Chapter 3 may constitute the tip of the iceberg as 
near-misses and less severe AEs are often unreported,63 my systematic scoping review 
showed gaps about the relation to PSIs leading to less severe harm or no harm. As 
described in Chapter 4, the majority of outcomes resulted in either no harm or low 
harm (94.7%; 1,379/1,1456). As shown in Table 4.8, the frequency of these outcomes 
is higher than harmful incidents. Near misses and no harm incidents can be analysed 
for the identification of risk and hazards58 without waiting for enough harmful 
incidents to accumulate and be analysed. Therefore, in Chapter 4 I expanded the 
characterisation of adverse outcomes and also included other organisational and non-
harmful outcomes within the identified no harm incidents. In doing so, I compared my 
findings in Chapters 3 and 4. This comparison showed that, although local and 
systemic adverse outcomes were identified, only lacerations/bleeding (99/1,420; 
6.8%) were among the most commonly described outcomes. Other non-adverse 
outcomes such as the increased documentation/follow-up (12.4%; 181/1,456), delays 
in using the dental clinic (5.8%; 85/1,456), unnecessary x-ray exposure (5.1%; 
74/1,456) and repeated procedures/additional treatment (4.9%; 71/1,456) were more 
frequent than other local and systemic adverse outcomes. Although these outcomes 
did not result in harm, their identification showed the presence of flaws in the provision 
of efficient and effective primary dental care, which represent dimensions for quality 
improvement, as proposed by the IOM32 (see Table 1.2 in Chapter 1). Moreover, the 
over-utilisation of healthcare services can a) contribute to future unnecessary harm, b) 
result in additional financial demands for the patient and c) cause waste of resources 
within the healthcare system.243In Chapter 3, I also identified other non-immed iate 
adverse outcomes (see Table 3.4) such as nerve damage, 166, 170, 174, 183, 184, 190, 192, 196, 200, 
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201 post-treatment infection, 170, 174, 175, 178, 180, 184, 185, 189, 190, 197, 201  prolonged pain172, 180, 
184, 196 and temporomandibular complications,184, 190, 196, 201 all of which can take weeks 
or months to be detected following treatment. Although temporomandibular joint 
complications were also reported within the NRLS, these and other non-immed iate 
adverse outcomes represent a challenge to be associated with any traceable potential 
contributory factors. To address this challenge, standardised and updated dental 
records are required to screen any potential PSIs and outcomes that might occur in the 
course of the patient’s treatment. However, this strategy should also include a follow 
up and registration of any potential non-immediate adverse outcomes. Kalenderian et 
al.198 have shown the potential of a trigger tool adapted for dentistry to identify adverse 
outcomes located within electronic health records. In their study, the authors employed 
information about ‘incision and drainage’ and ‘multiple visits’ to identify cases of 
infection, temporomandibular joint complications and tooth fractures.198 
6.2.4 Never events 
In Chapter 5, I achieved international expert consensus in 23 out of 43 candidate NEs 
(See Table 5.8), as well as matching with 10 of the 27 NEs proposed by Black and 
Bowie (published after the completion of my study).145 Although not exact, I identified 
similar domains for NEs (e.g. drug prescription, wrong-tooth extractions, infect ion 
control practices, aspiration of foreign objects and treating the wrong patient). 
However, I also found discrepancies since 13 of my proposed NEs did not match those 
identified by Black and Bowie.145 Of the 17 remaining NEs, five of them were similar 
to candidate NEs used during the first and second round of my study. These were: a) 
mistaken patient identity, b) wrong-tooth treated (excluding extraction), c) tooth 
extraction in patients treated with bisphosphonates, d) use of outdated material and e) 
ingestion of foreign objects. However, these were not included in my list as I did not 
achieve consensus equal or greater than 80%. Probable reasons for discrepancies, 
regarding the the rest of the 12 NEs that did not match my list, are the process for 
identification of candidate NEs and the composition of experts. Black and Bowie145  
initially conducted a rapid literature review and then held workshops with dental 
practitioners. My list, however, was developed and structured in accordance with the 
conceptualised stages in my systematic scoping review206described in Chapter 3. Black 
and Bowie145 identified a sample of experts in Scotland whereas my sample of experts 
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had a more heterogeneous and international composition. Moreover, the feedback I 
received from the experts, during the first and second rounds, highlighted that 
recommendations, guidelines and availability of clinical/environmental resources 
were likely to be different between countries. This feedback suggests that, although 
similar concerns around NEs are shared, the presence of different resources between 
countries, for the provision of quality dental care provided the experts with a different 
knowledge-base and experience. These differences highlight the need to standardise 
guidelines and recommendations for clinical procedures, which need to be shared 
between countries. However, the differing clinical resources also highlight that 
countries are likely to have own contextually appropriate local patient safety concerns. 
Therefore, the possibility of establishing agreement on country-specific lists of NEs 
should also be explored. 
6.3 Literature update 
In the course of my PhD, I periodically reviewed and updated the literature. In doing 
so, I broadened my view and therefore my understanding of patient safety and how its 
research and developments have been constructed around primary care dentistry over 
time.  
6.3.1 Continuous efforts to reinforce patient safety 
The WHO and other national bodies have continued their efforts to encourage 
healthcare providers and regulatory bodies to continuously improve the quality of care. 
Previous, scarcely explored areas such as under-utilisation244 and over-utilisation245 of 
services, as well as patient safety in primary care,117, 246 are also now receiving 
attention. The global extent of under-utilisation of healthcare services has been 
recently explored.244 In their study, Glasziou et al. reported that under-utilisation of 
care is an issue prevalent in both high- and low-income economies. Factors 
contributing to this issue broadly are: a) inaccessible healthcare services to the patient, 
b) the unavailability of effective services, for instance the result of a lack of resources, 
c) the clinician’s failure to provide effective care, and d) the patients’ (inadequate) 
compliance and adherence to effective healthcare interventions.244 When I compared 
these factors with my findings, I found that issues of accessibility to the dentist and 
unavailability of effective services were also present in my data. These issues were 
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mainly related, as a contributory incident or a contributory factor, to patients 
experiencing delays in receiving treatment, which was the main PSI reported within 
the NRLS data. Therefore, these findings reveal that under-utilisation of services 
primary dental care services is also a prevalent issue in patient safety. 
The global extent of over-utilisation of healthcare services has also been explored. In 
their study, Brownlee et al 245 reported that, although over-utilisation is a recognised 
problem globally, its significance has not been clearly defined. In this article, the 
authors highlighted the over-utilisation of medications, screening tests, diagnostic tests 
and therapeutic procedures as areas in which overuse has the potential to affect patients 
and/or healthcare systems. When I compared these factors with my findings, I found 
that repeated procedures/additional treatments and unnecessary x-ray exposures were 
among the more frequent reported outcomes. These outcomes were even more frequent 
that other local or systemic adverse outcomes. Therefore, these findings reveal that 
over-utilisation of services in primary dental care is also an issue that can be easily 
overlooked by researchers, policy makers and members of the dental profession. This 
point is also reflected in the focus of patient safety research when reporting harmful 
outcomes, described in Chapter 3. 
Following the Safer Primary Care report,3 the WHO released their technical series to 
provide member states with a common body of evidence around key issues in primary 
care for building national capacity in designing and delivering safe healthcare delivery. 
These technical series broadly include patient engagement247 and education, in 
addition to training the healthcare workforce,248 including human factors.249 Other 
areas covered in these technical series are the process-related issues in healthcare 
delivery, such as administrative errors,250 diagnostic errors,251 medication errors,252 
multiborbidity253 and transitions of care.254 Guidance for the use of information and 
communication technologies in health,255 also known as eHealth, is also available. In 
addition to these technical series, the WHO released the third global challenge toward 
the reduction of severe, avoidable medication-related harm by 50% in the following 5 
years.256 
In the US, 15 years after the publication of To Err is Human brought worldwide 
attention to patient safety,16 the NPSF (now part of the IHI) convened an expert panel 
Discussion  97 
to discuss the current state of patient safety. As a result, the report Free from Harm 
was released to reinforce the importance of patient safety, as the subject remains to be 
an important public health issue.246 This report also reinforces the need for more focus 
on previously under recognised aspects of patient safety in primary care, such as 
overuse and underuse of treatments, misdiagnosis and complications of care.246  
 
6.3.2 Progress within the UK 
In the UK, 16 years after the publication of An Organisation with a Memory,17 the 
NHS’s Imperial Patient Safety Translational Research Centre issued the Patient Safety 
2030 report117 and the NRLS Research and Development report222 to reinforce the need 
for patient safety across the healthcare system. On the one hand, the Patient Safety 
2030 report117 this report acknowledged the issue of patient safety as a shared goal 
throughout healthcare systems worldwide, stressing the point that it is not a matter 
which should be limited to high-income economies.117 This report also recommended 
that international collaboration should focus, over the next 30 years, on the 
identification of common patient safety issues, including the measurement of a core 
set of high-level trends.117 These trends are: a) the increasing complexity of cases and 
multi-morbidities as the population gets older by living longer, b) the reduction or 
limitation of resources as the demand for care increases, c) the increasing sophisticated 
solutions in care and d) the rise of antimicrobial resistance.117 On the other hand, the 
NRLS Research and Development report222 highlighted the need for the existing NRLS 
to be improved and that they should be integrated with other existing incidents. This 
need for the integration of reporting systems resonates with the need highlighted by 
Renton et al.,257 also for an integrated approach to the reporting PSIs in dentistry. In 
their article, the authors highlighted that the wide variety of reporting systems can 
bring complexity and confusion to report incidents. The consequences of this 
complexity have been reported by Renton et al.143 after they reviewed serious events 
and NE reports relevant to dentistry in the NRLS and STEIS databases. In their study, 
the reports were found to be incorrectly coded, were missing information and, in some 
cases, were duplicated within the same database.143 The NRLS Research and 
Development report222 also highlights the need to employ better IT approaches in order 
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to simplify incident reporting and to analyse the vast amount of accumulated reports. 
As the reports contain unstructured narratives of the PSIs, natural language processing 
(NLP) has emerged as an important area within patient safety research. NLP offers a 
set of informatics tools capable of transforming text into a structured format that can 
be used for research.258 Extraction systems, based on NLP, have been developed in the 
medical domain,259 however, these systems have not yet been introduced in dentistry. 
Following the Patient Safety 2030117 and NRLS Research and Development222 reports, 
NHS England announced the development of the Patient Safety Incident Management 
System (PSIMS), as the successor of the existing NRLS.260 
6.3.3 Increasing awareness of, and attention to, patient safety in 
dentistry 
As described in Chapter 3, the field of patient safety in primary dental care has been 
poorly organised for the past 20 years. Fortunately, in the course of my PhD, I 
discovered more organised efforts to address unsafe dental care practices have started 
to emerge. At an international level, the FDI has recently released three policy 
statements to be adopted by its country members. The first policy highlights the 
imperative for quality in dentistry,261 which promotes the inclusion of competencies 
on quality as part of the full range of dental education and training, as well as the 
implementation of quality improvement practices. The second policy statement 
concerns the responsibility of dentists to implement evidence-based practices,262  
which encourage: a) the incorporation of the principles of evidence-based dentistry 
(EBD) in the dental curriculum, and also in continuing professional education and b) 
use the BD approach to help dentists interpret and apply the best available evidence in 
everyday practice. Finally, the third policy statement encourages country members to 
raise awareness among dentists and staff members about the risks of using non-
compliant dental products with regulatory agencies.263  
In the UK, in December 2015, the England’s Regulation of Dental Services 
Programme Board released The Future of Dental Service Regulation report.264 This 
document highlighted the absence of a clear model of regulation, with no clear 
definition of roles and responsibilities between organisations resulting in a confusing 
system, which can lead to duplication of efforts and inefficiencies within the system. 
Moreover, the report highlights the absence of a common data set focusing on quality 
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and safety that would enable regulators to establish overall safety of dental services 
across England. However, the report also highlights opportunities for improvement, 
including support for quality improvement.  
Then, in 2016 the corporate strategy report: Patients, Professionals, Partners, 
Performance report was released by the GDC.265 In this document, the GDC described 
their 2016-2019 plan for improving the regulation of dentistry/dental practices. This 
plan seeks to improve four main areas: a) patient-centred system, b) continuous 
support to dental professionals in delivering good quality dental care, c) effective 
regulation of dentistry and complaint procedures and d) efficient, effective and 
innovative regulation in line with the standards set by the Professional Standards 
Authority.265 Then, in the same year, the GDC also released the Shifting the balance: 
a better, fairer system of dental regulation report,266 which mentions that a “good 
regulation should be focused first and foremost in learning”. Moreover, this report 
included specific proposals for actions, which broadly required the GDC to improve 
the standards for the dental team, as well initiating improvements within the education 
and continuous professional development of the dentistry profession. Therefore, this 
approach that focuses on learning, aligns with the purpose of the NRLS and the data I 
analysed, which represents an important source of learning and improvement in 
primary dental care.  
The field of patient safety research in dentistry has also started to generate more robust 
findings via standardised methods and terminology. Recent studies oriented towards 
patient safety in primary care dentistry have focused on the characterisation of PSIs 
and AEs. Maramaldi et al.267 published a primary classification of AEs based on 
feedback from dental professionals and domain experts obtained through focus groups 
and interviews. Then, over the course of one year, this preliminary classification of 
AEs was further refined by Kalenderian et al.268 This classification system of AEs 
shares similarities with the systemic and local outcomes I identified in Chapter 4. 
However, my characterisation of outcomes was not limited to adverse outcomes as I 
expanded the characterisation of harmful outcomes and included no-harm outcomes, 
such as non-clinical outcomes in patients and organisational outcomes. Another 
contribution to the evidence base was provided by Hiivala et al.,239 whose research 
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also characterised PSIs and assessed multiple contributory factors. However, their 
study was limited to report frequencies of these factors and did not explore the  
chronological sequence of those leading to the main incident. When compared with 
my findings, I also identified multiple incidents; however, I employed the Recursive 
Model for incident Analysis216 to identify the chronological sequence of PSIs with 
their respective contributory incidents and contributory factors (see Appendixes 12 to 
14).  
6.4 Implications for policy and practice 
Policy. Following To Err is Human, national PSI reporting systems were proposed to 
enable national- level learning about PSIs. In the UK, the NRLS in England and Wales 
has generated many lessons to improve patient safety. Examples in secondary care 
include the patient safety alerts for the risk of inadvertently cutting in-line (closed) 
suction catheters269 and the risk of using different airway humidification devices 
simultaneously.270 However, patient safety in dentistry is still in its early development 
and needs a clear patient safety-focused agenda. I believe the more frequent and 
harmful incidents described in Chapter 4 and the proposed list of NEs in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis can be used to inform administrators, dental associations and policymakers 
about the need for the development of interventions and policies. This initiative should 
be done at a national level by taking into consideration how dentistry is organised and 
financed within each country. In the UK, my findings can be used to inform the GDC’s 
Patients, Professionals, Partners, Performance strategy265 and the Revised Never 
Events Policy and Framework.87 Data from incident reporting systems need to be part 
of a continuous quality improvement agenda set within those countries. The WHO’s 
Safer Primary Care report 38 highlights many areas for research and development; my 
thesis adds new insights which warrant consideration to update the agenda which 
should now include dentistry.141, 271 The Council of European Dentists has already 
recommended use of incident reporting systems in dentistry,141 and these should now 
be either developed exclusively for the profession, or integrated into existing reporting 
systems for healthcare, such as the NRLS. Advocates supporting these reporting 
systems by specialty are also needed4 and dentistry is no exception. 
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Any dentistry-focused initiative needs to be supported by clear regulations and policies 
that allow private and healthcare-funded dental practices to report all incidents, 
preferably to a single system. Currently, as Renton and Master highlighted,257 mult ip le 
regulations by, for example, the GDC, the CQC and NHS England towards incident 
reporting by dentists in the UK, create complexity and unclear processes for dentists 
to follow. Parallel to the development of PSIMS, national policies for patient safety 
assurance within independent and NHS funded primary dental care services need to be 
either adapted from existing policies for medicine or developed in their own right. 
Such policies should include the use of standardised concepts of PSI and AEs, 
including clearly defined serious incidents and NEs for dentistry. The WHO’s 
International Classification for Patient Safety,29 and more recently the Minimal 
Information Model for Patient Safety, provide a common vocabulary for reporting and 
learning from PSIs.272 Policies for the standardised reporting of PSIs should be 
implemented across the profession, combined with ensuring appropriate clinica l 
governance to monitor and learn from PSIs, near misses and their outcomes. 
The concept of ‘never event’ was first introduced by Kizer in 2001 to describe the 
‘most egregious health care errors’ that shouldn’t ever occur.273 However, definit ions 
for NEs vary between countries274 and therefore making comparisons between 
countries is therefore challenging. 275 In the UK, Renton and Sabbah143 have even 
reported discrepancies between the reports from two databases for cases of wrong-
tooth extractions. These reports were also largely unstructured and were missing 
information about demographics, outcomes and learning points. Therefore, patient 
safety organisations, policy makers and dentistry communities need to: a) establish 
standards for the accuracy of NEs derived from administrative data and b) agree on a 
standard definition of a NE. 274 I believe my proposed list of NEs is a sound starting 
point for operationalising NEs to improve safety in practice, as well as facilita t ing 
further integration into existing reporting systems, such as the NRLS or PSIMS in the 
UK. Then, policies like the Framework for the Identification and Management of 
Never Events87, 88 from the NHS should be either developed or adapted for dentistry, 
to be supported by education and training efforts, as well as clear policies for no-blame 
reporting or disciplinary actions.53 
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Practice. Initiatives to improve quality, including patient safety, in primary care 
dentistry should focus on improving the main sources of unsafe care. My research 
highlights consistent issues reported over the past eight years mainly in the intra -
operative stage during which contributory incidents and contributory factors were 
mostly identified in the pre-operative stage. Therefore, I recommend improving the 
pre-clinical processes to reduce delays affecting patients receiving treatments or 
procedures by improving the communication between staff members and practices. 
Failures in communication and teamwork are one of the main issues in primary care 
delivery.22 From a system-based perspective, policies should be developed to create 
an infrastructure at a national level to build and maintain professional networks and 
services to enable professionals to communicate and learn from each other.248 
Effective primary care teams, health information technology, effective transitions of 
care, effective diagnostic services and patient engagement are opportunities for patient 
safety improvement in primary care.249  
I also recommend efforts to enable standardisation of intra-operative procedures. 
Many treatments or procedures in dentistry do not follow established evidence-based 
guidelines.148 Therefore, these guidelines should be developed for further 
implementation and evaluation by national regulatory bodies supported by the law 
with agreed standards for performance.276 Examples of these regulatory bodies within 
the UK include the Professionals Standards Authority98 which oversees independent 
regulatory bodies such as the GMC99 and the GDC.100 These regulatory agencies, in 
their areas of interest, set the standards of competence and conduct that healthcare 
professionals must meet to obtain and maintain their registration and fitness to 
practice. One additional function of such agencies is to review the content and quality 
of education and training courses. Pre-service and in-service education relating to 
patient safety needs to be discipline-oriented in accordance with a system-based 
perspective to facilitate its sustainable improvement.248 Other measures to tackle 
patient safety include the inspections undertaken by the CQC78 and the NCAS for 
poorly performing dentists, doctors and pharmacists 102 Another strategy learned from 
the human factors research undertaken in hospital-based studies is to reduce the 
reliance on memory, attention or perception.105 Examples of this strategy include 
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patient safety checklists for oral surgery,277 endodontic procedures,278 wrong-tooth 
extractions223 and dental implant placement.279  
Although the effectiveness of these checklists has not yet been tested in dentistry, 2 6  
implementation could have a significant impact on prevention of wrong-tooth 
extractions. These have been classified as a “never events” due to both their severity 
and their high degree of preventability.143, 280 I also recommend the periodic 
maintenance of all dental equipment, since faulty equipment was the fourth most 
common reported incident in my analysis. Moreover, it was also identified as a 
contributory factor for procedural errors and errors for obtaining or processing x-rays. 
Regardless of the type of incident or outcome, the integration of patient safety 
principles and concepts into the daily practice of clinicians and leaders is a necessary 
step to reduce all types PSIs and their adverse outcomes.281 My recommendations also 
resonate with the 11 recently proposed basic practices/procedures by Perea et al.282 
(2015) for patient safety in dentistry. These broadly encourage: i) improvement in the 
areas of patient safety culture, ii) quality of medical records, iii) infection control 
practices, iv) medication prescribing, v) avoidance of unnecessary x-ray exposure and 
vi) usage of procedural checklists. However, a likely difficulty exists around how to 
most effectively foster an environment receptive to change.283 Facilitators for a patient 
safety culture include the recognition of the risks of oral healthcare delivery through 
all health sectors and dental associations, as well as the integration of patient safety 
into the curricula of dental schools and within the organisational structure of dentistry.  
151 The WHO’s patient safety curriculum guides have outlined the core learning 
requirements for healthcare professionals.121, 122 Online courses such as those provided 
by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement Open School, 284-286 are also valuable 
resources to help dental schools to integrate patient safety education into the 
professional curricula in dentistry.  
6.5 Reflection on strengths and limitations 
To reflect on the strengths and limitations of the studies conducted in my doctoral 
research, I have to highlight my previous experience as a clinical practitioner in 
primary care dentistry and additional training in Health Sciences (Master in Sciences). 
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I consider my previous experience as both a strength and a limitation that influenced 
my judgements about the methodological approaches described in this thesis.  
Strengths. My background can be viewed as a strength, as I familiar with primary care 
dentistry as a discipline and the related clinical procedures. This previous 
understanding was reflected in the conceptualisation, data collection, interpretat ion 
and analysis of the information retrieved in the systematic scoping review, described 
in Chapter 3. These processes were further reinforced by employing published 
guidelines.154, 155 The systematic scoping review method provided a comprehens ive 
overview of the published empirical evidence on patient safety research in the field of 
primary care dentistry. I used a broad search strategy to retrieve as many potential 
articles as possible. Taking into consideration that quality assessment is not a 
component of scoping reviews,163 the anticipated wide variety of studies allowed me 
to cover a broad range of relevant literature for analysis. Although patient safety 
research in primary care dentistry lacks a standardised terminology, I employed my 
clinical experience supported by internationally agreed terminology developed for 
patient safety research in hospital medicine. In doing so, I grouped the emerging AEs 
and PSIs into the major concepts shown in Figure 3.3. Then, I conceptually mapped 
and organised the PSIs and AE that were reported (see Tables 3.3 and 3.3). These steps 
provided the overall evidence-based structure I followed to understand PSIs (Chapter 
4) and used to build consensus on my list of NEs (Chapter 5). The experience of 
submitting the manuscript of the systematic scoping review for publication, and 
responding to peer-reviewed comments, advanced my understanding of the method I 
employed in Chapter 3. This experience also allowed me to raise my awareness on 
improving the methodological approaches described in Chapters 4 and 5. 
It is also important to highlight that the study described in Chapter 4 builds on a wider 
NHS-funded project, “Characterising the nature of primary care patient safety 
incident reports in England and Wales: mixed methods study”, which was hosted at 
Cardiff University with The University of Edinburgh as a collaborator in this work. 
Thanks to this support, I held continuous discussions with colleagues at Cardiff 
University which helped me to bring more structure to the study, as described in 
Chapter 4. Having obtained an evidence-based conceptual structure in Chapter 3, I 
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discussed this structure with my supervisors and colleagues at Cardiff University. This 
process resulted in the agreement to employ a mixed-methods approach to 
systematically deconstruct the narratives present in the PSI reports into quantitat ive 
data.152, 153 In conducting this method, I demonstrated the consistency of code 
application of primary PSIs by recruiting a second coder and achieving very good 
agreement with a Cohen’s kappa statistic of 0.860 (p<0.01). This mixed-methods 
approach, at a conceptual level, mirrors the sequence of incidents described in the 
Swiss Cheese Model of System Accidents proposed by Reason,30 that was discussed 
in Chapter 1. Moreover, this method has been used in other studies208-210, 220, 221 and 
has received positive reviews.287 To my knowledge, the study described in Chapter 4 
is the first mixed-methods analysis of reports from primary care dentistry. 
Finally, I used the findings from Chapter 3 and 4 to build the evidence base and 
generate a list of candidate NEs. I used this list to seek, in Chapter 5, an internationa l 
experts’ consensus-based list of NEs. In doing so, I have addressed the methodologica l 
concerns highlighted in the study by Black and Bowie.145 Firstly by developing an 
initial NE-list supported by a comprehensive and systematic scoping review206  
(described in Chapter 3) complemented by a mixed methods review of patient safety 
reports from primary dental care in a national PSI reporting system (described in 
Chapter 4). The review also included established NEs in general practice235 and 
secondary care. 19 Secondly, I followed a structured and rigorous approach 
appropriately modified from processes developed by the RAND Corporation.  225, 226 
Finally, I recruited an international sample of professionals with clinical and academic 
backgrounds, as well as experience in public health services, who provided different 
insights of NEs. As a result I obtained a consensus from a more diverse composition 
of participants and thus, information that was more representative of, and relevant to, 
primary care dentistry. 
Limitations. The heterogeneity of evidence retrieved in Chapter 3 posed challenges 
for the interpretation of the extracted data. Individually, the gathered data from each 
article was generated for specific and narrow objectives, which represented a challenge 
for data extraction and for the conceptual mapping and organising of the PSIs and AEs. 
To address this issue, I employed my clinical experience and internationally agreed 
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terminology to initially extract data about the emerging AEs and PSIs, which were 
later grouped into the major concepts shown in Figure 3.3. These concepts were also 
synthesised164 and integrated in Tables 3.3 and 3.3. In doing so, I focussed on 
extracting data from particular incidents that I believed matched my experience and 
terminology, whilst potentially neglecting other incidents. I therefore acknowledge 
that my conceptual framework (Figure 3.3) might be incomplete. Therefore, in the 
future, I believe this systematic review will require an update to: a) develop a more 
comprehensive search strategy with free-text terms such as ‘dental practice’, 
‘negligence’, ‘non-compliance’, ‘primary dental care’ or ‘ambulatory dentistry’ to 
other potentially missed incidents, b) employ a second reviewer with a professiona l 
background in dentistry, c) include studies from more recent years and d) revise the 
conceptual framework. Patient safety in dentistry is an emerging field and, as a 
consequence, there was insufficient evidence to either justify a systematic review, 
meta-analysis or to calculate pooled estimates. Nevertheless, the findings from the 
systematic scoping review revealed valuable information that allowed me to build the 
initial conceptual structure of this thesis. 
One of the issues encountered in Chapter 4 was the quality of the incident reports 
submitted to the NRLS. The pilot analysis of 300 reports revealed that the free 
narrative descriptions, a mandatory field, constituted the only field which consistent ly 
contained data for coding and analysis. Renton and Sabbah (2016) also reported this 
data issue; it was largely unstructured data with insufficient information about the 
demographics and disciplines involved.143 In my study, the absence of this information 
represented a challenge to bring sense to the data. In addition, the free narrative 
descriptions were often shorthanded and contained abbreviations or other jargon to 
describe clinical procedures. My strategy to deal with this issue was firstly by 
employing my experience as a dental practitioner to bring meaning to these 
abbreviations. Secondly, I re-read the narratives and annotated these abbreviations and 
searched their meaning through on-line medical- or dentistry-related search engines.  
During the coding process, there was a risk of confirmation bias.288 In the context of 
the study, as described in Chapter 4, this risk was related to the tendency to read the 
narrative descriptions and use my clinical experience to assign codes and confirm my 
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pre-existing hypotheses. Similarly, recognition bias was possible in the light of 
potential limitations of the vocabulary employed within the codes, which can result in 
limitations when attempting to clarify the complexity of what was described .288 My 
strategy to deal with these difficulties consisted of the systematic application of codes 
in accordance with the Recursive Model of Incident Analysis.216 This approach was 
also supported by discussions held with my supervisors and colleagues at the Cardiff 
University, which drew upon their previous experiences in analysing data from the 
NRLS. These recommendations consisted of assigning codes which represented what 
was explicitly described in the reports; inferences were to avoided, in particular when 
no explicit description was available. This strategy allowed me to minimise the 
subjectivity in the coding process. 
The PSI reports submitted to the NRLS are likely to constitute the tip of the iceberg6 3  
as these only included events that were actually reported. Also, these reports are 
limited to NHS-funded practices in England and Wales. Therefore, reports NHS-
funded practices in Scotland were included and analysed in the study described in 
Chapter 5. Although, I assume that similar types and frequencies of PSIs are likely to 
happen within independent and/or private primary dental care practices, these still need 
to be explored. Since its introduction in 2003, the NRLS has collected over 15 million 
incident reports; however, less than 1% of NRLS reports originate from primary 
care.222 Whilst NHS healthcare professionals might be aware of the NRLS, a recent 
evaluation of the NRLS showed that fear of punishment from reporting incidents, the 
time required to report, and the lack of belief that reporting will bring any improvement 
are reasons for under-reporting.222  
Patient safety in primary care dentistry remains largely unexplored and is a relative ly 
new field of dentistry. In Chapter 5, I achieved international consensus on a list of 
NEs; however, in my sample of experts, only three public health practitioners had an 
active role in researching and disseminating findings in patient safety research relevant 
to dentistry. Therefore, as more evidence accumulates and training and education in 
patient safety training increases, the number of patient-safety focused experts is likely 
to increase. I believe my proposed list should be further updated based on the 
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consensus of future patient-safety-experts’ opinions and the evidence emerging from 
primary care dentistry. 
6.6 Recommendations for further research 
Further research of patient safety in primary care dentistry should now more closely 
align with the research agenda for WHO’s Safer Primary Care Programme.3, 22 This 
agenda includes: a) recognising that risks to patients exist during the delivery of 
primary care dentistry,3 b) the identification of priority areas and key knowledge gaps,  
3 and c) the improvement of data collection methods and improved taxonomies in order 
to generate learning from PSIs.22 The findings described in Chapter 4, permit one lens 
to focus on apparent priority issues for improvement and is a starting point for setting 
patient safety research priorities in dentistry,283 particularly towards prevention, policy 
making and resource allocation for interventions. The priority areas I identified were 
delays in treatment, procedural errors, medication-related adverse incidents, 
equipment failure, errors in obtaining or processing x-rays and wrong tooth 
extractions. I believe these areas should be pursued with research strategies that 
embrace robust primary research designs and methods with agreed working 
definitions.20 Examples of these research designs include cross-sectional studies using 
secondary data (e.g. medical records, malpractice cases) or mixed-methods when the 
available data consists of unstructured narrative descriptions. Moreover, NLP also 
provides an oportunity to link the field of informatics with patient safety research, as 
NLP can help to develop informatic tools to analyise free narratives and transform 
them into a structured format that can be used for research. 
Given that patient safety research aims to minimise risks of future PSIs, contributory 
factors should also form the basis of understanding where and how to intervene in 
systems to mitigate or prevent future similar incidents. I believe my coding 
frameworks (Appendices 8 to 10) provide a basis for further research, as well as an 
understanding of the relationships between incident types and contributory factors 
which highlight opportunities to improve patient safety. Further research in this area 
also bring the opportunity to corroborate my findings, including the coding 
frameworks, with other sources of patient safety data. Lastly, as the field of patient 
safety makes advances in dentistry, my list of NEs (see Table 5.8) should be further 
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updated and amended as more evidence accumulates and more professionals are 
trained in patient safety. This improvement of the list would require an update of the 
systematic scoping review (described in Chapter 3), as discussed previously, to include 
other potentially missed incidents and to include studies from more recent years. 
6.7 Conclusions 
In this PhD, I aimed to describe, understand PSIs and build consensus on a list of NEs 
in primary care dentistry. To achieve this aim I compiled the first comprehens ive 
account of empirical evidence on the types and frequencies of PSIs and AEs arising 
from primary care dentistry. The findings from this work, described in Chapter 3, show 
that patient safety in dentistry has not progressed at the same pace as it has in hospital 
care. Therefore, future research must embrace robust primary research designs and 
methods with agreed working definitions.20 Furthermore, consideration should be 
given to  which frameworks already developed in medicine 30, 35 might beneficially be 
adapted to suit dentistry. 
Other research included in my thesis is the first mixed-methods analysis of PSI reports 
from primary care dentistry submitted to the NRLS, details of which are presented in 
Chapter 4. By employing this methodological approach, I have developed coding 
frameworks for the classification of PSIs, contributory factors and outcomes 
(Appendices 8 to 10). These frameworks can be taken into consideration for the 
development of a classification system which maximises learning from reports 
describing PSIs and their outcomes in other patient safety studies in dentistry.4, 134, 220 
Further, I identified priority areas for research and policy making which were related 
to delays in a treatment or procedure, procedural errors, medication-related adverse 
incidents, equipment failure, errors in obtaining or processing x-rays and wrong-tooth 
extractions. Other initiatives for research and improvement in clinical practice should 
also focus on improving the administrative processes to reduce delays in treatment and 
the standardisation of procedures. The integration of patient safety in the professiona l 
curricula is also needed to reduce procedural errors and errors in obtaining or 
processing x-rays. As more patient safety-focused evidence continues to emerge, such 
material should be considered for integration into evidence-based guidelines. 
Compliance with these guidelines can also be encouraged by fostering a patient safety 
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culture in dentistry. Failure of equipment is another area for improvement, which could 
probably by achieved by encouraging periodic maintenance and checking the 
availability of appropriate supplies. Lastly, I have produced the first internationa l 
expert consensus-based list of NEs for primary care dentistry.  
The findings described in this thesis provide a starting point to support future research 
initiatives, quality assessment and governance activities. These findings can be used 
by dental regulators, as well as professional and academic communities in dentistry to 
foster patient safety through evidence-based initiatives that can be translated into 
action. Future areas for research include the further refinement and standardisation of 
a patient safety classification system for dentistry. As priority areas may differ between 
settings and countries, these areas should also be explored in different scenarios. This 
will require the analysis of PSIs and their outcomes in different sources of data, which 
then can be corroborated with my findings. I also believe that my coding frameworks 
provide a basis for coding other data that also contain free narrative descriptions. 
Likewise, NLP offers a set of informatics tools capable of transforming text into a 
structured format that can be used for research.258 Data extraction systems based on 
NLP have been developed in the medical domain.259 However, this innovation has yet 
to be explored in dentistry. Patient safety is an emerging field in dentistry that offers a 
wide spectrum of opportunities for both research and improvement. Although 
beginnings can be challenging, dentistry has the support of two decades of evidence 
from secondary care. This support can help dentistry to advance the field of patient 
safety at a quicker pace than with secondary care.  
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An error that occurs at the level of the frontline operator and whose 
effects are felt almost immediately.16, 29 
Adverse event An injury that was caused by medical management or complication 
instead of the underlying disease and that resulted in prolonged 
hospitalisation or disability at the time of discharge from medical 
care or both.29 
Classification 
An arrangement of concepts into classes and their subdivisions to 
express the semantic relationships between them.29 
Clinical error 
The failure to carry out a planned action as intended or the 
application of an incorrect plan.30 
Contributory factor 
An antecedent factor to an event, effect, result or outcome similar to 
a cause. A contributory factor may represent an active failure or a 
reason an active failure occurred, such as a situational factor or a 
latent condition that played a role in the genesis of the outcome.29 
Degree of harm 
The severity and duration of harm, and the treatment implications, 
that results from an incident.29 
Error 
The failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or use 
of a wrong, inappropriate, or incorrect plan to achieve an aim.29 
Error of 
commission 
An error that occurs as a result of an action taken.289 
Error of omission An error that occurs as a result of an action not taken.289 
Harm 
Impairment of structure or function of the body and/or any 
deleterious effect arising there from. Harm includes disease, injury, 
suffering and death.29 
Healthcare 
Services received by individuals or communities to promote, 
maintain, monitor or restore health.29 
Healthcare 
associated harm 
Harm arising from or associated with plans or actions taken during 




The conscious application of existing knowledge to the 
management of novel situations.29, 290 
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Concept Definition 
Lapse 
Errors which result from some failure in the execution and/or 
storage stage of an action sequence, largely involving failures of 
memory, that do not necessarily manifest themselves in actual 
behaviour and may be only apparent to the person who experience 
them.29 
Latent error 
A defect in the design, organization, training or maintenance in a 
system that leads to operator errors and whose effects are typically 
delayed or lay dormant in the system for lengthy periods of time.29 
Near miss An incident which did not reach the patient.29 
Never events 
Serious, largely preventable patient safety incidents that should not 
occur if the available preventative measures have been 
implemented.19 
No harm event 
When an error does not result in an adverse event for the patient and 
the absence of injury is owed to chance. This differs from a near 
miss, in which injury is absent because the error was “caught”. 20 
Patient safety 
the reduction of risk of unnecessary harm associated with healthcare 
to an acceptable minimum.29 
Patient safety 
incident 
An event or circumstance that could have resulted, or did result, in 
unnecessary harm to a patient.29  
Preventable adverse 
event 
Adverse event that would not have occurred if the patient had 
received ordinary standards of care appropriate for the time.29 
Quality of care 
The degree to which health services for individuals and populations 
increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are 
consistent with current professional knowledge.20 
Slips 
any observable, external failure in the physical execution of a plan 
and generally as a result from deficits in attention or perception.42 
Skill-based error 
A mistake that] relates to problems for which the person possesses 
some pre-packaged solution, acquired as a result of training, 
experience, or the availability of appropriate procedures.291 
Violation 
Deliberate deviation from an operating procedure, standard or 
rules.44 
  
Appendices section  129 
Appendix 2. Permission to reproduce material from 
the former Institute of Medicine 
 
  
Appendices section  130 
Appendix 3. Permission to reproduce the Yorkshire 
Contributory Factors Framework 
 
 




Appendices section  132 
 
  
Appendices section  133 
 
  
Appendices section  134 
 
Appendix 4. Overview of search databases 
Medline. 
Medline is a database from the U.S. National Library of Medicine (NLM) that 
comprises records from 1946 to date. The publications registered cover scientific 
journals, newspapers, magazines and newsletters in the areas of biomedicine and 
health (including dentistry). This database is indexed with NLM Medical Subject 
Headings (MeSH) which were used for the search strategy. 
Embase. 
Embase is a database containing records from 1947 to the present. It includes research 
literature on drug adverse events as well as conference abstracts from conferences 
(from 2009), research done on medical and drug safety and systematic reviews. This 
database is indexed with the Elsevier Life Science thesaurus Emtree. 
Cochrane library. 
The Cochrane Library is composed from six databases a collection of six databases 
including a database for systematic reviews, the Cochrane Central Register of 
Controlled Trials (CENTRAL), the Cochrane Methodology Register, the Database of 
Abstracts of Reviews of Effects (DARE),the Health Technology Assessment Database 
and the NHS Economic Evaluation Database (EED). 
The Scientific Electronic Library Online (Scielo). 
Scielo is a database originated in Brazil that contains online journal publications and 
scientific journals in open access. Also serves a model for cooperation between 
developing countries for electronic publishing. 
Virtual health library (VHL). 
VHL is an online library of sources from the Pan American Health Organizat ion 
(PAHO) developed by the Latin American and Caribbean Center on Health Science 
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Information (BIREME). Latin American and Caribbean countries contribute to this 
on-line collection of health information database including over 1,000 institutions in 
more than 30 countries. This database has also access to Scielo. 
Global health library (GHL). 
GHL is a database launched by the WHO in 2005 in order to foster and facilitate 
access, particularly to developing countries, to reliable sources of scientific 
information on health sciences. Moreover, through BIREME, the GHL has access to 
the VHL network and therefore to Scielo 
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Appendix 5. Search strategy (MEDLINE) 
1. exp Dentistry/ 
2. dentistry.mp. 
3. exp Diagnostic errors/ 
4. exp Medical errors/ 
5. exp Medication errors/ 
6. exp Delayed diagnosis/ 
7. delayed diagnosis.mp. 
8. misdiagnosis.mp. 
9. treatment delay*.mp. 
10. exp Unnecessary Procedures/ 
11. exp Patient Safety/ 
12. exp Risk Management/ 
13. adverse event*.mp. 
14. exp Patient Harm/ 
15. patient harm.mp. 
16. exp Malpractice/ 
17. exp Accidents/ 
18. exp Iatrogenic Disease/ 
19. exp Needles/ae [Adverse effects] 
20. exp Surgery, Oral/ 
21. dental complication*.mp. 
22. systematic review*.mp. 
23. "Review Literature as Topic"/ 
24. exp Research Design/ 
25. exp Research Report/ 
26. exp Clinical Trials as Topic/ or exp Adult/ or exp Epidemiologic Methods/ or exp 
Research Design/ or study design.mp. 
27. exp Cross-Sectional Studies/ 
28. exp Intervention Studies/ 
29. exp Comparative study/ 
30. exp Follow-up Studies/ 
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31. exp Prospective Studies/ 
32. exp Observational Study/ 
33. exp Cohort Studies/ 
34. exp Congresses as Topic/ or meeting abstract*.mp. 
35. exp Meta-Analysis/ 
36. qualitative stud*.mp. 
37. Ethnographic Research/ 
38. Phenomenological Research/ 
39. Models, Theoretical/ or Grounded Theory.mp. 
40. focus group*.mp. or Focus Groups/ 
41. Interview/ or interview*.mp. 
42. 1 or 2 
43. 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 or 17 or 18 
or 19 or 20 or 21 
44. 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30 or 31 or 32 or 33 or 34 or 35 or 
36 or 37 or 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 
45. 42 and 43 and 44 
46. limit 45 to (human and medline and yr="1994 -Current") 
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Provision of a working definition Yes/No 
 




Method for collecting data 
  








Main Type of procedure 
  
Patient safety incidents 
  
Lack of skill or experience of operators  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Errors in documentation or medical records  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Error related to clinical examination / 
diagnosis  
Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Administrative errors  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Communication errors  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
lack of Informed consent Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Referral errors  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Failure to provide treatment Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Errors in treatment planning Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Multiple exposure to x-rays  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Equipment failure Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Procedural errors  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Broken instruments  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
 Local anaesthesia overdose Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Failure to appropriately treat medically 
compromised patients  
Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Inhaled & ingested objects  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Errors in sedation dosage Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Cognitive failure / action lapse/ confusion Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Negligence Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Infection control Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Wrong tooth Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Wrong treatment /procedure Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
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Wrong body part Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Drug prescription errors  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Lack of follow-up Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Local adverse outcomes  Yes/No Reported 
frequency(ies) 
Damage to anatomical site (injuries) Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Accidental injection of sodium hypochlorite Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
tooth damage Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Treatment failure Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Alveolar bone loss  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Apical root resorption Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Alveolitis/dry socket Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Tooth loss  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Infection after treatment Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Poor healing Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Peri-implantitis  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Maxillary sinus perforation Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Tooth fracture after treatment Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Bisphosphonate-induced osteonecrosis of the 
jaw 
Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Occlusion or TMJ complication after 
treatment 
Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Nerve prolonged paraesthesia/ permanent 
impairment 
Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Prolonged pain Post-procedural 
pain/persistent 
Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Prolonged treatment/additional treatment Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Systemic adverse outcomes  Yes/No Reported 
frequency(ies) 
Adverse reactions (drug reaction ald LA) Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Medical emergencies  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Cardiovascular event (stroke or infarction) Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Diabetic events  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Hypoglycaemia (including coma) Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Angina pectoris  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Hypotension Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Vasovagal collapse /syncope Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Dizziness, Headache, Nausea or vomiting Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Asthma or apnea events  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Hyperventilation Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Brain damage Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Death Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Desaturation Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Prolonged sedation Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
Allergic reaction Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
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Fits/Seisures  Yes/No Reported frequency(ies) 
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Appendix 7. Level 1 Ethics approval 
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Appendix 8. Patient safety incident framework 
Types of incidents W orking definitions 
P re-operative stage  
  
1 .  Administration incidents  
Ab ility to access the dentist 
Patient is not capable of approaching the dentist or dental care setting 
for receiving oral healthcare 
Er rors in managing appointments Flaws in scheduling appointment for receiving oral healthcare  
Er rors in the logistics for transporting 
p atients 
Flaws in the transportation of patients from their residences to the 
primary dental care setting 
I nterpreter services not available or non-
at tendance 
Absence of a translator to enable communication between the patient 
and any member of primary dental care team 
I n formation filled incorrectly Patient’s information is not accurate 
Er rors in the process of payment systems Errors in the process of healthcare payment systems 
Failure to follow-up 
Failure to monitor patient’s treatment between appointments or after 
the treatment has finished 
D elays in treatment  Failure in the provision of dental care or treatment when needed 
  
2 .  Diagnosis and assessment incidents  
Er rors in choosing the correct process or 
p rocedure 
Failure in deciding the appropriate oral healthcare procedure or 
treatment 
I n sufficient assessment in history 
/examination 
Failure in the provision of satisfactory or complete preoperative clinical 
evaluation  
D elayed assessment Preoperative assessment of the patients was  postponed 
D elayed diagnosis The correct diagnosis was postponed  
Missed diagnosis Failure in achieving the correct diagnosis of a patient’s condition  
  
3 .  Documentation incidents  
I ncorrect or unavailable documentation Flaws in obtaining access and correct documentation of the patient 
Record not up to date or information 
m issing 
Patient’s medical records contain non-updated information or are 
incomplete 
I n accurate information on record Patient’s information in the medical record is not accurate  
W rong medical record Flaws in obtaining or getting access to the correct medical record 
  
4 .  Communication incidents  
Breaches of confidentiality 
Personal details of the patient were mistakenly shared/exposed with/to 
other patients or unauthorised personnel 
I ncomplete referral 
The patient’s appropriate referral to other dentist or service was not 
completed 
Communication errors between 
p rofessionals 
Failure to transmit and understand any information among healthcare 
professionals 
Communication errors between dentist 
an d patient 
Failure to transmit and understand any information between the dentist 
and the patient 
D elayed referral 
The patient’s appropriate referral to other dentist or service was not 
achieved on time 
I n efficient transfer of information between 
h ealthcare settings 
Failure to transmit or transfer the patient’s information at an office level 
Communication errors between staff and 
p atients 
Failure to transmit and understand any information between the staff 
members (excluding dentist) and the patient 
Er rors in obtaining the informed consent 
Flaws in obtaining the patient’s informed consent before the clinical 
treatment 
Un necessary referral Inappropriate referral of patients 
  
5 .  Insufficient supplies 
Unavailability of supplies for appropriate actions/procedures in the 
preoperative clinical stage of a treatment 
  
6 .  Dental laboratory errors 
Flaws related any dental prosthetics or appliances developed by the 
dental laboratory 
  
7 .  Professionalism issue Errors in the professional conduct of healthcare professionals 
  
8 .  Inaccurate laboratory test results Errors in the process of receiving the accurate laboratory results 
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Types of incidents W orking definitions 
I ntra-operative stage  
  
7 .  Procedural incidents  
P rocedural error Procedural error for conducting the appropriate process or procedure 
Medication-related adverse incidents 
A detrimental patient condition that arises subsequent the intraoperative 
administration of medication (e.g. local anaesthesia, sedation, general 
anaesthesia) 
Broken instrument 
The breakage of any dental instrument during the conduction of the 
dental process or procedure 
Er rors in obtaining or processing x-rays Flaws in the process for obtaining or processing x-rays 
Procedure performed on wrong anatomical 
sid e or site 
Any reported incident involving procedures performed on the wrong 
anatomical side or tooth 
I n gestion/inhalation of foreign body 
Accidental ingestion or inhalation of foreign bodies during the conduction 
of the dental process or procedure 
No n-specified procedural complication 
Detrimental of the patient’s condition that arises during the conduction 
of the dental process or procedure that cannot be attributed to 
medication or allergies 
Er rors in the process of administering a 
m edication 
Errors in the process of administering medication to a patient 
 
Er rors in obtaining a biopsy Errors in the process of obtaining a biopsy sample 
W rong instrument used 
Any reported incidents in which an incorrect instrument was used in the 
correct process or procedure 
Co ntraindicated dental material used Incorrect dental material was used in the correct process or procedure 
  
8 .  Equipment and supply related incidents  
Eq uipment failure Faulty equipment during a process or dental procedure 
L o st equipment 
The location of the appropriate equipment is unknown when needed to 
conduct a process or dental procedure 
Su pplies out of date Unavailability of appropriate up to date supplies 
Eq uipment not available 
Unavailability of the appropriate equipment when needed to conduct a 
process or dental procedure 
  
9 .  Failure to comply with infection control 
st andard procedures  
Flaws from any staff member to follow/apply standard infection control 
practices 
  
1 0. IT related incidents  
I T - Software errors Errors within the software in any equipment used 
I T - User errors Errors from any staff member to use any device used 
  
1 1  Other  
Un expected movement of the patient 
Unexpected and non-intentional movements from the patient during the 
process of care delivery 
Un expected movement from staff 
Unexpected and non-intentional movements from any staff member 
during the process of care delivery 
  
P o st-operative  
  
1 2. Medication incidents  
Er rors in the process of delivering a 
m edication 
Errors in the process of delivering a medication order or inappropriate 
medication order 
Co ntraindicated medication 
p rescribed/dispensed 
A contraindicated medication was prescribed or dispensed 
W rong dose prescribed Errors in the prescription of the correct dose of medication 
W rong medication prescribed Errors in the prescription of the correct medication 
Medication not available The appropriate medication was not available 
No  medication/treatment given when 
ap propriate 
Errors in providing medication-treatment on time 
Medication incorrectly stored Flaws in the storage of medications 
L o st prescription The location of a medication prescription is unknown when needed 
Un intentional drug overdose (self-
ad ministered) 
A non-intentional overdose of an appropriately prescribed medication 
occurred 
W rong medication/treatment given Failure to provide the correct medication 
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Appendix 9. Contributory factors framework 
 
Types of contributory in c id en t s  W o rk in g d efin it io n s  
1 .  Staff factors  
Distraction 
Inattention from the dentist which is thought to have influenced/contributed to a patient 
safety incident 
 
Failure to adhere to procedures 
or regulations 
Dentist or staff member did not comply with procedural clinical standards or regulations 
Inadequate skills/knowledge 
Dentist or staff member did not meet the expected set of skills or knowledge to implement 
a clinical procedure 
Thinking error - action as planned 
but decision was wrong  
The dentist or staff member failed in the decision-making process to determine the 
appropriate clinical course of action 
No assistance from staff Staff members did not assist the dentist during a clinical procedure 
  
2 .  Equipment & supplies related  
Lack of equipment maintenance 
The appropriate dental equipment does not work properly during a process or dental 
procedure 
Poor equipment design Flaws in the equipment or devices for conducting dental clinical procedures 
Lack of supplies 
Appropriate dental supplies to conduct a process or dental procedure are not available 
when needed  
Equipment failure 
Dental equipment fails to work or function appropriately during a process or dental 
procedure 
  
3 .  Organization factors  
Insufficient staff members 
Sufficient number of staff members were not available for conducting any clinical 
procedure 
Inadequate or unavailable 
policies or guidelines to follow 
Appropriate policies or guidelines were inadequate or not available for conducting the 
appropriate clinical procedure 
Interpreter services unavailable  
Interpreter was not available to enable appropriate communication between the dentist or 
staff member with a non-English-speaking patient  
Failure to provide continuity of 
care to healthcare professionals 
Failure to provide or assure, at an office level, the appropriate transition of care between 
primary dental care professionals or other healthcare professionals 
Busy or overloaded dental 
practice 
The dental practice is overloaded with patients waiting for receiving treatment 
Cultural factors between dental 
team members 
Individual patterns behaviour of any staff member (including dentist) influence the 
organizational approach to healthcare delivery 
Insufficient education/training 
Any staff member’s performance was not supported with appropriate academic or clinical 
training  
Long wait service Patients experience greater waiting times than the average or expected waiting time 
  
4 .  Patient factors  
Patient's previous health related 
conditions 
Any history of a previous and underlying health related conditions of the patient (excluding 
allergy) 
Unexpected movement of the 
patient 
Any circumstance or moment in which the patient unintentionally  move during the 
process of receiving oral healthcare treatment  
Patient's previous history of 
allergies 
Any history of a previous and underlying allergy-related health condition 
Non-compliance from the patient Any circumstance or moment in which the patient does not follow advice or instructions 
Gag reflex 
Any involuntary defence mechanism from the patient to protect the pharynx and throat 
from foreign objects during clinical care delivery 
Patient unable to communicate in 
English 
Any circumstance or moment in which the patient cannot communicate in English 
Patient's pregnancy Patient’s pregnancy at the moment of receiving dental care 
  
5 .  Dental laboratory errors Flaws related any dental prosthetics or appliances developed by the dental laboratory 
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Appendix 10. Incident outcomes framework 
Types of outcomes Working definitions 





X-ray related procedures are over utilised 
Unnecessary 
procedures 
Dental procedures (excluding x-rays) are over utilised 
Repeated procedures / 
additional treatment 
Flaws in the initial treatment resulted in additional procedures or treatment 
Hospital admission Patient safety incident that led to hospital admission 
  
2. Local outcomes  
Laceration/bleeding 
A deep cut or tear in skin or oral soft issues due to procedural patient safety incidents  
Bleeding of external or internal soft tissues of the oral cavity 
Localised non-
specified injury 




A highly unpleasant physical sensation caused by procedural patient safety incidents. 
Thermal injury 
Unintentional application of heat to the external or internal oral soft tissues by dental material or 
equipment during any clinical treatment 
Chemical injury 
Injury due to the unintentional exposure of the oral soft tissues to dental materials (e.g. etching 
gel, sodium hypochlorite and peroxides)  
Extended paraesthesia 
Affection of the facial, maxillary or mandibular nerve branches involving numbness after receiving 
any dental treatment. 
Bruises 
Outcome/ injury reported as such or describing marks on unbroken skin and darker in color, as a 
result of dental care 
Fracture Outcome/ injury reported as such or describing mandibular fracture or maxillary fracture 
Skin tear 
Outcome/ injury reported as such or describing traumatic injuries to the external or internal oral 
soft tissues as a result of shearing or friction by dental instruments or devices 
Needle-stick injuries 
Outcome/ injury caused by needles (e.g. during local anaesthesia administration) that 




Outcome/ injury reported as such or describing the collection of pus within the teeth, gums or 




Outcome/ injury reported as such or describing irreversible degeneration of structural elements 
of the tooth (e.g. gum, bone, interdental papillae) 
Localised swelling 
Outcome reported as such or describing abnormal protuberance or localised enlargement 
following dental treatment 
Affection of the 
temporomandibular 
joint 
Outcome reported as such or describing the alteration of the masticatory function following 
dental treatment 
  
3. Systemic outcomes  
Faint / loss of 
consciousness 
The patient experienced weakness, dizziness and/or close to losing consciousness during or after 
a dental procedure  
Vasovagal response 
The patient experienced a slowed-down heart beat and overall weakness during or after a dental 
procedure 
Seizure The patient experienced a sudden epileptic episode during or after a dental procedure 
Dizziness The patient experienced disorientation or unsteadiness during or after a dental procedure 
Anaphylaxis Acute allergic reaction to a dental material or medication 
Difficulty to breathe The patient experienced difficulties for breathing properly during or after a dental procedure 
Prolonged sleep / 
unarousable after 
sedation 




The patient experienced loss of consciousness and abnormal or absent breathing during or after a 
dental procedure 




The patient experienced a deterioration of their overall health status during or after receiving 
dental treatment 
Rash The patient experienced a change in colour, appearance or texture of their skin 
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Types of outcomes Working definitions 





Delays in using the 
dental clinic 
The dental staff is unable to use the dental practice for dental care delivery within the 




The patient received dental care without the sufficient information about the patient’s condition 




Increased documentation and/or follow-up due to flaws (including patient safety incidents) within 
the delivery of dental care 
Legal implication Any circumstance or moment that resulted in patient’s seeking legal assistance 
  
5. Psychological / 
emotional distress 
Unintentional infliction of the emotional/psychological well-being of the patient due to patient 
safety incidents during or after the delivery of dental care 
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Appendix 11. Nine rules of the Australian Recursive 
Model of Incident Analysis 
 
Recursive Model Incident Analysis Rules 
1. An incident has a set of contributory factors and / or contributory incidents 
2. An incident can contribute to another incident 
3. Contributory factors cannot be incidents in their own right 
4. An incident has a set of outcomes 
5. An incident can be an outcome of another incident  
6. Some outcomes cannot be incidents in their own right 
7. An outcome of an incident could be a contributory incident to another incident 
8. An incident can be designated the primary incident type – the incident proximal to 
the descriptive patient outcome 
9. The outcome of a primary incident cannot be an incident 
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Appendix 12. Distribution of combinations in the pre-operative stage 
Primary incident Contributory incident 1 Contributory incident 2 Contributory factor 1 Contributory factor 2 Contributory factor 3 Frequency 
Delays in treatment  Ability to access the dentist 0 Insufficient staff members 0 0 77 
Delays in treatment 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
0 0 0 0 31 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
0 0 Primary incident 0 0 30 
Delays in treatment 0 0 Insufficient staff members 0 0 22 
Delays in treatment 
Errors in the logistics for 
transporting patients 
0 0 0 0 21 
Delays in treatment Ability to access the dentist 0 0 0 0 17 
Delays in treatment Dental laboratory errors 0 0 0 0 17 
Delays in treatment  IT - Software errors 0 0 0 0 12 
Breaches of confidentiality 0 0 
Failure to adhere to 
procedures or regulations 
0 0 11 
Record not up to date or 
information missing 
0 0 0 0 0 11 
Delays in treatment Equipment failure 0 
Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 0 10 
Delays in treatment 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
0 Insufficient staff members 0 0 10 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
IT - Software errors 0 0 0 0 10 
Inefficient transfer of 
information between 
healthcare settings 
0 0 0 0 0 10 
Delays in treatment 0 0 0 0 0 9 
Errors in the logistics for 
transporting patients 
0 0 0 0 0 8 
Delays in treatment Insufficient supplies 0 0 0 0 7 
Dental laboratory errors 0 0 0 0 0 7 
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Primary incident Contributory incident 1 Contributory incident 2 Contributory factor 1 Contributory factor 2 Contributory factor 3 Frequency 
Inappropriate professional 
conduct from healthcare 
professional 
0 0 0 0 0 7 
Delays in treatment 0 0 Lack of supplies 0 0 6 
Insufficient supplies 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Communication errors 
between dentist and patient 
0 0 0 0 0 5 
Delays in treatment Equipment failure 0 0 0 0 5 
Delays in treatment 




0 0 0 5 
Delays in treatment Ability to access the dentist 
Errors in the logistics for 
transporting patients 
0 0 0 5 
Delays in treatment 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
0 0 0 0 5 
Delays in treatment 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
IT - Software errors 0 0 0 5 
Ability to access the dentist 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Breaches of confidentiality 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Delayed referral 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Delays in treatment 0 0 
Interpreter services 
unavailable  
0 0 4 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
0 0 0 0 0 4 
Incomplete referral 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Wrong medical record 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Ability to access the dentist 0 0 Insufficient staff members 0 0 3 
Breaches of confidentiality 0 0 Distraction  0 0 3 
Communication errors 
between professionals 
0 0 0 0 0 3 
Delays in treatment 0 0 
Busy or overloaded dental 
practice 
0 0 3 
Delays in treatment Insufficient supplies 0 Lack of supplies 0 0 3 
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Primary incident Contributory incident 1 Contributory incident 2 Contributory factor 1 Contributory factor 2 Contributory factor 3 Frequency 
Delays in treatment 
Interpreter services not 
available or non-attendance 
0 0 0 0 3 
Delays in treatment 
Interpreter services not 
available or non-attendance 
0 
Patient unable to 
communicate in English 
0 0 3 
Delays in treatment 
Communication errors 
between staff and patients 
0 0 0 0 3 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
0 0 
Busy or overloaded dental 
practice 
0 0 3 




0 0 0 0 3 
Errors in the logistics for 
transporting patients 




0 0 0 3 
Inaccurate information on 
record 
0 0 0 0 0 3 
Insufficient assessment in 
history /examination 
0 0 0 0 0 3 
Insufficient supplies 0 0 Lack of supplies 0 0 3 
Ability to access the dentist Equipment failure 0 0 0 0 2 
Delays in treatment 0 0 
Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 0 2 
Delays in treatment 
Errors in the professional 
conduct of healthcare 
professionals 
0 
Busy or overloaded dental 
practice 
0 0 2 
Delays in treatment IT - Software errors 0 
Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 0 2 
Delays in treatment 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
0 
Failure to provide continuity of 
care between healthcare 
professionals 
0 0 2 
Delays in treatment 
Errors in the logistics for 
transporting patients 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
0 0 0 2 
Delays in treatment 
Communication errors 
between professionals 
0 0 0 0 2 
Delays in treatment 
Interpreter services not 
available or non-attendance 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
Patient unable to 
communicate in English 
0 0 2 
Errors in choosing the correct 
process or procedure 
0 0 Distraction 0 0 2 
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Primary incident Contributory incident 1 Contributory incident 2 Contributory factor 1 Contributory factor 2 Contributory factor 3 Frequency 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
0 0 0 0 2 
Inaccurate laboratory test 
results 
0 0 0 0 0 2 
Inefficient transfer of 
information between 
healthcare settings 
0 0 Distraction  0 0 2 
Insufficient supplies 
Failure to comply with 
infection control standard 
procedures  
0 0 0 0 2 
Ability to access the dentist Equipment failure 0 
Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 0 1 
Breaches of confidentiality 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
0 0 0 0 1 
Breaches of confidentiality 
Errors in the professional 
conduct of healthcare 
professionals 
0 0 0 0 1 
Breaches of confidentiality 
Errors in the taking and 
distribution of messages 
0 0 0 0 1 
Breaches of confidentiality 
Inaccurate information on 
record 
Communication errors 
between staff and patient 
Failure to adhere to 
procedures or regulations 
0 0 1 
Breaches of confidentiality 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
0 
Failure to adhere to 
procedures or regulations 
0 0 1 
Breaches of confidentiality 
Inefficient transfer of 
information between 
healthcare settings 
0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Breaches of confidentiality Insufficient supplies 0 Lack of supplies 0 0 1 
Breaches of confidentiality IT - Software errors 0 IT -  Technical failure 0 0 1 
Breaches of confidentiality Wrong medical record 0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Breaches of confidentiality Wrong medical record 0 
Failure to adhere to 
procedures or regulations 
0 0 1 
Communication errors 
between dentist and patient 
0 0 
Patient's previous health 
related conditions 




Failure to provide continuity of 
care between healthcare 
professionals 
0 0 1 
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Primary incident Contributory incident 1 Contributory incident 2 Contributory factor 1 Contributory factor 2 Contributory factor 3 Frequency 
Communication errors 
between professionals 
Wrong medical record 0 
Thinking error - mistake - 
action as planned but decision 
was wrong  
Patient unable to 
communicate in English 
0 1 
Communication errors 
between staff and patients 
Wrong medical record 0 
Thinking error - mistake - 
action as planned but decision 
was wrong  
0 0 1 
Communication errors 
between staff and patients 
0 0 
Non-compliance from the 
patient 
0 0 1 
Communication errors 
between staff and patients 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
Delayed assessment Equipment failure 0 
Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 0 1 
Delayed diagnosis 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Delayed referral 
Inefficient transfer of 
information between 
healthcare settings 
0 0 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 0 0 Dental laboratory errors 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 0 0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 0 0 
Failure to adhere to 
procedures or regulations 
0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 
Inefficient transfer of 
information between 
healthcare settings 
0 0 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 0 0 
Non-compliance from the 
patient 
0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 




Failure to provide continuity of 
care between healthcare 
professionals 
0 0 1 
Delays in treatment Equipment failure IT - Software errors 0 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment Insufficient supplies 0 
Inadequate or unavailable 
policies or guidelines to follow 
0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 0 0 
Patient's previous health 
related conditions 
0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
Communication errors 
between dentist and 
patient 
0 0 0 1 
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Primary incident Contributory incident 1 Contributory incident 2 Contributory factor 1 Contributory factor 2 Contributory factor 3 Frequency 
Delays in treatment Dental laboratory errors 
Errors in the taking and 
distribution of messages 
0 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment Ability to access the dentist 
Communication errors 
between professionals 
0 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment Ability to access the dentist 0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 0 0 
Busy or overloaded dental 
practice 
Insufficient staff members 0 1 
Delays in treatment 
Failure to comply with 
infection control standard 
procedures 
0 0 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
Communication errors 
between staff and patient 
0 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
Errors in the logistics for 
transporting patients 
0 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment Ability to access the dentist Equipment failure 
Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
IT - Software errors 0 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
Inefficient transfer of 
information between 
healthcare settings 
0 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
IT - Technical errors 0 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
0 
Busy or overloaded dental 
practice 
Insufficient staff members 0 1 
Delays in treatment 
Errors in the logistics for 
transporting patients 
Communication errors 
between dentist and 
patient 
0 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 0 0 
Interpreter services 
unavailable  
Insufficient staff members 0 1 
Delays in treatment 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
0 
Failure to adhere to 
procedures or regulations 
0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 




0 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 
Communication errors 
between dentist and patient 
0 
Non-compliance from the 
patient 
0 0 1 
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Primary incident Contributory incident 1 Contributory incident 2 Contributory factor 1 Contributory factor 2 Contributory factor 3 Frequency 
Delays in treatment 




Lack of supplies 
Patient's previous health 
related conditions 
Thinking error - mistake - 
action as planned but 
decision was wrong  
1 
Delays in treatment 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
0 
Patient unable to 
communicate in English 
0 0 1 
Delays in treatment Incomplete referral 0 0 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 
Failure to comply with 
infection control standard 
procedures 
0 
Inadequate or unavailable 
policies or guidelines to follow 
0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
0 Insufficient staff members 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 
Communication errors 
between professionals 
0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment Information filled incorrectly 0 0 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 
Record not up to date or 
information missing 
0 0 0 0 1 
Delays in treatment 
Errors in choosing the 
correct process or procedure 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
Insufficient staff members 0 0 1 
Dental laboratory errors 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
0 0 0 0 1 
Dental laboratory errors 0 0 Inadequate skills / knowledge 0 0 1 
Errors in choosing the correct 
process or procedure 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
Errors in choosing the correct 
process or procedure 
0 0 Pregnant patient 0 0 1 
Errors in choosing the correct 
process or procedure 
Errors in obtaining the 
informed consent 
0 0 0 0 1 
Errors in choosing the correct 
process or procedure 
Errors in the professional 
conduct of healthcare 
professionals 
0 0 0 0 1 
Errors in choosing the correct 
process or procedure 
Inefficient transfer of 
information between 
healthcare settings 
0 0 0 0 1 
Errors in choosing the correct 
process or procedure 
Insufficient assessment in 
history /examination 
0 
Non-compliance from the 
patient 
0 0 1 




0 0 0 0 1 
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Primary incident Contributory incident 1 Contributory incident 2 Contributory factor 1 Contributory factor 2 Contributory factor 3 Frequency 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
Inefficient transfer of 
information between 
healthcare settings 
0 0 0 0 1 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
IT - Software errors 0 0 0 0 1 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
IT - Technical errors 0 0 0 0 1 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
0 0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
0 0 Insufficient staff members 0 0 1 







0 0 1 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
0 0 
Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 0 1 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
IT - Software errors 0 
Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 0 1 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
Equipment failure 
Thinking error - mistake - 
action as planned but decision 
was wrong  
Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 1 





0 0 1 
Errors in obtaining the 
informed consent 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
Errors in obtaining the 
informed consent 




Errors in the logistics for 
transporting patients 
0 0 Insufficient staff members 0 0 1 
Errors in the logistics for 
transporting patients 
Equipment failure 0 
Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 0 1 
Errors in the process of 
payment systems 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
Errors in the process of 
payment systems 
IT - Software errors 0 0 0 0 1 
Failure to follow-up 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Inaccurate information on 
record 
Errors in obtaining or 
processing x-rays 
0 0 0 0 1 
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Primary incident Contributory incident 1 Contributory incident 2 Contributory factor 1 Contributory factor 2 Contributory factor 3 Frequency 
Inaccurate information on 
record 
Inefficient transfer of 
information between 
healthcare settings 
0 0 0 0 1 
Inaccurate information on 
record 
Inefficient transfer of 
information between 
healthcare settings 
IT - Software errors 0 0 0 1 
Inaccurate information on 
record 
Insufficient assessment in 
history /examination 
0 0 0 0 1 
Inaccurate information on 
record 
IT - Software errors 0 0 0 0 1 
Inaccurate information on 
record 
0 0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Inaccurate information on 
record 
0 0 
Thinking error - mistake - 
action as planned but decision 
was wrong  
0 0 1 
Inappropriate professional 
conduct from healthcare 
professional 
Errors in obtaining the 
informed consent 
0 0 0 0 1 
Incomplete referral 
Communication errors 
between dentist and patient 
0 0 0 0 1 
Incomplete referral 
Inefficient transfer of 
information between 
healthcare settings 
0 0 0 0 1 
Incomplete referral 
Record not up to date or 
information missing 
0 0 0 0 1 
Incomplete referral 0 0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
Errors in obtaining or 
processing x-rays 
IT - Software errors 0 0 0 1 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
Inefficient transfer of 
information between 
healthcare settings 
0 0 0 0 1 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
IT - Technical errors 0 0 0 0 1 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
IT - User errors 0 0 0 0 1 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
Record not up to date or 
information missing 
0 0 0 0 1 
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Primary incident Contributory incident 1 Contributory incident 2 Contributory factor 1 Contributory factor 2 Contributory factor 3 Frequency 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
0 0 
Busy or overloaded dental 
practice 
0 0 1 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
0 0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
IT - Software errors 0 
Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 0 1 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
0 0 
Thinking error - mistake - 
action as planned but decision 
was wrong  
0 0 1 
Inefficient transfer of 
information between 
healthcare settings 
Equipment failure 0 0 0 0 1 




Failure to provide continuity of 
care between healthcare 
professionals 
0 0 1 




Inadequate or unavailable 
policies or guidelines to follow 
0 0 1 
Information filled incorrectly 
Inappropriate professional 
conduct from healthcare 
professional 
0 0 0 0 1 
Information filled incorrectly 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Insufficient assessment in 
history /examination 
Errors in obtaining the 
informed consent 
0 0 0 0 1 
Insufficient assessment in 
history /examination 
Errors in obtaining the 
informed consent 
0 
Failure to adhere to 
procedures or regulations 
Inadequate leadership 0 1 
Insufficient assessment in 
history /examination 
0 0 Lack of supplies 0 0 1 
Insufficient supplies 0 0 
Lack of equipment 
maintenance 




0 Lack of supplies 0 0 1 
Interpreter services not 




0 0 1 
Interpreter services not 
available or non-attendance 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
Missed diagnosis 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Primary incident Contributory incident 1 Contributory incident 2 Contributory factor 1 Contributory factor 2 Contributory factor 3 Frequency 
Record not up to date or 
information missing 
IT - Software errors 0 0 0 0 1 
Record not up to date or 
information missing 
0 0 
Failure to adhere to 
procedures or regulations 
0 0 1 




0 Insufficient staff members 0 0 1 
Record not up to date or 
information missing 
0 0 
Patient's previous history on 
allergies 
0 0 1 
Unnecessary referral Insufficient supplies 0 Lack of supplies 0 0 1 
Wrong medical record 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
0 0 0 0 1 
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Appendix 13. Distribution of combinations in the intra-operative stage 
P r im ary  in c id en t  Co ntributory  in c id en t  1  Co ntribu t o ry  in c id en t  2  Co n t r ib u t o ry  fac t o r  1  Co n t r ib u t o ry  fac t o r  2  Co ntributory  fac t o r  3  Freq u en c y  
Medication-related adverse 
incidents 
0 0 0 0 0 117 
Procedural error 0 0 0 0 0 65 
Procedural error 0 0 Distraction 0 0 65 
Broken instrument 0 0 0 0 0 56 
Equipment failure 0 0 0 0 0 41 
Equipment failure 0 0 Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 0 39 
Other procedural complications 0 0 0 0 0 24 
Procedural error 0 0 Unexpected movement of 
the patient 
0 0 23 
Ingestion / inhalation of foreign 
body 
0 0 0 0 0 21 
Medication-related adverse 
incidents 
0 0 Patient's previous health 
related conditions 
0 0 20 
Procedural error 0 0 Inadequate skills / 
knowledge 
0 0 20 
Wrong tooth extracted 0 0 Distraction 0 0 19 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
0 0 0 0 0 18 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
0 0 Distraction 0 0 18 
Procedural error Equipment failure 0 0 0 0 17 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
IT - Software errors 0 0 0 0 11 
Wrong tooth extracted 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Failure to comply with infection 
control standard procedures 
0 0 Failure to adhere to 
procedures or regulations 
0 0 9 
Broken instrument Procedural error 0 0 0 0 8 
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P r im ary  in c id en t  Co ntributory  in c id en t  1  Co ntribu t o ry  in c id en t  2  Co n t r ib u t o ry  fac t o r  1  Co n t r ib u t o ry  fac t o r  2  Co ntributory  fac t o r  3  Freq u en c y  
Failure to comply with infection 
control standard procedures 
0 0 0 0 0 8 
Medication-related adverse 
incidents 
0 0 Non-compliance from the 
patient 
0 0 7 
Procedure performed on wrong 
anatomical side or site 
0 0 Distraction 0 0 7 
Equipment failure 0 0 Poor equipment design 0 0 6 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
Equipment failure 0 0 0 0 6 
Failure to comply with infection 
control standard procedures 
0 0 Inadequate or unavailable 
policies or guidelines to 
follow 
0 0 6 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
0 0 Inadequate skills / 
knowledge 
0 0 5 
Insufficient supplies 0 0 Lack of supplies 0 0 5 
Wrong tooth extracted Inefficient transfer of 
information between 
healthcare settings 
0 0 0 0 5 
Medication-related adverse 
incidents 
0 0 Patient's previous history on 
allergies 
0 0 4 
Procedural error 0 0 Gag reflex 0 0 4 
Ingestion / inhalation of foreign 
body 
Equipment failure 0 0 0 0 4 
Ingestion / inhalation of foreign 
body 
0 0 Distraction 0 0 4 
Broken instrument 0 0 Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 0 3 
Broken instrument 0 0 Poor equipment design 0 0 3 
Broken instrument 0 0 Unexpected movement of 
the patient 
0 0 3 




0 0 0 0 3 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
Equipment failure 0 0 0 0 3 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
Equipment failure IT - Software errors 0 0 0 3 
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P r im ary  in c id en t  Co ntributory  in c id en t  1  Co ntribu t o ry  in c id en t  2  Co n t r ib u t o ry  fac t o r  1  Co n t r ib u t o ry  fac t o r  2  Co ntributory  fac t o r  3  Freq u en c y  
Ingestion / inhalation of foreign 
body 
Broken instrument 0 0 0 0 3 
Ingestion / inhalation of foreign 
body 
0 0 Gag reflex 0 0 3 
Insufficient supplies 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Broken instrument 0 0 Inadequate skills / 
knowledge 
0 0 2 
Broken instrument Procedural error 0 Inadequate skills / 
knowledge 
0 0 2 
Procedural error Insufficient assessment in 
history /examination 
0 0 0 0 2 
Procedural error Insufficient supplies 0 0 0 0 2 
Procedural error 0 0 Non-compliance from the 
patient 
0 0 2 
Procedural error Insufficient assessment in 
history /examination 
0 Patient's previous history on 
allergies 
0 0 2 
Procedural error Equipment failure 0 Poor equipment design 0 0 2 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
Equipment failure 0 0 0 0 2 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
Equipment failure IT - Software errors 0 0 0 2 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
0 0 Failure to adhere to 
procedures or regulations 
0 0 2 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
Equipment failure 0 Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 0 2 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
0 0 Unexpected movement of 
the patient 
0 0 2 
Errors in the process of 
administering a medication 
0 0 Distraction 0 0 2 
Errors in the process of 
administering a medication 
Supplies out of date 0 0 0 0 2 
Insufficient supplies 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Broken instrument Equipment failure 0 0 0 0 1 
Broken instrument Procedural error 0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Broken instrument Procedural error 0 Distraction Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 1 
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P r im ary  in c id en t  Co ntributory  in c id en t  1  Co ntribu t o ry  in c id en t  2  Co n t r ib u t o ry  fac t o r  1  Co n t r ib u t o ry  fac t o r  2  Co ntributory  fac t o r  3  Freq u en c y  
Broken instrument Equipment failure 0 Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 0 1 
Broken instrument Equipment failure 0 Poor equipment design 0 0 1 
Broken instrument Procedural errors 0 Poor equipment design 0 0 1 
Medication-related adverse 
incidents 
Accidental injection of 
dental material into soft 
tissues 
Procedural error 0 0 0 1 
Medication-related adverse 
incidents 
Procedural error 0 0 0 0 1 
Medication-related adverse 
incidents 
Procedural error 0 0 0 0 1 
Medication-related adverse 
incidents 




conduct from healthcare 
professional 
0 Non- compliance from the 
patient 
0 0 1 
Medication-related adverse 
incidents 
Insufficient assessment in 
history /examination 
0 Patient unable to 
communicate in English 
0 0 1 
Medication-related adverse 
incidents 
0 0 Non-compliance from the 
patient 





0 0 Patient's pregnancy 0 0 1 
Medication-related adverse 
incidents 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
IT - Software errors Patient's previous health 
related conditions 
0 0 1 
Medication-related adverse 
incidents 
Record not up to date or 
information missing 
0 Patient's previous history on 
allergies 
0 0 1 
Medication-related adverse 
incidents 
0 0 Patient's previous health 
related conditions 
Failure to adhere to 




0 0 Patient's previous history on 
allergies 
Distraction 0 1 
Complication as a result of the 
dental material used 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
Contraindicated dental material 
used 
Insufficient assessment in 
history /examination 
0 Distraction Pregnant patient 0 1 
Equipment failure Insufficient supplies 0 0 0 0 1 
Equipment failure IT - Software errors 0 0 0 0 1 
Appendices section  163 
P r im ary  in c id en t  Co ntributory  in c id en t  1  Co ntribu t o ry  in c id en t  2  Co n t r ib u t o ry  fac t o r  1  Co n t r ib u t o ry  fac t o r  2  Co ntributory  fac t o r  3  Freq u en c y  
Equipment failure 0 0 Inadequate skills / 
knowledge 
0 0 1 
Equipment failure IT - Software errors 0 Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 0 1 
Equipment not available 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Errors in choosing the correct 
process or procedure 
0 0 Failure to adhere to 
procedures or regulations 
Insufficient staff members 0 1 




0 0 0 1 
Procedural error Communication errors 
between professionals 
0 0 0 0 1 
Procedural error Out of date medication 0 0 0 0 1 
Procedural error Supplies out of date 0 0 0 0 1 
Procedural error 0 0 Distraction Inadequate skills / knowledge 0 1 
Procedural error Wrong medical record 0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Procedural error Wrong medical record 0 Distraction Thinking error - mistake - 
action as planned but decision 
was wrong  
0 1 
Procedural error 0 0 Equipment failure 0 0 1 
Procedural error Insufficient supplies 0 Equipment failure 0 0 1 
Procedural error 0 0 Failure to adhere to 
procedures or regulations 
0 0 1 
Procedural error Insufficient assessment in 
history /examination 
0 Failure to adhere to 
procedures or regulations 
0 0 1 
Procedural error Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
0 Inadequate or unavailable 
policies or guidelines to 
follow 
0 0 1 
Procedural error 0 0 Insufficient staff members 0 0 1 
Procedural error Equipment failure 0 Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 0 1 
Procedural error Communication errors 
between dentist and 
patient 
0 Non-compliance from the 
patient 
0 0 1 
Procedural error 0 0 Patient's previous history on 
allergies 
0 0 1 
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P r im ary  in c id en t  Co ntributory  in c id en t  1  Co ntribu t o ry  in c id en t  2  Co n t r ib u t o ry  fac t o r  1  Co n t r ib u t o ry  fac t o r  2  Co ntributory  fac t o r  3  Freq u en c y  
Errors in obtaining a biopsy 0 0 Failure to adhere to 
procedures or regulations 
0 0 1 
Errors in obtaining a biopsy 0 0 Insufficient staff members 0 0 1 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
Equipment failure IT - Software errors 0 0 0 1 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
Equipment failure 0 0 Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 1 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
0 0 0 0 1 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
Inefficient transfer of 
information between 
healthcare settings 
0 0 0 0 1 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
Lost equipment 0 0 0 0 1 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
Equipment failure 0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
Errors in managing 
appointments 
0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
Insufficient supplies 0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Errors in obtaining or processing 
x-rays 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
0 Failure to provide continuity 
of care between healthcare 
professionals 
0 0 1 




0 Inadequate skills / 
knowledge 
0 0 1 
Errors in the process of 
administering a medication 
Supplies out of date 0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Errors in the process of 
administering a medication 
Communication errors 
between professionals 
0 Insufficient staff members 0 0 1 
Errors in the process of 
administering a medication 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
IT - Software errors 0 0 0 1 
Errors in the process of 
administering a medication 
Supplies out of date 0 Failure to adhere to 
procedures or regulations 
Distraction 0 1 
Failure to comply with infection 
control standard procedures 
Equipment failure 0 0 0 0 1 
Failure to comply with infection 
control standard procedures 
0 0 Distraction 0 0 1 
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P r im ary  in c id en t  Co ntributory  in c id en t  1  Co ntribu t o ry  in c id en t  2  Co n t r ib u t o ry  fac t o r  1  Co n t r ib u t o ry  fac t o r  2  Co ntributory  fac t o r  3  Freq u en c y  
Failure to comply with infection 
control standard procedures 
Communication errors 
between professionals 
0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Failure to comply with infection 
control standard procedures 
Communication errors 
between professionals 
0 Inadequate or unavailable 
policies or guidelines to 
follow 
Distraction 0 1 
Failure to comply with infection 
control standard procedures 
Errors in the professional 
conduct of healthcare 
professionals 
0 Inadequate or unavailable 
policies or guidelines to 
follow 
0 0 1 
Failure to comply with infection 
control standard procedures 
0 0 Insufficient staff members 0 0 1 
Failure to comply with infection 
control standard procedures 
Equipment failure 0 Lack of equipment 
maintenance 
0 0 1 
Ingestion / inhalation of foreign 
body 
Procedural error 0 0 0 0 1 
Ingestion / inhalation of foreign 
body 
Equipment failure 0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Ingestion / inhalation of foreign 
body 
Procedural error 0 Gag reflex Inadequate skills / knowledge 0 1 
Ingestion / inhalation of foreign 
body 
0 0 Inadequate skills / 
knowledge 
0 0 1 
Ingestion / inhalation of foreign 
body 
0 0 Poor equipment design 0 0 1 
Ingestion / inhalation of foreign 
body 
Procedural error 0 Poor equipment design 0 0 1 
Ingestion / inhalation of foreign 
body 
0 0 Unexpected movement of 
the patient 
0 0 1 
Insufficient supplies 0 0 Inadequate skills / 
knowledge 
0 0 1 
Lost equipment Communication errors 
between professionals 
0 0 0 0 1 
Other procedural complications 0 0 Patient's previous health 
related conditions 
0 0 1 
Other procedural complications 0 0 Patient's previous history on 
allergies 
0 0 1 
Procedure performed on wrong 
anatomical side or site 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
Procedure performed on wrong 
anatomical side or site 
Communication errors 
between professionals 
0 Distraction 0 0 1 
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P r im ary  in c id en t  Co ntributory  in c id en t  1  Co ntribu t o ry  in c id en t  2  Co n t r ib u t o ry  fac t o r  1  Co n t r ib u t o ry  fac t o r  2  Co ntributory  fac t o r  3  Freq u en c y  
Procedure performed on wrong 
anatomical side or site 
Errors in obtaining or 
processing x-rays 
0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Procedure performed on wrong 
anatomical side or site 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
0 0 0 0 1 
Supplies out of date 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Unexpected movement from 
staff 
0 0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Wrong instrument used Communication errors 
between professionals 
0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Wrong tooth extracted 0 0 Inadequate skills / 
knowledge 
0 0 1 
Wrong tooth extracted 0 0 Thinking error - mistake - 
action as planned but 
decision was wrong  
0 0 1 
Wrong tooth extracted Errors in obtaining the 
informed consent 
0 0 0 0 1 
Wrong tooth extracted Insufficient assessment in 
history /examination 
0 0 0 0 1 
Wrong tooth extracted Insufficient assessment in 
history /examination 




Appendices section  167 
Appendix 14. Distribution of combinations in the post-operative stage 
Primary incident Contributory incident 1 Contributory incident 2 Contributory factor 1 Contributory factor 2 Contributory factor 3 Frequency 
Errors in the process of 
delivering a medication 
0 0 0 0 0 6 
Contraindicated medication 
prescribed / dispensed 
0 0 Patient's previous history on 
allergies 
0 0 5 
Unintentional drug overdose 
(self-administered) 
0 0 0 0 0 4 
Wrong dose prescribed 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Medication incorrectly stored 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Wrong medication / 
treatment given 
0 0 Distraction 0 0 3 
Contraindicated medication 
prescribed / dispensed 




prescribed / dispensed 
Insufficient assessment in 
history /examination 
0 0 0 0 2 
Contraindicated medication 
prescribed / dispensed 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
Contraindicated medication 
prescribed / dispensed 
Errors in choosing the 
correct process or 
procedure 
0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Contraindicated medication 
prescribed / dispensed 
Insufficient assessment in 
history /examination 
0 Patient's previous history on 
allergies 
0 0 1 
Contraindicated medication 
prescribed / dispensed 
0 0 Patient's previous history on 
allergies 




prescribed / dispensed 




prescribed / dispensed 
Incorrect or unavailable 
documentation 
0 Non-compliance from the 
patient 
Patient or parent has 
poor understanding 
0 1 
Errors in the process of 
delivering a medication 
Communication errors 
between dentist and patient 
0 0 0 0 1 
Errors in the process of 
delivering a medication 
Inefficient transfer of 
information between 
healthcare settings 
0 0 0 0 1 
Errors in the process of 
delivering a medication 
0 0 Distraction 0 0 1 
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Primary incident Contributory incident 1 Contributory incident 2 Contributory factor 1 Contributory factor 2 Contributory factor 3 Frequency 
Errors in the process of 
delivering a medication 
0 0 Non-compliance from the 
patient 
0 0 1 
Lost prescription 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Lost prescription Lost prescription 0 0 0 0 1 
Medication incorrectly stored 0 0 Inadequate or unavailable 
policies or guidelines to 
follow 
0 0 1 
Medication incorrectly stored Supplies out of date 0 0 0 0 1 
Medication not available 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Medication not available Supplies out of date 0 0 0 0 1 
Medication not available Communication errors 
between professionals 
0 0 0 0 1 
No medication/treatment 
given when appropriate 
Communication errors 
between dentist and patient 
0 Non-compliance from the 
patient 
0 0 1 
Wrong dose prescribed Communication errors 
between professionals 
0 0 0 0 1 
Wrong dose prescribed 0 0 Distraction 0 0 1 
Wrong dose prescribed Inefficient transfer of 
information between 
healthcare settings 
0 Inadequate skills / knowledge 0 0 1 
Wrong medication / 
treatment given 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
Wrong medication 
prescribed 
0 0 Patient's previous history on 
allergies 
0 0 1 
 
Appendices section  169 
 
Appendix 15. Ethical approval for the first round 
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Appendix 16. Ethical approval for the second round 
 
  
Appendices section  171 
Appendix 17. Sample e-mail invitation 
“Evidence-based priority setting for patient safety research on never events in 
primary dental care: Delphi study”  
 
Dear (expert’s name),  
 
We would like to invite you to participate, as an expert in the field, in a Delphi study 
to refine an expert consensus-based list of ‘never events’ in primary dentistry we have 
previously developed. These events are defined as serious, largely preventable patient 
safety incidents that should not occur if the available preventative measures have been 
implemented.19 However, despite the ongoing progress being made in medicine, the 
evidence in relation to dental never events is far less developed.   
Given your expertise, you are in the ideal position to provide us valuable first hand 
feedback for generating this list. The study comprises a series of up to three 
questionnaires. Each questionnaire takes around 15 minutes to complete. Please be 
assured that your responses will be treated in the strictest confidence.  
Your participation will be a valuable addition to patient safety research in primary care 
dentistry. The findings of this study will help to inform further research initiat ives 
concerning patient safety in primary care dentistry. The findings also have the potential 
to inform the development of future policies for the prevention of never events in 
dentistry at a national and international level. You will be provided with feedback of 
the study results should you wish to receive it. 
If you are willing to participate, please let us know and we will send you further 
information.  
 
Thank you for considering this request, 
Eduardo Ensaldo Carrasco 
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Appendix 18. Information sheet for Delphi study 
Evidence-based priority setting for patient safety research on never events in 
primary dental care: an international Delphi study 
You are being invited to participate in the above study. Before deciding whether to participate 
or not, we wish to inform you why we are undertaking this study, our approach and what we 
are asking you to do. This Information Sheet also indicates how we will collect, store and use 
the data collected. We appreciate you are busy and would like to thank you in advance for 
taking the time to read this Information Sheet and considering this request. 
 
Background 
Unintended harm in patients as a result of the care they receive has been a concern in medicine 
for the past 20 years. Nowadays, the accumulated evidence in this field has moved from the 
identification and understanding of these to the implementation of strategies to reduce harm. 
‘Never events’ are an area that has received attention due to their high potential to cause severe 
harm. These events are defined as serious, largely preventable patient safety incidents that 
should not occur if the available preventative measures have been implemented (e.g. wrong 
tooth extraction). However, despite the ongoing progress being made in medicine, the 
evidence in relation to dental never events is far less developed.  Only wrong-tooth extractions 
has been reported under the domain of “wrong site surgery” as never events in dental practices 
within the National Health Service in the United Kingdom.  
The Delphi technique is a formal structural process for generating consensus among a group 
of experts based on feedback obtained from their anonymous responses. This methodological 
approach is favoured in cases where little to no empirical or historical data exist (e.g. never 
events in dentistry). We believe your expert-feedback will help us to fill this gap and seek to, 
with your help, refine an expert consensus-based list of ‘never events’ in primary care dentistry 
we have previously developed. 
Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to generate an expert consensus-based list of ‘never events’ in 
primary care dentistry.  
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been identified as an expert in patient safety in dentistry because you have: 
 More than three years of active clinical experience; 
 More than three years of active academic experience;  
 Any experience in leadership roles within national dental associations. 
 Any experience in patient safety at a clinical or organisational level 
 
As an established expert in your field, we are looking for your opinion about possible never 
events in primary care dentistry. Specifically, we would like to ask to you to rank never events 
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from an initial list we have developed. In addition, we would like to know your opinions on 
further possible additions to the list provided. 
We would like to invite you to participate, as an expert in the field, in a Delphi study to refine 
an expert consensus-based list of ‘never events’ in primary care dentistry we have previously 
developed.  
Please read this information sheet carefully. 
Do I have to take part? 
No. It is entirely up to you if you wish to participate. If you agree, you will still be free to 
withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. If you do decide to take part you will need 
to complete the Consent Form and should also keep this Information Sheet. 
 
What will happen if I decide to take part? 
As a Delphi panel member, you will be invited to complete a brief questionnaire in order to 
rank a list of potential never events using an online survey. The estimated time for answering 
the questionnaire is about 15 minutes. Since the purpose of the study is to build consensus, 
for the following rounds you will receive an anonymised summary of the responses of the 
whole group. It usually takes up to three rounds to build consensus. In order to allow timely 
conclusion of the study we would respectfully request a response time of two weeks for 
completion of each round.  This will allow us to complete the entire process in a timely 
fashion.  Your overall time commitment is expected to be less than 1 hour in total. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
Taking part in the surveys will take up some of your time. There are no risks involved in 
participating. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Your participation in this study will help us to identify events that should never happen in 
primary care dentistry. The generated list, based on your expertise and experience, will be 
used to identify research priorities that can be used in evaluative studies and in due course 
help to develop interventions and guidelines for prevention strategies to improve the safety 
of primary care dentistry. 
 
Will my participation in the study remain confidential? 
Yes. All responses will be strictly confidential and your identity will not be divulged to other 
participants. Once we collect the answered survey, we will remove your identification details 
and assign a number to each questionnaire. Then, we will only extract your responses and 
comments into a customised Excel sheet for further analysis. 
Free-text answers may be used as part of the study to assess and modify the list of never events 
for each round. However, these will not be attributed to you. 
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Survey responses will be collected online and stored within a password-protected desktop 
computer at the Centre for Population Health Sciences at the University of Edinburgh, 
Scotland.  
 
Which tasks will I be expected to do?  
The Delphi study requires your participation in up to three consecutive and structured 
questionnaires. The first constitutes a list of candidate never event identified from the 
literature and analysis from patient safety incident reports submitted to the National 
Reporting Learning System. Initially, you will be asked to read this list and assign 
predefined scores in a structured questionnaire. If you feel necessary, you can comment on 
how this list can be improved either by modifying, adding or removing items. Then, the 
responses will be collected and the findings will be analysed and summarised for you to see 
and these will form the basis of the second questionnaire and third questionnaire if 
necessary. You will be asked again to assign predefined scores and to provide feedback for 
the second questionnaire and, if needed, for the third. The decision to conduct a third round 
will depend on the level of consensus reached at the end of the second round. If this is 
greater or equal to 80% we will interpret it as a satisfactory agreement and will consider the 
study completed. 
 
What will happen to the results of this study? 
The results of this study will help to inform further research initiatives concerning patient 
safety in ambulatory dentistry. The findings also have the potential to inform the 
development of future policies for the prevention of never events in dentistry at a national 
and international level. 
The results of this study will be published in a PhD thesis and relevant academic journals, and 
presented at conferences. If necessary, the anonymised data may be reused by the research 
team e.g. if a more in-depth and contextualised approach requires further analysis.  
No individual participant will be identifiable in any of the published material.  
 
Who is organizing and funding the research? 
This research is part of a larger PhD project hosted by The University of Edinburgh in 
Scotland and in collaboration with the Primary Care Patient Safety (PISA) Research Group, 
Cardiff University in Wales. 
 
The Delphi study will be conducted by Eduardo Ensaldo Carrasco, who is being funded by 
the Mexican National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT) and Mexico's 
Ministry of Education (SEP). 
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Has this study undergone ethical review? 
Yes. This study has been granted ethical approval by the Ethics Review Group at the Centre 
for Population Health Sciences, University of Edinburgh.  
 
What can I do if I have a complaint about the study? 
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please raise them with a member of 
the research team (all contact details are given below). If you feel that you need to make a 
formal complaint, please get in touch with Professor David Weller. Centre for Population 
Health Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Medical School, Teviot Place, Edinburgh, EH8 
9AG. Tel: 0131 650 2807. Fax: (0131) 650 9519; email: David.Weller@ed.ac.uk 
 
Who do I contact for further information? 
For further information about this study please contact either: 
PhD student: Eduardo Ensaldo Carrasco, Usher Institute of Population Health Sciences and 
Informatics, The University of Edinburgh, Medical School, Teviot Place, Edinburgh, EH8 
9AG. email: E.Ensaldo-Carrasco@ed.ac.uk 
Kathrin Cresswell, Usher Institute of Population Health Sciences and Informatics, The 
University of Edinburgh, Medical School, Teviot Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9AG. Tel: (0131) 
516 7982; email: Kathrin.Beyer@ed.ac.uk 
Andrew Carson Stevens, Primary and Emergency Care Research (PRIME) Centre, Cardiff 
University, Wales; email: andypcs@gmail.com 
Raman Bedi.  King’s College London Dental Institute at Guy’s, King’s College and St 
Thomas’s Hospitals, Division of Population and Patient Health, King’s College London, 
United Kingdom; email: raman.bedi@kcl.ac.uk 
Aziz Sheikh, Usher Institute of Population Health Sciences and Informatics, The University 
of Edinburgh, Medical School, Teviot Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9AG; Tel: 0131 651 4151; 
email: Aziz.Sheikh@ed.ac.uk 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and for considering this request. 
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Appendix 19. Delphi study consent form 
Evidence-based priority setting for patient safety research on never events in 
ambulatory dental care: Delphi study 
QUESTIONNAIRE CONSENT FORM 
Thank you for reading the information sheet about the Delphi study. If you are happy to 
participate, then please complete and sign the form below. Please initial the box alongside 
each statement to confirm that each statement is true for you.  
 Initials 
I have read the information sheet and asked any questions I want, which were answered 
to my satisfaction (Please note that the information sheet gives the names of people you 
can contact to discuss the study) 
 
I have been informed of the objectives of the study, my role within it, and the tasks I am 
expected to undertake 
 
I understand that I will be participating in a study to refine an expert consensus -based 
list of ‘never events’ in ambulatory dentistry the research team has previously developed 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time and without giving a 
reason for withdrawing 
 
I have been reassured that my anonymity as a participant will be maintained   
I have been provided with the contact details of the researcher and  have details of the 
complaints procedure that I can use if I wish to 
 
I agree for the anonymised data to be reused by the research team e.g. if a more in -depth 
and contextualised approach requires further analysis  
 
I agree to participate in the study  
 
Name of participant (capitals): …….……. 
Signed:   …………………………………………….…   Date:   ……………….. 
I would like to receive a summary of the work (expected by November 2016). Please send 
this to the following email address: ____________________________________ 
Please return to:  
Eduardo Ensaldo Carrasco, Usher Institute Population Health Sciences and Informatics, The 
University of Edinburgh, Medical School, Teviot Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9AG. email: 
E.Ensaldo-Carrasco@ed.ac.uk 
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Appendix 20. First round questionnaire 
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Appendices section  180 
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Appendix 21. Second questionnaire 
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Appendix 22. Delphi study participant’s feedback 
summary – Round 2 
Evidence-based priority setting for patient safety research on never events in 
ambulatory dental care: a Delphi study 
Dear (Expert’s name), 
We are grateful for your participation and useful feedback to the second round of this Delphi study. The 
responses and feedback received in the first round, provided the basis for refining the list of candidate 
`never events´ (NEs) that were reviewed and scored in the second questionnaire.  
We are happy to inform you that we have reached consensus in 24 out of the 43 candidate NEs. 
Therefore, a third round of questionnaires will not be needed. Below is a summary of the received 
responses from all the participants compared to your responses. A summary is also included with the 
overall feedback we received. Thank you for providing your time to help us with our research.  
Overall overview of the responses  
A total of 32 experts were invited to participate in the second round. Out of these, 29 filled the second 
questionnaire. After having analysed your responses and feedback we developed a summary of the 
responses, expressed in medians, and the level agreement between the participants in this study (see 
Table 1). We estimated your median response considering the three responses given in every 
candidate NE - that the event is preventable; that it is serious; and finally, that it  should be classified 
as a ‘never event.’ Any unanswered field was considered as “no opinion.” All the candidate ‘never 
events’ (NEs) obtained overall median scores equal or greater to 3 corresponding to the responses “no 
opinion” = 3, “agree” = 4 and “strongly agree” = 5. 
 








… routine assessment    
Failure to implement oral cancer screening as part 
of the routine assessments  
5 89.7A 
5 
Failure to refer for oral cancer assessment after 









   
… pre-operative stage    
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Failure to check patient´s identity before 
implementing a procedure 
5 93.1A 
4 
Treatment provided to the wrong patient 5 96.6A 4 
Failure to prescribe antibiotic prophylaxis before 
treating patients at risk of developing endocarditis  
4 79.3 
2 
Surgical or complex procedure carried out without 
the voluntary and signed informed consent 
4 79.3 
5 
Failure to take pre-operative radiographs prior 
invasive or surgical procedures  
4 69.0 
4 
Failure to sterilise re-usable instruments  5 89.7A 5 
… intra-operative stage    
Use of non-sterilised re-useable instruments  5 89.7A 5 
Use of non-disinfected equipment 5 82.8A 3 
Re-use of disposable items  5 86.2A 5 
Patient’s eye injured due to the omission of using 
appropriate eye protection 
5 89.7A 
5 
Re-use of damaged endodontic files  5 86.2A 5 




Use of dental material in a patient with known 
history of allergy to the dental material used 
5 89.7A 
5 
Injection of wrong anaesthetic solution 5 86.2A 3 
Treatment performed to a patient with a previously 
known untreated medical condition that can 
potentially be ex acerbated by the dental treatment 
5 75.9 
1 
Ingestion (swallowing) of foreign objects  4 65.5 3 
Aspiration (inhalation) of foreign objects  5 86.2A 5 
Wrong tooth extracted 5 96.6A 5 
Tooth extraction in a patient that received 
radiotherapy in the jaw or maxilla 
4 65.5 
3 
Extraction in a patient with a non-medically 
controlled bleeding disorder 
5 79.3 
3 




Wrong tooth treated (excluding extraction) 4 75.9 4 
Thermal injury to the pulp for not using irrigation 
during cavity/crown preparation 
4 75.9 
4 
Thermal injury to the soft tissues during root canal 
obturation with guttapercha 
4 69.0 
3 
Chemical injury by dental materials  4 65.5 3 
Severe apical tooth resorption due to applying 
heavy forces during orthodontic treatment 
4 79.3 
3 
Appendices section  190 








Perforation of the maxillary sinus  4 62.1 2 
Perforation of the tooth during root canal treatment 4 58.6 3 
Nerve damage due to errors in treatment plan 4 79.3 3 
Intravascular injection of local anaesthetic 4 62.1 2 
Acrylic set inside the mouth 3 48.3 3 








Injection of sodium hypochlorite into surrounding 
structures during root canal treatment/irrigation 
5 89.7A 
4 
Overdose of sedatives  5 75.9 3 
Needle stick injuries  4 75.9 3 
 
   
… post-operative stage    
Retained foreign objects after surgical procedures 
(excluding root canal procedures) 
5 89.7A 
5 




Prescription of a drug to a patient with a known 
allergy to the drug 
5 93.1A 
5 
Prescription of teratogenic drug to patients known 
to be pregnant 
5 93.1A 
5 
*(agree + strongly agree) 
**expressed as the median calculated from your three responses in every candidate never event 
Aagreement reached 
 
What do the results shown in Table 1 mean? 
The results displayed in Table 1 show that consensus was achieved in 24 out of the 43 candidate NEs. 
To bring more clarity, we have further displayed the distribution of scores assigned for the candidate 
NEs during the routine assessment stage and preoperative staged (Figure 1), the intraoperative stage 
(Figure 2) and postoperative stage (Figure 3).  
 





0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Failure to implement oral cancer screening as part of
the routine assessments
Fai lure to refer for oral cancer assessment after 
patient’s lesion do not heal after two weeks of 
receiving treatment
Failure to register patient's history of allergies to
medication
Scores for candidate never events during the routine 
assesment stage
Strongly disagree Disagree No opinion Agree Strongly agree
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Failure to check patient´s identity before
implementing a procedure
Treatment provided to the wrong patient
Failure to prescribe antibiotic prophylaxis before
treating patients at risk of developing endocarditis
Surgical or complex procedure carried out without
the voluntary and signed informed consent
Failure to take pre-operative radiographs prior
invasive or surgical procedures
Failure to sterilise re-usable instruments
Scores for candidate never events during the pre-
operative stage
Strongly disagree Disagree No opinion Agree Strongly agree
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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Use of non-sterilised re-useable instruments
Use of non-disinfected equipment
Re-use of disposable items
Patient’s eye injured due to the omission of using appropriate 
eye protection
Re-use of damaged endodontic files
Administration of unlabelled cartridge of local anaesthetics
Use of dental material in a patient with known history of
allergy to the dental material used
Injection of wrong anaesthetic solution
Treatment performed to a patient with a previously known
untreated medical condition that can potentially be ex…
Ingestion (swallowing) of foreign objects
Aspiration (inhalation) of foreign objects
Wrong tooth extracted
Tooth extraction in a patient that received radiotherapy in the
jaw or maxilla
Extraction in a patient with a non-medically controlled
bleeding disorder
Tooth extraction in a patient treated with bisphosphonates
Wrong tooth treated (excluding extraction)
Thermal injury to the pulp for not using irrigation during
cavity/crown preparation
Thermal injury to the soft tissues during root canal obturation
with guttapercha
Chemical injury by dental materials
Severe apical tooth resorption due to applying heavy forces
during orthodontic treatment
Perforation of the maxillary sinus
Perforation of the tooth during root canal treatment
Nerve damage due to errors in treatment plan
Intravascular injection of local anaesthetic
Acrylic set inside the mouth
Jaw fracture during implant placement due to poor treatment
plan
Jaw fracture during implant placement due to its incorrect
placement
Injection of sodium hypochlorite into surrounding structures
during root canal treatment/irrigation
Overdose of sedatives
Needle stick injuries
Scores for candidate never events during the intra-operative stage
Strongly disagree Disagree No opinion Agree Strongly agree





For the refined list of candidate NEs were eliminated or rephrased in line to the comments and 
suggestions received in the first questionnaire. We have synthesised these for you to read (see Table 
2). Your individual responses are being kept confidential to the research team. 
Candidate never events during… Summary of comments 
… routine assessment 
 
Failure to implement oral cancer 
screening as part of the routine 
assessments  
The population of patients targeted might be 
considered, particularly in patients with elevated risk 
for developing oral cancer. Patients with less risk, such 
as children, may not be considered for oral cancer 
routine assessments. 
Failure to refer for oral cancer 
assessment after patient’s lesion do not 
heal after two weeks of receiving 
treatment 
There are a variety of lesions and types of treatments 
for them. Any oral cancerous lesion should be treated 
immediately. The time for referring a non-healing 
lesion may vary between two to three weeks. 
Failure to register patient's history of 
allergies to medication 
When filling the medical history, we assume that the 
patient is providing accurate and relevant details about 
allergies. 
  
… pre-operative stage 
 
Failure to check patient´s identity 
before implementing a procedure 
No comments received 
Treatment provided to the wrong 
patient 
No comments received 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Retained foreign objects after surgical
procedures (excluding root canal procedures)
Incorrect medication prescribed to paediatric
patients
Prescription of a drug to a patient with a known
allergy to the drug
Prescription of teratogenic drug to patients
known to be pregnant
Scores for candidate never events during the post-
operative stage
Strongly disagree Disagree No opinion Agree Strongly agree
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Failure to prescribe antibiotic 
prophylaxis before treating patients at 
risk of developing endocarditis  
Participants report that current recommendations or 
guidelines vary between countries. In some countries, 
the prescription of antibiotic prophylaxis before 
treating patients at risk of developing endocarditis may 
not be compulsory and may be up to the dentist to 
decide.  
 
Surgical or complex procedure carried 
out without the voluntary and signed 
informed consent 
Dentists need to make sure patients are well informed 
about the treatment and the potential risks. In the case 
of emergencies or when a patient cannot communicate, 
dentists need to obtain the informed consent of a 
parent, guardian or relative. Some of these events may 
occur when dentists encounter life-threatening 
emergencies. 
Failure to take pre-operative 
radiographs prior invasive or surgical 
procedures  
Equipment may not be available in some countries´ 
dental practice. On the one hand, dentists may no take 
pre-operative radiographs for non-invasive or non-
surgical procedures. In some other instances, patients 
may not allow radiographs to be taken. 
Failure to sterilise re-usable 
instruments  
No comments received 
  
… intra-operative stage 
 
Use of non-sterilised re-useable 
instruments  
These instruments can be subjected to high-level 
disinfection as an alternative. However, some 
participants commented that a mixing spatula might not 
be necessarily sterilised before using it in another 
patient. Also, participants in some countries report that, 
instead of sterilization, high-speed handpiece 
disinfection is still a common procedure. A similar 
approach is common for re-using irrigation syringes 
during root canal treatment. 
Use of non-disinfected equipment It depends on the type of equipment. Dental equipment 
that has no direct contact with patients may not be 
necessary to be disinfected. 
Re-use of disposable items  It depends on the type of item re-used. For instance, 
disposable spatulas for mixing cement can be re-used 
after being subjected to high-level disinfection. 
Patient’s eye injured due to the 
omission of using appropriate eye 
protection 
No comments received 
Re-use of damaged endodontic files  No comments received 
Administration of unlabelled cartridge 
of local anaesthetics  
No comments received 
Use of dental material in a patient 
with known history of allergy to the 
dental material used 
In some cases, patients may not be aware of any history 
of allergies to dental materials. 
Appendices section  195 
Injection of wrong anaesthetic solution No comments received 
Treatment performed to a patient with 
a previously known untreated medical 
condition that can potentially be ex 
acerbated by the dental treatment 
This never event may need further clarification as 
variables such as the type of treatment and/or 
medications administered need to be considered. 
Ingestion (swallowing) of foreign 
objects  
The potential for serious harm because of swallowing 
foreign objects can depend on the size and material 
accidentally ingested. In some cases, these events 
cannot be avoided even if appropriate preventive 
measures are taken. 
Aspiration (inhalation) of foreign 
objects  
In some cases, these events cannot be avoided even if 
appropriate preventive measures are taken 
Wrong tooth extracted A wrongly extracted tooth should be a never event. The 
potential to cause serious harm may depend on the 
tooth extracted (e.g. molar, premolar or canine) and the 
subsequent consequences on the patients’ oral health, 
oral function and/or aesthetics. 
Tooth extraction in a patient that 
received radiotherapy in the jaw or 
maxilla 
Different comments were recorded. First, this 
procedure can be carried out after having a 
comprehensive discussion of the risks and benefits with 
the patient. Secondly, the procedure can be performed 
after appropriate management and consultation with a 
physician.   
 
Extraction in a patient with a non-
medically controlled bleeding disorder 
The procedure can be performed after appropriate 
management and consultation with a physician. 
 
Tooth extraction in a patient treated 
with bisphosphonates  
The procedure can be performed after having 
appropriate management and consultation with a 
physician as bisphosphonates can be administered by 
oral route or intravenous route.  Patients taking oral 
bisphosphonates may have lower risk than the ones 
having it by the intravenous route.  In some instances, 
endodontic treatment may be a better alternative, even 
if the tooth cannot be fully restored. 
Wrong tooth treated (excluding 
extraction) 
This event needs more clarity as there is a variety of 
treatment with varying degrees of potential harm. 
 
Thermal injury to the pulp for not 
using irrigation during cavity/crown 
preparation 
No comments received 
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Thermal injury to the soft tissues 
during root canal obturation with 
guttapercha 
The degree of harm may depend on the extent of the 
injury and the areas of soft tissues involved. 
 
Chemical injury by dental materials  The degree of harm may depend on the type of 
chemical that caused harm. Also, the extent of the 
injury and the areas of soft tissues involved 
 
 
Severe apical tooth resorption due to 
applying heavy forces during 
orthodontic treatment 
No comments received  
Perforation of the maxillary sinus  A more detailed description may be needed. Even with 
appropriate preventive measures, the perforation of the 
maxillary sinus might still happen. Failure to inform 
the patient or to follow up may be more critical. 
 
Perforation of the tooth during root 
canal treatment 
The degree of harm may depend on the size, location, 
management and follow-up. In dental school, it is an 
event challenging for students to prevent. 
Nerve damage due to errors in 
treatment plan 
Nerve damage occurs during the intraoperative stage. It 
may not necessarily be a consequence of flaws when 
developing a treatment plan. 
Intravascular injection of local 
anaesthetic 
This event can be potentially serious in a patient with 
pre-existing medical conditions. 
Acrylic set inside the mouth This item is not clear 
Jaw fracture during implant 
placement due to poor treatment plan 
No comments received 
 
Jaw fracture during implant 
placement due to its incorrect 
placement 
No comments received 
 
Injection of sodium hypochlorite into 
surrounding structures during root 
canal treatment/irrigation 
This event can be prevented if appropriate measures 
are taken. Other variables, such as the morphology of 




Overdose of sedatives  This event can still happen even if appropriate 
preventive measures are taken. In some countries, 
patients can get access to medications without a 
medical prescription. Failure to identify signs and 
symptoms of potential overdose is also critical.  
 
Needle stick injuries  Failure to conduct the appropriate steps during the 
administration of local anaesthetic would be better. 
  
… post-operative stage 
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Retained foreign objects after surgical 
procedures (excluding root canal 
procedures) 
No comments received 
Incorrect medication prescribed to 
paediatric patients  
The potential to cause harm varies. However, this event 
can be expanded to all patients instead of paediatric 
patients. Also, the erroneous dose is inappropriate. 
 
Prescription of a drug to a patient 
with a known allergy to the drug 
No comments received 
Prescription of teratogenic drug to 
patients known to be pregnant 
A classification system for assessing the degree of 
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Appendix 23. Delphi study participant’s feedback 
summary – Round 1 
Evidence-based priority setting for patient safety research on never events in 
ambulatory dental care: a Delphi study 
Dear (Expert’s name), 
Thank you for your participation and very helpful feedback to the first round of this Delphi study. Below 
is a summary of the received responses of the other participants compared to your own responses. You 
will also see a summary of the feedback we received. Please use this information to score your answers 
again in the second round. Thank you for giving your time to help us with our research. Your 
participation for the second round is very important to ensuring a valid result, and we look forward to 
receive your answers and feedback.  
Overall overview of the responses  
A total of 41 experts were invited to participate in the study. Out of these, 32 agreed after having 
provided their informed consent and filled the first questionnaire. After having analysed your 
responses and feedback we developed a summary of the responses, expressed in median s, and the 
level agreement between the participants in this study (see Table 1). We estimated your median 
response taking into account the three responses given in every candidate ´never event´ - that the event 
is preventable; that it is serious; and finally that it should be classified as a ‘never event.’ Any 
unanswered field was considered as “no opinion.” All the candidate ‘never events’ (NEs) obtained 
overall median scores equal or greater to 3 corresponding to the responses “no opinion” = 3, “agree” = 
4 and “strongly agree” = 5. 
Table 1. Overall 'expert' median scores for all potential never events 





…routine assessment       
Missed diagnosis of oral cancer 4 59.4  5 
Delayed referral of patient with 
clinical suspicion of cancer 
5 68.8  5 
      
 
…pre-operative stage       
Mistaken patient identity 5 71.9  5 
Failure to prescribe antibiotic 
prophylaxis before treating root canal 
infections  
3 37.5  1 
Procedure carried out without the 
voluntary and signed informed 
consent  
4 53.2  5 
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…intra-operative stage       
Use of non-sterile instruments or 
equipment 
5 75.0  5 
Use of dental material in a patient 
with known history of allergy to the 
dental material used 
5 78.1  5 
Use of outdated material 3.5 50.0  4 
Administration of unlabeled cartridge 
of local anesthetics  
5 68.8  5 
Injection of wrong anesthetic solution 5 75.0  5 
Treatment performed to a patient with 
a previously known untreated medical 
condition that can potentially be ex 
acerbated by the dental treatment 
4.5 68.8  5 
Ingestion or aspiration of foreign 
objects  
4 68.8  5 
Wrong tooth treated or extracted 5 75.0  5 
Severe apical tooth resorption due to 
orthodontic treatment 
3 46.9  4 
Nerve damage due to errors in 
treatment plan 
4 65.6  5 
Intravascular injection of local 
anesthetic 
3 43.8  5 
Acrylic set inside the mouth 4 53.1  5 
Jaw fracture due to implant placement 4 68.7  5 
Accidental injection of sodium 
hypochlorite 
5 68.7  5 
Overdose of sedatives  4 59.4  5 
Needle stick injuries  4 68.8  5 
        
…post-operative stage       
Retained foreign objects after surgical 
procedures  
5 65.6  5 
Prescription of a drug to a patient 
with a known allergy to the drug 
5 78.1  5 
Prescription of teratogenic drug to 
patients known to be pregnant 
5 75.0  5 
*(agree + strongly agree) 
**expressed as the median calculated from your three responses in every candidate never 
event 
 
What do the results shown in Table 1 mean? 
The results displayed in Table 1 show that, no agreement was reached in the first round in this Delphi 
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study. In order to bring more clarity, we have further displayed the distribution of scores assigned for 
the candidate NEs at the routine assessment and preoperative staged (Figure 1), the intraoperative 
stage (Figure 2) and postoperative stage (Figure 3).  
As shown in these, a reason for not reaching a consensus is due to the number of scores under the “no 
opinion” label. This was later understood after analysing your feedback as we were able to identify that 
some of candidates NEs that needed more clarity and further refinement. Therefore, your responses and 
feedback have provided the basis for refining the list of candidate NEs for you to review and score in 
the second questionnaire.  
 
 
Figure 1. Score distribution for potential never events in the routine assessment and pre-operative 
stages  
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Missed diagnosis of oral cancer
Delayed referral of patient with
clinical suspicion of cancer
Mistaken patient identity
Failure to prescribe antibiotic
prophylaxis before treating root canal
infections
Procedure carried out without the
voluntary and signed informed
consent
Scores for potential never events in the routine 
assessment and pre-operative stages
Strongly disagree Disagree No opinion Agree Strongly agree
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Figure 2. Score distribution for potential never events in the intraoperative stage  
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Use of non-sterile instruments or equipment
Use of dental material in a patient with known
history of allergy to the dental material used
Use of outdated material
Administration of unlabelled cartridge of local
anaesthetics
Injection of wrong anaesthetic solution
Treatment performed to a patient with a previously
known untreated medical condition that can
potentially be ex acerbated by the dental treatment
Ingestion or aspiration of foreign objects
Wrong tooth treated or extracted
Severe apical tooth resorption due to orthodontic
treatment
Nerve damage due to errors in treatment plan
Intravascular injection of local anaesthetic
Acrylic set inside the mouth
Jaw fracture due to implant placement
Accidental injection of sodium hypochlorite
Overdose of sedatives
Needle stick injuries
Scores for potential never events in the intra-operative stage 
Strongly disagree Disagree No opinion Agree Strongly agree
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Figure 3. Score distribution for potential never events in the post-operative stage  
Feedback received. For the second round, candidate NEs were eliminated or rephrased in line to 
the comments and suggestions received in the first questionnaire. We have synthesised these for you 
to read and consider for scoring the candidate NEs contained in the second questionnaire (see Table 
2). Your individual responses are being kept confidential to the research team. 
Table 2. Summary of the feedback received in the first questionnaire 
Stage Summary of comments 
Routine assessment 
 
Missed diagnosis of oral 
cancer 
Oral cancer diagnosis, particularly in early stages, can be 
challenging task as the potentially cancerous lesions can be 
misdiagnosed as other benign and more common lesions of the 
oral mucosa. Moreover, patients with a greater risk for 
developing oral cancer are less likely to attend dental practices 
for routine check-ups 
Delayed referral of 
patient with clinical 
suspicion of cancer 
In order to consider it as a never event, the nature of the signs 
and symptoms need to be considered. Examples include failure 
to refer after ulcers do not heal after receiving treatment 
 
Preoperative stage  
Mistaken patient 
identity 
It would be better to classify it as “Treatment provided to the 
wrong patient” 
Failure to prescribe 
antibiotic prophylaxis 
before treating root 
canal infections  
Antibiotic prophylaxis may not be always necessary and may 
also not be a standardised practice among different countries. It 
also depends of the purpose of the antibiotic prophylaxis itself. 
In some cases, it is recommended to prevent local infection, but 
also it can be recommended in medically compromised. For 
example, in patients at risk of developing endocarditis. 
Procedure carried out 
without the voluntary 
and signed informed 
consent 
It depends of the procedure as for minor procedures, which do 
not involve painful and/or invasive procedures, the verbal 
consent mat be enough. Moreover, we need to also assume that 
the patient should have the capacity to provide consent. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Retained foreign objects after surgical procedures
Prescription of a drug to a patient with a known
allergy to the drug
Prescription of teratogenic drug to patients known
to be pregnant
Scores for potential never events in the postoperative stage
Strongly disagree Disagree No opinion Agree Strongly agree
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Stage Summary of comments 
 
Intra-operative stage  
Use of non-sterile 
instruments or 
equipment 
A difference needs to be considered between sterile instruments 
and sterile equipment. Dental instruments can be either sterilised 
or subjected to high-level disinfection. This also leads to the way 
in which sterile and non-sterile instruments is stored for future 
use. 
Use of dental material in 
a patient with known 
history of allergy to the 
dental material used 
Registering any history of allergy is a mandatory task during 
medical history taking 
Use of outdated material 
It appears that outdates material can be used. As long as there is 
no apparent high risk for using outdate dental material, it can still 
be used. 
Administration of 
unlabelled cartridge of 
local anaesthetics  
The labels for local anaesthesia cartridges can vary from 
countries and brand. Some of them can have stamps while other 
have the contents stamped directly on the glass. 
Injection of wrong 
anaesthetic solution 
It depends of the patient 
Treatment performed to 
a patient with a 
previously known 
untreated medical 
condition that can 
potentially be ex 
acerbated by the dental 
treatment 
It depends of the medical condition. Also, emergency dental 
treatments should be considered to make a distinction between 
routine treatment and emergency treatments. 
Ingestion or aspiration 
of foreign objects  
A distinction needs to be made between ingestion as aspiration. 
Ingestion can be potentially serious, however, aspiration is 
inevitably a serious event, It is a risk as most of the treatments 
are performed in the patients’ mouth. 
Wrong tooth treated or 
extracted 
A distinction needs to be made between “extraction” and 
“treated.” When a wrong tooth is extracted, the outcome is 
irreversible. However, for minor procedures, the outcome may 
not be irreversible. 
Severe apical tooth 
resorption due to 
orthodontic treatment 
The use of heavy forces can result in severe apical resorption, 
however, also minor forces can make it happen. 
Nerve damage due to 
errors in treatment plan 
It should be modified to “permanent nerve damage due to errors 
in treatment plan” Nerve damage can also happen due to poor 
anaesthetic administration techniques. 
Intravascular injection 
of local anaesthetic 
This event, when it happens, usually has a temporary effect. 
Moreover, instruments that can aid the dentist to prevent it such 
as aspirating syringes, may not be available in all countries. 
Also, this event is potentially difficult to prevent in students. 
Acrylic set inside the 
mouth 
This event need further clarification. Also, in some countries, 
this technique is no further used 
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Stage Summary of comments 
Jaw fracture due to 
implant placement 
Jaw fracture is a risk related to implant placement. However, it 
would not occur if the treatment planning was poor or flaws 
during its placement occurred. 
Accidental injection of 
sodium hypochlorite 
This event needs rewording as it does not clarify if the sodium 
hypochlorite makes contact with the soft tissues during irrigation 
of root canals. 
Overdose of sedatives  
The decision to consider this event as a never event depends on 
the extent of the overdose. Also, the consequences or degree of 
resulting harm need to be considered. 
Needle stick injuries  No comments received 
 
Intra-operative stage  
Retained foreign objects 
after surgical 
procedures  
In order to consider it as a NE, particularly in it seriousness and 
preventability, it depends on the type of retained object. For 
instance, endodontic files that break during root canal treatments 
can be left inside the tooth without apparent complications. 
Moreover, other materials like root canal sealing cements can be 
extruded beyond the apex and thus, retained. 
Prescription of a drug to 
a patient with a known 
allergy to the drug 
No comments received 
Prescription of 
teratogenic drug to 
patients known to be 
pregnant 
No comments received 
 
 
